Element Map and Affirmative-Defense Negation Map

PREPARED BY DOCKET ENTRY

ELEMENT MAP

Count I (Spacelabs) — Sex discrimination, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff	Spacelabs: ¶¶ 19–28, 101, 126.	42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: *Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc.*, 163 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1998) (post-trial; control over the adverse decision); *McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home*, 834 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment; four factors); *Peppers v. Cobb County*, 835 F.3d 1289, 1297–1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment; governmental entities; its governmental presumption does not govern private companies).	
Protected trait (sex)	¶¶ 13, 102, 127, 164, 189.	Statutory text.	None.
Adverse action (termination)	¶¶ 89–90, 105, 130, 167, 192. The PIP is pleaded as sequence and motive, not as a separately challenged action (¶ 98).	Statutory text ("to discharge"). *Muldrow v. City of St. Louis*, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) is not relied on because the PIP is not separately challenged.	

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Facts making sex causation plausible	Facts: ¶¶ 40–43, 45–46, 48–49, 55. In count: ¶¶ 103–104, 106; 128–129, 131; 165–166, 168; 190–191, 193. Pleaded as "because of" and as a motivating factor (¶¶ 106, 131, 168, 193).	*Surtain*, 789 F.3d at 1246; *Swierkiewicz*, 534 U.S. at 511–14; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (motivating factor).	
Harm	¶¶ 91–92, 107, 133, 169, 195.	42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5).	

Count II (Spacelabs) — Age discrimination, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff; 20-employee threshold	Spacelabs: ¶¶ 19–28, 109, 144. Threshold: ¶¶ 28, 32–33.	29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: as in the sex-discrimination map.	
Age 40 or over	¶¶ 14, 110, 145, 172, 207.	29 U.S.C. § 631(a).	None.
Adverse action (termination)	¶¶ 89–90, 113, 148, 175, 210.	Statutory text ("to discharge").	
Facts making age the but-for cause plausible	Facts: ¶¶ 40, 50–53, 55. In count: ¶¶ 110–112, 114–115; 145–147, 149–150; 172–174, 176–177; 207–209, 211–212. But-for causation in plain words in the ADEA counts (¶¶ 150, 212).	*Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (jury instruction; ADEA requires but-for causation).	

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Harm	¶ 91. ADEA counts: economic loss only (¶¶ 152, 214). FCRA counts: economic loss and emotional distress (¶¶ 116, 178).	29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5).	

Count III (Spacelabs) — Retaliation, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff	Spacelabs: ¶¶ 118, 135, 154.	As in the discrimination maps.	
Protected activity (opposition)	April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46).	Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). *Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc.*, 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint.	
Materially adverse action	¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220.	*Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White*, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard.	None.

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer and decisionmaker knowledge	Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86.	Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated.	
Causal connection	¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221).	*Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar*, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); *Thomas*, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient).	None.
Harm	¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only).	As in the discrimination maps.	

Count IV (Spacelabs) — Sex discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff	Spacelabs: ¶¶ 19–28, 101, 126.	42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: *Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc.*, 163 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1998) (post-trial; control over the adverse decision); *McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home*, 834 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment; four factors); *Peppers v. Cobb County*, 835 F.3d 1289, 1297–1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment; governmental entities; its governmental presumption does not govern private companies).	
Protected trait (sex)	¶¶ 13, 102, 127, 164, 189.	Statutory text.	None.
Adverse action (termination)	¶¶ 89–90, 105, 130, 167, 192. The PIP is pleaded as sequence and motive, not as a separately challenged action (¶ 98).	Statutory text ("to discharge"). *Muldrow v. City of St. Louis*, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) is not relied on because the PIP is not separately challenged.	
Facts making sex causation plausible	Facts: ¶¶ 40–43, 45–46, 48–49, 55. In count: ¶¶ 103–104, 106; 128–129, 131; 165–166, 168; 190–191, 193. Pleaded as "because of" and as a motivating factor (¶¶ 106, 131, 168, 193).	*Surtain*, 789 F.3d at 1246; *Swierkiewicz*, 534 U.S. at 511–14; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (motivating factor).	

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Harm	¶¶ 91–92, 107, 133, 169, 195.	42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5).	
Malice or reckless indifference (Title VII punitive damages; Counts IV, XI)	¶¶ 132, 194, pleaded with the basis facts: complaint to human resources, no investigation, PIP kept in effect, termination.	42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).	

Count V (Spacelabs) — Retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff	Spacelabs: ¶¶ 118, 135, 154.	As in the discrimination maps.	
Protected activity (opposition)	April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46).	Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). *Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc.*, 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint.	
Materially adverse action	¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220.	*Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White*, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard.	None.

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer and decisionmaker knowledge	Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86.	Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated.	
Causal connection	¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221).	*Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar*, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); *Thomas*, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient).	None.
Enhanced damages	Title VII malice or reckless indifference (Counts V, XII): ¶¶ 141, 203. ADEA willfulness (Counts VII, XIV): ¶¶ 160, 222.	42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).	
Harm	¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only).	As in the discrimination maps.	

Count VI (Spacelabs) — Age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (ADEA)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff; 20-employee threshold	Spacelabs: ¶¶ 19–28, 109, 144. Threshold: ¶¶ 28, 32–33.	29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: as in the sex-discrimination map.	
Age 40 or over	¶¶ 14, 110, 145, 172, 207.	29 U.S.C. § 631(a).	None.
Adverse action (termination)	¶¶ 89–90, 113, 148, 175, 210.	Statutory text ("to discharge").	
Facts making age the but-for cause plausible	Facts: ¶¶ 40, 50–53, 55. In count: ¶¶ 110–112, 114–115; 145–147, 149–150; 172–174, 176–177; 207–209, 211–212. But-for causation in plain words in the ADEA counts (¶¶ 150, 212).	*Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (jury instruction; ADEA requires but-for causation).	
Willfulness (ADEA liquidated damages; Counts VI, XIII)	¶¶ 151, 213, pleaded with the basis facts.	29 U.S.C. § 626(b) ("liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations").	
Harm	¶ 91. ADEA counts: economic loss only (¶¶ 152, 214). FCRA counts: economic loss and emotional distress (¶¶ 116, 178).	29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5).	

Count VII (Spacelabs) — Retaliation, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff	Spacelabs: ¶¶ 118, 135, 154.	As in the discrimination maps.	
Protected activity (opposition)	April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46).	Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). *Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc.*, 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint.	
Materially adverse action	¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220.	*Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White*, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard.	None.
Employer and decisionmaker knowledge	Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86.	Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated.	

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Causal connection	¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221).	*Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar*, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); *Thomas*, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient).	None.
Enhanced damages	Title VII malice or reckless indifference (Counts V, XII): ¶¶ 141, 203. ADEA willfulness (Counts VII, XIV): ¶¶ 160, 222.	42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).	
Harm	¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only).	As in the discrimination maps.	

Count VIII (OSI) — Sex discrimination, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff	OSI: ¶¶ 29–34, 163, 188.	42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: *Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc.*, 163 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1998) (post-trial; control over the adverse decision); *McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home*, 834 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment; four factors); *Peppers v. Cobb County*, 835 F.3d 1289, 1297–1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment; governmental entities; its governmental presumption does not govern private companies).	
Protected trait (sex)	¶¶ 13, 102, 127, 164, 189.	Statutory text.	None.
Adverse action (termination)	¶¶ 89–90, 105, 130, 167, 192. The PIP is pleaded as sequence and motive, not as a separately challenged action (¶ 98).	Statutory text ("to discharge"). *Muldrow v. City of St. Louis*, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) is not relied on because the PIP is not separately challenged.	

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Facts making sex causation plausible	Facts: ¶¶ 40–43, 45–46, 48–49, 55. In count: ¶¶ 103–104, 106; 128–129, 131; 165–166, 168; 190–191, 193. Pleaded as "because of" and as a motivating factor (¶¶ 106, 131, 168, 193).	*Surtain*, 789 F.3d at 1246; *Swierkiewicz*, 534 U.S. at 511–14; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (motivating factor).	
Harm	¶¶ 91–92, 107, 133, 169, 195.	42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5).	

Count IX (OSI) — Age discrimination, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff; 20-employee threshold	OSI: ¶¶ 29–34, 171, 206. Threshold: ¶¶ 28, 32–33.	29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: as in the sex-discrimination map.	
Age 40 or over	¶¶ 14, 110, 145, 172, 207.	29 U.S.C. § 631(a).	None.
Adverse action (termination)	¶¶ 89–90, 113, 148, 175, 210.	Statutory text ("to discharge").	
Facts making age the but-for cause plausible	Facts: ¶¶ 40, 50–53, 55. In count: ¶¶ 110–112, 114–115; 145–147, 149–150; 172–174, 176–177; 207–209, 211–212. But-for causation in plain words in the ADEA counts (¶¶ 150, 212).	*Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (jury instruction; ADEA requires but-for causation).	

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Harm	¶ 91. ADEA counts: economic loss only (¶¶ 152, 214). FCRA counts: economic loss and emotional distress (¶¶ 116, 178).	29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5).	

Count X (OSI) — Retaliation, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff	OSI: ¶¶ 180, 197, 216.	As in the discrimination maps.	
Protected activity (opposition)	April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46).	Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). *Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc.*, 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint.	
Materially adverse action	¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220.	*Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White*, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard.	None.

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer and decisionmaker knowledge	Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86.	Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated.	
Causal connection	¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221).	*Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar*, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); *Thomas*, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient).	None.
Harm	¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only).	As in the discrimination maps.	

Count XI (OSI) — Sex discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff	OSI: ¶¶ 29–34, 163, 188.	42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: *Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc.*, 163 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1998) (post-trial; control over the adverse decision); *McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home*, 834 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment; four factors); *Peppers v. Cobb County*, 835 F.3d 1289, 1297–1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment; governmental entities; its governmental presumption does not govern private companies).	
Protected trait (sex)	¶¶ 13, 102, 127, 164, 189.	Statutory text.	None.
Adverse action (termination)	¶¶ 89–90, 105, 130, 167, 192. The PIP is pleaded as sequence and motive, not as a separately challenged action (¶ 98).	Statutory text ("to discharge"). *Muldrow v. City of St. Louis*, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) is not relied on because the PIP is not separately challenged.	
Facts making sex causation plausible	Facts: ¶¶ 40–43, 45–46, 48–49, 55. In count: ¶¶ 103–104, 106; 128–129, 131; 165–166, 168; 190–191, 193. Pleaded as "because of" and as a motivating factor (¶¶ 106, 131, 168, 193).	*Surtain*, 789 F.3d at 1246; *Swierkiewicz*, 534 U.S. at 511–14; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (motivating factor).	

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Harm	¶¶ 91–92, 107, 133, 169, 195.	42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5).	
Malice or reckless indifference (Title VII punitive damages; Counts IV, XI)	¶¶ 132, 194, pleaded with the basis facts: complaint to human resources, no investigation, PIP kept in effect, termination.	42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1).	

Count XII (OSI) — Retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff	OSI: ¶¶ 180, 197, 216.	As in the discrimination maps.	
Protected activity (opposition)	April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46).	Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). *Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc.*, 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint.	
Materially adverse action	¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220.	*Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White*, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard.	None.

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer and decisionmaker knowledge	Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86.	Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated.	
Causal connection	¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221).	*Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar*, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); *Thomas*, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient).	None.
Enhanced damages	Title VII malice or reckless indifference (Counts V, XII): ¶¶ 141, 203. ADEA willfulness (Counts VII, XIV): ¶¶ 160, 222.	42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).	
Harm	¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only).	As in the discrimination maps.	

Count XIII (OSI) — Age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (ADEA)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff; 20-employee threshold	OSI: ¶¶ 29–34, 171, 206. Threshold: ¶¶ 28, 32–33.	29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: as in the sex-discrimination map.	
Age 40 or over	¶¶ 14, 110, 145, 172, 207.	29 U.S.C. § 631(a).	None.
Adverse action (termination)	¶¶ 89–90, 113, 148, 175, 210.	Statutory text ("to discharge").	
Facts making age the but-for cause plausible	Facts: ¶¶ 40, 50–53, 55. In count: ¶¶ 110–112, 114–115; 145–147, 149–150; 172–174, 176–177; 207–209, 211–212. But-for causation in plain words in the ADEA counts (¶¶ 150, 212).	*Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (jury instruction; ADEA requires but-for causation).	
Willfulness (ADEA liquidated damages; Counts VI, XIII)	¶¶ 151, 213, pleaded with the basis facts.	29 U.S.C. § 626(b) ("liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations").	
Harm	¶ 91. ADEA counts: economic loss only (¶¶ 152, 214). FCRA counts: economic loss and emotional distress (¶¶ 116, 178).	29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5).	

Count XIV (OSI) — Retaliation, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA)

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Employer; employed Plaintiff	OSI: ¶¶ 180, 197, 216.	As in the discrimination maps.	
Protected activity (opposition)	April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46).	Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). *Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc.*, 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint.	
Materially adverse action	¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220.	*Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White*, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard.	None.
Employer and decisionmaker knowledge	Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86.	Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated.	

ELEMENT	PARAGRAPHS	AUTHORITY	GAP OR NOTE
Causal connection	¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221).	*Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar*, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); *Thomas*, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient).	None.
Enhanced damages	Title VII malice or reckless indifference (Counts V, XII): ¶¶ 141, 203. ADEA willfulness (Counts VII, XIV): ¶¶ 160, 222.	42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).	
Harm	¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only).	As in the discrimination maps.	

AFFIRMATIVE-DEFENSE NEGATION MAP

ANTICIPATED DEFENSE	COUNTS	FACTS PLEADED AGAINST IT	PARAGRAPHS	STRENGTH
Failure to exhaust: charge did not name OSI, or did not cover age or retaliation		States that the charge named Spacelabs and OSI (¶ 93), the two notices of July 27, 2026 (¶¶ 94–95), the filing of the original complaint on August 27, 2026 within 90 days (¶ 96), and conditions precedent (¶ 97). States no charge date or charge contents, because the charge was not supplied.	¶¶ 93–97.	

ANTICIPATED DEFENSE	COUNTS	FACTS PLEADED AGAINST IT	PARAGRAPHS	STRENGTH
Untimeliness: 300-day charge period; 90-day suit period; 60-day ADEA waiting period		Pleads only the dates the record supplies. The 90-day allegation is from the original complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).	¶¶ 94–97.	
FCRA: no route to a civil action under Fla. Stat. § 760.11		The route is not pleaded because the Florida Commission on Human Relations record was not supplied.	¶ 97 (general).	
OSI was not Plaintiff's employer		Pleads 100 percent ownership and the Grindstaff events, and states the single-employer theory once with those facts (¶ 34). Those facts do not by themselves answer the control argument in Doc. 12.	¶¶ 29–34; 163, 171, 180, 188, 197, 206, 216.	
Numerosity (15 or 20 employees)		Pleaded at the ADEA threshold, without calendar-year detail. Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).	¶¶ 27–28, 32–33.	
Legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (performance)		Pleads that no employer questioned Plaintiff's performance before Martin; that Martin's criticism followed Plaintiff's objections each time; that the PIP's statements were not accurate; that Plaintiff asked for an investigation of the "erroneous information"; and that Spacelabs did not investigate.	¶¶ 40, 45–46, 55, 63–67, 69.	
Same-actor inference		Not pleaded. No source identifies who hired Plaintiff.	None.	

ANTICIPATED DEFENSE	COUNTS	FACTS PLEADED AGAINST IT	PARAGRAPHS	STRENGTH
Arbitration		Nothing pleaded concedes an agreement.	None.	
Statute of limitations, beyond exhaustion		No limitations facts are pleaded, by design.	None.	

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