Docket Entry

Recent Docket Entry

Phillip v. The Michaels Organization, LLC: First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

A Marine family alleges MacDill privatized-housing defendants concealed the home's mold history, dismissed reported mold as "dust," cleaned ducts without containment, and painted over hurricane damage, causing physical injuries. Fifteen counts: contract, negligence, statutory habitability, misrepresentation, fraud, FDUTPA. Federal enclave doctrine shapes applicable Florida law.

Court: M.D. Fla.Case: 8:26-cv-02634

Documents

1Court record

Complaint

ECF No. 1 · 09/09/2026 · 44 pp.

2Court record

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint, or in the alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

ECF No. 17 · 10/08/2026 · 19 pp.

3Prepared by Docket Entry

First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

Not filed in the case · 40 pp.

4Prepared by Docket Entry

Element Map and Affirmative-Defense Negation Map

Not filed in the case · 118 rows

40 pp.

View PDF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Staff Sergeant David Phillip serves in the United States Marine Corps. The Marine Corps stationed him at MacDill Air Force Base. He, his wife Carly Phillip, and their three children needed a home. AMC East Communities, LLC leased them one at 8468 Fortress Drive. Before the family moved in, Harbor Bay's Assistant Community Director, Geri Leto, said the house had been "newly renovated" after a hurricane. No one told the family that two military families had lived in that house before them and had reported mold. No one told the family that those earlier occupants had reported neurological symptoms.

2. The family moved in. On or about September 10, 2022, Carly Phillip found mold around the kitchen air vents and the attic access panel. She reported it. A Harbor Bay technician called it "dust." Contractors cleaned the ducts while the family stayed inside. No one set up containment. On December 10, 2022, water came through the kitchen ceiling. A technician blamed "too much water in the tub upstairs." The upstairs bathroom was dry. The technician placed fans and closed the work order. Through 2023 Carly Phillip reported the mold at least four more times. Each time the answer was "dust."

3. On or about November 1, 2023, Carly Phillip lost her vision, collapsed, and had seizures. She was pregnant. Surgeons delivered her son about four weeks early. Imaging found a brain tumor. She had neurosurgery, then radiation, then chemotherapy. She came home to the same vents and the same attic access panel. The mold was still there. The answer was still "dust."

4. Hurricane Milton struck in October 2024. The family came home to roof failure and water in all four bedrooms. Harbor Bay told them the house was "not a priority." Harbor Bay moved them out after two weeks of requests. Six weeks later Harbor Bay said the repairs were done and sent them back. The stains had been painted over. The mold around the attic access panel remained.

5. C.P. now has a diagnosed mold allergy. P.P. and S.P. had one respiratory illness after another. David Phillip's skin conditions worsened and he developed insomnia. Carly Phillip had headaches and brain fog through cancer treatment. Rent was paid for that house every month.

I. PARTIES

6. Plaintiff David Phillip is a Staff Sergeant in the United States Marine Corps. At all times relevant to this Complaint, David Phillip was stationed at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida ("MacDill").

7. David Phillip signed the residential lease for 8468 Fortress Drive, MacDill (the "Residence"). David Phillip resided at the Residence at all times relevant to this Complaint.

8. Plaintiff Carly Phillip is the spouse of David Phillip. Carly Phillip resided at the Residence at all times relevant to this Complaint.

9. Plaintiff C.P. is a minor child of David Phillip and Carly Phillip. C.P. resided at the Residence at all times relevant to this Complaint. C.P. sues through David Phillip and Carly Phillip as next friends.

10. Plaintiff P.P. is a minor child of David Phillip and Carly Phillip. P.P. resided at the Residence at all times relevant to this Complaint. P.P. sues through David Phillip and Carly Phillip as next friends.

11. Plaintiff S.P. is a minor child of David Phillip and Carly Phillip. S.P. resided at the Residence at all times relevant to this Complaint. S.P. sues through David Phillip and Carly Phillip as next friends.

12. Plaintiff R.P. is a minor child of David Phillip and Carly Phillip. R.P. was born in 2023. R.P. resided at the Residence from R.P.'s discharge from the hospital after birth. R.P. sues through David Phillip and Carly Phillip as next friends.

13. Defendant The Michaels Organization, LLC ("Michaels") is a New Jersey limited liability company with its principal place of business at 2 Cooper Street, Camden, New Jersey 08102. Michaels is registered to do business in Florida.

14. Defendant AMC East Communities, LLC ("AMC") is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business at 2 Cooper Street, Camden, New Jersey 08102.

15. Defendant MMS Air Force, LLC ("MMS") is a New Jersey limited liability company with its principal place of business at 2 Cooper Street, Camden, New Jersey 08102. MMS is registered to do business in Florida.

16. "Harbor Bay at MacDill" ("Harbor Bay") is a name under which leasing, management, and maintenance of military housing at MacDill were conducted. Harbor Bay is not registered as a legal entity with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations. Section III identifies the Defendants that acted under the Harbor Bay name.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

17. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

18. The Residence is located within MacDill.

19. On March 29, 1950, the Governor of Florida executed a Deed of Cession ceding to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the land that constitutes MacDill. The Florida Secretary of State recorded the Deed of Cession on April 4, 1950.

20. MacDill is a federal enclave. Plaintiffs are aware of no development since 1950 that has changed that status.

21. The exposure, inspections, maintenance work, and repair work alleged in this Complaint occurred at the Residence, within MacDill. The injuries alleged in this Complaint were sustained at the Residence.

22. Because the acts, omissions, and injuries giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims occurred within a federal enclave, Plaintiffs' claims arise under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

23. This civil action is brought to recover on account of injuries sustained at the Residence. Under 28 U.S.C. § 5001(b), in such an action "the rights of the parties shall be governed by the law of the State in which the place is located."

24. The Lease provides that Florida law applies.

25. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The Residence is in this District. The maintenance work, communications, exposure, and injuries alleged in this Complaint occurred in this District.

26. This Court has personal jurisdiction over AMC under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)1. and 2. AMC leased the Residence, which is in Florida, to David Phillip. AMC received rent for the Residence. AMC's obligations under the Lease were to be performed at the Residence. The breaches and torts alleged against AMC occurred at the Residence.

27. This Court has personal jurisdiction over MMS under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)1. and 2. MMS acted as property manager for housing at MacDill. MMS received maintenance requests, dispatched technicians, engaged contractors, and communicated with Plaintiffs in Florida about the Residence. The torts alleged against MMS occurred at the Residence.

28. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Michaels under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)1. and 2. Michaels is registered to do business in Florida. Michaels holds itself out as providing housing at MacDill. Michaels acquired the assets of the MacDill housing contractor in 2021. On information and belief, employees of Michaels communicated with Plaintiffs in Florida about leasing and maintenance of the Residence. The torts alleged against Michaels occurred at the Residence.

III. THE DEFENDANTS' ROLES AT THE RESIDENCE

29. In November 2007, AMC East, LLC and the United States Air Force entered into a 50-year ground lease to privatize military housing at MacDill (the "Ground Lease").

30. AMC East, LLC and the Air Force entered into an operating agreement that created AMC (the "Operating Agreement").

31. On information and belief, AMC holds the lessee's interest under the Ground Lease.

32. On information and belief, the Lease identifies AMC as "Owner."

33. The Air Force pays Defendants for management and maintenance of MacDill housing. Those payments consist of a monthly base fee and an incentive fee paid upon achieving performance criteria. To obtain the incentive fee, Defendants submit documentation and a statement that they satisfied performance criteria, including objectives related to maintenance work orders and customer satisfaction.

34. In 2021, Michaels acquired the assets of AMC East, LLC and AMC.

35. Michaels, directly or through its subsidiaries or affiliates, assumed the obligations of the MacDill housing contractor, including obligations under the Ground Lease, the Operating Agreement, the property management agreements, and the residential leases.

36. Michaels' public website identifies MacDill as a location at which Michaels provides "[q]uality housing from Coast to Coast."

37. On information and belief, employees of Michaels communicated with residents at MacDill, including the Phillip family, about leasing and maintenance. The e-mail addresses and signature blocks of those employees identified Michaels.

38. MMS acted as property manager for housing at MacDill at all times relevant to this Complaint.

39. On information and belief, the Lease identifies "Harbor Bay at MacDill, through Michaels Management Services, Inc." as Property Manager and Community Manager.

40. On information and belief, the mold addendum to the Lease identifies Harbor Bay as "Landlord/Lessor."

41. In Mullins v. The Michaels Organization, LLC, No. 8:25-cv-02637-SDM-AAS (M.D. Fla.), Doc. 22, MMS appeared individually and as successor in interest to Interstate Realty Management Company, Michaels Management Services, Inc., and Michaels Management Services, LLC, and represented that MMS had assumed the assets and liabilities of those companies.

42. Leasing, inspection, maintenance, repair, and resident communications for the Residence were conducted under the Harbor Bay name.

43. The persons who leased, inspected, maintained, repaired, and communicated with the Phillip family about the Residence under the Harbor Bay name, including Geri Leto, the technicians, the representatives, and the contractors those persons engaged, were employees or agents of MMS or of Michaels Management Services, Inc., whose liabilities MMS assumed. MMS and Michaels Management Services, Inc. are referred to together as the "property manager."

44. In the alternative, on information and belief, those persons were employees or agents of Michaels. In Mullins, AMC represented that Harbor Bay is a "common or trade name" of Michaels and not a distinct legal entity. Employees identified by their e-mail addresses and signature blocks as Michaels employees communicated with MacDill residents about leasing and maintenance.

45. On information and belief, AMC engaged the property manager, under a property management agreement, to perform AMC's obligations under the Lease to inspect, maintain, and repair the Residence, and AMC retained the right to direct that work. The property manager performed those obligations on AMC's behalf.

46. Each act of a Harbor Bay technician, representative, or contractor alleged in this Complaint was performed within the scope of that person's assignment to lease, inspect, maintain, or repair housing at MacDill, including the Residence. The identities of those persons are known to Defendants and are within their possession, custody, or control.

47. Defendants state publicly that they embrace the tenant rights set out in 10 U.S.C. § 2890 and incorporate those protections into their MacDill housing program.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. The Lease

48. Before the Phillip family moved into the Residence, David Phillip signed a residential lease with AMC for the Residence (the "Lease").

49. Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. moved into the Residence with David Phillip and occupied it with him under the Lease. R.P. occupied the Residence with the family after R.P.'s discharge from the hospital.

50. David Phillip's Basic Allowance for Housing ("BAH") was paid to AMC as rent for the Residence. The BAH was David Phillip's entitlement as a service member and was transferred to AMC on his behalf.

51. Under the Lease, AMC undertook to provide and maintain habitable housing and to remedy leaks, moisture, mold, and other conditions in the Residence.

52. On information and belief, the Lease represented that, before move-in, the Residence was in safe, clean, and habitable condition and free of mold, mildew, and signs of water intrusion.

53. The Lease contains warnings about moisture and mold. The Resident Guidelines and Community Handbook instruct residents to report signs of leaks, moisture, or mold immediately.

B. Earlier Occupants Had Reported Mold in the Residence

54. Before the Phillip family moved in, two military families had occupied the Residence.

55. Each of those families reported mold contamination while living in the Residence.

56. Each of those families reported neurological symptoms while living in the Residence.

57. The Residence had a history of repeated mold complaints before the Phillip family moved in.

58. Through their roles in leasing, managing, and maintaining the Residence, Defendants kept and had access to the maintenance history of the Residence, including the earlier occupants' complaints.

59. Defendants have long known about mold problems at MacDill. Military families have for years submitted complaints to Defendants about mold and about health issues caused by exposure to mold.

60. On information and belief, Harbor Bay personnel did not follow Defendants' mold policies and procedures in responding to the reports described below.

C. Geri Leto Described the Residence Before the Family Moved In

61. Geri Leto held the position of Assistant Community Director for Harbor Bay.

62. Before the Phillip family moved into the Residence, Leto represented to the Phillip family that the Residence had been "newly renovated" following a previous hurricane.

63. Leto did not disclose that earlier occupants had reported mold contamination in the Residence.

64. Leto did not disclose that earlier occupants had reported neurological symptoms while living in the Residence.

65. Leto did not disclose that the Residence had a history of repeated mold complaints.

66. Leto made the representation in the course of leasing the Residence to the Phillip family on behalf of the property manager and AMC.

67. When Leto made the representation, the property manager and AMC knew of the earlier occupants' reports and the Residence's history of mold complaints, or made the representation without any reasonable basis for knowing whether the renovation had addressed those conditions.

68. David Phillip and Carly Phillip relied on Leto's representation in accepting the Residence and moving the family into it. They would not have moved the family into the Residence had they known of the earlier reports.

D. Harbor Bay Called the September 2022 Mold "Dust" and Cleaned the Ducts Without Containment

69. On or about September 10, 2022, Carly Phillip observed visible mold around the kitchen air vents and the attic access panel.

70. Carly Phillip submitted a maintenance request to Harbor Bay.

71. A Harbor Bay technician responded. The technician told Carly Phillip that the growth around the kitchen vents and the attic access panel was "dust."

72. The technician ordered a duct cleaning and nothing else.

73. The technician represented to Carly Phillip that the attic area had already been addressed.

74. After the technician left, Carly Phillip examined the attic access panel. Nothing around the attic access panel had changed.

75. Harbor Bay hired contractors to perform the duct cleaning.

76. The contractors performed the duct cleaning while David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. remained inside the Residence.

77. The contractors established no containment.

78. The duct cleaning disturbed the mold and spread it through the Residence. The family inside was exposed to the disturbed mold.

E. Harbor Bay Blamed the December 2022 Leak on the Bathtub and Closed the Work Order

79. On December 10, 2022, Carly Phillip discovered water leaking through the kitchen ceiling from the upstairs bathroom.

80. Carly Phillip immediately submitted an emergency work order.

81. A Harbor Bay technician responded. The technician attributed the leak to "too much water in the tub upstairs."

82. No evidence supported that explanation. The upstairs bathroom had no wet conditions.

83. Harbor Bay performed no meaningful investigation into the source of the water intrusion.

84. The technician placed drying fans inside the Residence and closed the work order without identifying or correcting the source of the water.

F. Harbor Bay Repeated the "Dust" Response Through 2023

85. During 2023, Carly Phillip reported mold around the kitchen vents and the attic access panel to Harbor Bay on at least four additional occasions.

86. On each occasion, Harbor Bay maintenance personnel characterized the visible mold as "dust" and closed the work order.

87. On none of those occasions did Harbor Bay personnel conduct mold testing, identify the source of the moisture intrusion, or perform remediation.

88. Water intrusion, elevated moisture, and mold continued in the Residence throughout 2023.

G. Carly Phillip's Illness and the Continued "Dust" Response During Her Treatment

89. During the summer of 2023, while pregnant with R.P., Carly Phillip began experiencing repeated episodes of peripheral vision loss and blackouts.

90. On or about November 1, 2023, Carly Phillip lost her vision, collapsed, and suffered back-to-back seizures.

91. Emergency medical personnel transported Carly Phillip to Tampa General Hospital. Imaging revealed a brain mass.

92. Physicians performed an emergency Cesarean section. R.P. was delivered approximately four weeks prematurely and required oxygen support in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit.

93. Pathology confirmed that Carly Phillip had a Grade III astrocytoma.

94. On November 28, 2023, Carly Phillip underwent neurosurgery. The tumor could not be completely removed.

95. As a result of the surgery and the tumor's location, Carly Phillip permanently lost the peripheral vision in her left eye and sensation in portions of her left leg.

96. Carly Phillip then underwent multiple rounds of radiation and chemotherapy. She completed radiation in March 2025 and chemotherapy in June 2025.

97. Carly Phillip's physicians have advised that the tumor is expected to recur and will require lifelong monitoring.

98. During radiation and chemotherapy, Carly Phillip was immunocompromised.

99. While Carly Phillip recovered from surgery and underwent treatment, mold continued developing around the Residence's vents and attic access panel. Carly Phillip reported it. Harbor Bay again dismissed the growth as "dust."

H. Hurricane Milton Damaged the Residence and Harbor Bay Called It "Not a Priority"

100. Hurricane Milton struck the MacDill area in October 2024. The family evacuated.

101. Harbor Bay maintenance personnel entered the Residence during the evacuation.

102. Harbor Bay informed the family that its personnel had observed "some water damage" and would schedule repairs.

103. The family returned to the Residence on or about October 11, 2024.

104. The family found substantial roof failure, water intrusion in all four bedrooms, ceiling damage, and water damage around the attic access panel.

105. Harbor Bay hired a third-party contractor to assess the Residence. The contractor documented widespread saturation within the walls and ceilings of the Residence.

106. The family repeatedly asked Harbor Bay to relocate them.

107. Harbor Bay informed the family that the Residence was "not a priority."

108. When Harbor Bay said that, Carly Phillip was undergoing chemotherapy and radiation.

109. After approximately two weeks of repeated requests, Harbor Bay relocated the family to an on-base Temporary Living Facility.

I. Harbor Bay Sent the Family Back After Painting Over the Damage

110. The Temporary Living Facility contained mold.

111. Approximately six weeks after the relocation, Harbor Bay directed the family to return to the Residence and represented that all repairs had been completed.

112. When the family returned, water stains remained on the ceilings and mold remained around the attic access panel.

113. The apparent repairs consisted largely of painting over the existing damage.

114. Carly Phillip complained. Harbor Bay representatives repeatedly instructed her to "put in a ticket." She did. No meaningful follow-up occurred.

115. In January 2025, Carly Phillip attended a Harbor Bay town hall meeting. Harbor Bay staff collected her contact information and assured her that someone would follow up. No one did.

J. Each Plaintiff's Exposure and Injuries

116. During the tenancy, David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. came into contact with, inhaled, and ingested mold in the Residence. R.P. came into contact with, inhaled, and ingested mold in the Residence from R.P.'s arrival at the Residence after birth.

117. David Phillip developed worsening skin conditions during the tenancy. David Phillip also developed sleep issues and insomnia.

118. Carly Phillip developed brain fog and headaches during the tenancy.

119. Carly Phillip's exposure to mold in the Residence continued during her radiation and chemotherapy, while she was immunocompromised.

120. C.P. developed a mold allergy during the tenancy. A physician diagnosed the allergy.

121. P.P. suffered persistent respiratory illnesses during the tenancy.

122. S.P. suffered persistent respiratory illnesses during the tenancy.

123. R.P. was born prematurely and remained medically fragile. R.P. was exposed to mold in the Residence from infancy, including after the post-Milton saturation and after the family's return. R.P. requires ongoing medical evaluation because of that exposure.

124. The Phillip family endured chronic sleep disruption and persistent fatigue during the tenancy.

125. The physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 124 were accompanied by emotional distress, including ongoing stress and anxiety regarding the deteriorating condition of the Residence and the risks the conditions posed to Carly Phillip because of her immunocompromised condition.

126. Had the Phillip family known the true history and condition of the Residence, they would not have moved into or remained in the Residence.

K. Property and Financial Losses

127. Water intrusion and mold damaged personal property belonging to the Phillip family.

128. The family incurred costs and inconvenience from displacement after Hurricane Milton, including the stay in the Temporary Living Facility. AMC did not fully compensate the family for those costs.

129. Plaintiffs incurred medical expenses for diagnosis and treatment of the injuries alleged in Section IV.J.

130. BAH was paid to AMC throughout the tenancy, including the months in which the Residence had mold around the kitchen vents and attic access panel, water intrusion, or saturated walls and ceilings.

131. In that condition, the Residence was worth a fraction of the rent paid for it.

V. CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I — Breach of the Lease (David Phillip against AMC)

132. David Phillip incorporates paragraphs 6 through 53, 69 through 115, and 127 through 131.

133. The Lease is a valid contract between David Phillip and AMC.

134. Under the Lease, AMC was obligated to provide and maintain habitable housing and to remedy leaks, moisture, mold, and other conditions in the Residence.

135. David Phillip performed his obligations under the Lease. His BAH was paid to AMC as rent. Carly Phillip reported leaks, moisture, and mold as the Lease and the Resident Guidelines and Community Handbook required.

136. AMC breached the Lease. AMC did not remedy the mold around the kitchen vents and attic access panel reported in September 2022 and on at least four occasions in 2023. AMC did not identify or repair the source of the December 2022 leak. AMC did not repair the roof failure and saturated walls and ceilings after Hurricane Milton. AMC represented the post-Milton repairs complete when the work consisted largely of painting over the damage.

137. The property manager performed AMC's maintenance and repair obligations on AMC's behalf. AMC is responsible for that performance.

138. David Phillip was damaged by the breaches. Rent was paid for a Residence that was not in the condition the Lease required. He incurred displacement costs after Hurricane Milton that AMC did not fully compensate. Personal property was damaged. He incurred other out-of-pocket expenses caused by the breaches.

139. David Phillip seeks attorney's fees and costs to the extent the Lease provides for them.

COUNT II — Negligence (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

140. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 6 through 131.

141. Before the Phillip family moved in, AMC, as lessor of the Residence, knew that earlier occupants had reported mold and neurological symptoms in the Residence and that the Residence had a history of repeated mold complaints. AMC did not disclose those facts to the family. Those conditions were not observable on a walkthrough of a Residence described as newly renovated.

142. AMC owed Plaintiffs a duty to reasonably inspect the Residence before the family took possession, to make the repairs necessary to deliver a reasonably safe dwelling, and, after the family took possession, to exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous conditions upon notice.

143. MMS, as property manager, undertook to inspect, maintain, and repair the Residence. MMS received Plaintiffs' maintenance requests, dispatched technicians, engaged contractors, and closed work orders. Having undertaken that work, MMS owed Plaintiffs a duty to perform it with reasonable care.

144. On information and belief, Michaels participated in the management and maintenance of the Residence through employees who handled leasing and maintenance communications for the Residence and as the entity that assumed the MacDill housing contractor's obligations in 2021. In the alternative, on information and belief, the Harbor Bay personnel who inspected, maintained, and repaired the Residence were employees of Michaels. On either basis, Michaels owed Plaintiffs a duty to perform that work with reasonable care.

145. Defendants had notice of mold and water intrusion in the Residence from the earlier occupants' reports; from Carly Phillip's report on or about September 10, 2022; from her emergency work order of December 10, 2022; from her at least four additional reports in 2023; from her reports during her cancer treatment; and from the third-party contractor's documentation of saturation after Hurricane Milton.

146. AMC breached its duty. AMC delivered the Residence without inspecting and repairing the conditions earlier occupants had reported. After each notice described in paragraph 145, AMC did not repair the mold, the leak, or the saturated structure.

147. MMS breached its duty through the Harbor Bay personnel it employed. The technician who responded in September 2022 characterized visible mold as "dust," ordered only a duct cleaning, and represented that the attic area had been addressed when nothing there had changed. The contractors engaged for the duct cleaning established no containment while the family was inside. The technician who responded in December 2022 attributed the leak to the bathtub without a meaningful investigation of the source, placed fans, and closed the work order. Maintenance personnel characterized mold as "dust" and closed at least four more work orders in 2023 without testing, source identification, or remediation. After Hurricane Milton, personnel left the family in a Residence with roof failure and saturated walls and ceilings for approximately two weeks. Personnel then painted over the water-damaged surfaces, left mold around the attic access panel, and directed the family to return.

148. MMS did not require the duct-cleaning contractors to establish containment and did not supervise their work to ensure that containment was established.

149. Michaels, on the bases alleged in paragraph 144, is responsible for the breaches alleged in paragraphs 147 and 148.

150. The property manager performed AMC's inspection, maintenance, and repair obligations as AMC's agent. AMC is liable for the property manager's negligence in performing those obligations.

151. Each breach exposed Plaintiffs to mold and moisture-damaged conditions in the Residence or prolonged that exposure.

152. That exposure caused the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 124: David Phillip's skin conditions and insomnia; Carly Phillip's headaches and brain fog; C.P.'s mold allergy; P.P.'s respiratory illnesses; S.P.'s respiratory illnesses; and R.P.'s exposure requiring ongoing medical evaluation.

153. Plaintiffs were damaged. Each Plaintiff seeks damages for those physical injuries, for the medical expenses of diagnosing and treating them, for the emotional distress that accompanied them, and for the losses alleged in paragraphs 127 through 129.

COUNT III — Gross Negligence (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

154. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 6 through 131.

155. On information and belief, Michaels participated in the management and maintenance of the Residence through its employees and as the entity that assumed the MacDill housing contractor's obligations, or, in the alternative, employed the Harbor Bay personnel who inspected, maintained, and repaired the Residence.

156. AMC, as lessor, and MMS and Michaels, as the entities that managed and maintained the Residence, owed Plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care in inspecting, maintaining, and repairing the Residence.

157. Before the Phillip family moved in, Defendants knew that earlier occupants had reported mold and neurological symptoms in the Residence.

158. From on or about September 10, 2022, Defendants knew that mold was present around the kitchen vents and attic access panel of the Residence.

159. From December 10, 2022, Defendants knew that water was entering the Residence through the kitchen ceiling from a source Defendants had not identified.

160. Throughout 2023, Defendants knew from at least four further reports that the mold persisted in the same locations.

161. In October 2024, Defendants knew from their own contractor's documentation that the walls and ceilings of the Residence were saturated.

162. Those conditions presented a danger to the health of the occupants that a reasonable landlord or property manager would know would probably result in injury.

163. With that knowledge, Defendants' personnel closed work orders without remediation, cleaned ducts without containment while the family was inside, told the family the Residence was "not a priority," painted over saturated surfaces, and directed the family to return.

164. That conduct was carried out or directed by Harbor Bay management personnel, including the personnel who decided when to relocate the family and when to return the family to the Residence.

165. That course of conduct caused the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 124 and the losses alleged in paragraphs 127 through 129.

166. Plaintiffs were damaged.

COUNT IV — Breach of the Landlord's Statutory Obligation to Maintain the Premises (All Plaintiffs against AMC)

167. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 6 through 53 and 69 through 131.

168. AMC is the landlord of the Residence.

169. David Phillip is the tenant under the Lease. Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., S.P., and R.P. occupied the Residence with him under the Lease.

170. Section 83.51(1), Florida Statutes, requires the landlord, "at all times during the tenancy," to "[c]omply with the requirements of applicable building, housing, and health codes" or, "[w]here there are no applicable building, housing, or health codes, maintain the roofs, windows, doors, floors, steps, porches, exterior walls, foundations, and all other structural components in good repair and capable of resisting normal forces and loads and the plumbing in reasonable working condition."

171. AMC did not maintain the plumbing of the Residence in reasonable working condition. In December 2022, water leaked from the upstairs bathroom through the kitchen ceiling. AMC did not identify or repair the source.

172. AMC did not maintain the roof, ceilings, walls, and other structural components of the Residence in good repair. After Hurricane Milton, the roof had failed, water had entered all four bedrooms, and the walls and ceilings were saturated. AMC painted over the damaged surfaces. AMC did not repair the roof or the saturated structure.

173. To the extent applicable building, housing, or health codes governed the Residence, AMC did not comply with them. The Residence was maintained with mold around the kitchen vents and attic access panel, water intrusion, and saturated walls and ceilings.

174. AMC had notice of each condition from Plaintiffs' maintenance requests, from the emergency work order, and from the contractor's documentation.

175. Section 83.55, Florida Statutes, provides a right of action for damages to a party aggrieved by the other party's noncompliance with the rental agreement or with Part II of Chapter 83.

176. AMC's noncompliance caused the moisture and mold conditions that caused the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 124.

177. Plaintiffs were damaged. Each Plaintiff seeks damages for those physical injuries, for the medical expenses of diagnosing and treating them, for the emotional distress that accompanied them, and for the losses alleged in paragraphs 127 through 129.

COUNT V — Breach of Contract as Intended Third-Party Beneficiaries (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

178. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 6 through 53 and 69 through 131.

179. The Operating Agreement is a contract between AMC East, LLC and the Air Force. The Operating Agreement contains language establishing that residents of MacDill housing are intended beneficiaries of the contractor's obligations to provide, maintain, and repair that housing. On information and belief, the current version of the Operating Agreement under which AMC operates contains the same or similar language. AMC is bound by the Operating Agreement.

180. The Ground Lease is a contract between AMC East, LLC and the Air Force. On information and belief, the Ground Lease contains language establishing that residents of MacDill housing are intended beneficiaries of the lessee's obligations to maintain that housing. On information and belief, AMC holds the lessee's interest and is bound by the Ground Lease.

181. On information and belief, one or more property management agreements govern the management and maintenance of MacDill housing, and those agreements contain provisions establishing that residents are intended beneficiaries of the manager's obligations. On information and belief, MMS, as property manager, is a party to or bound by those agreements.

182. On the basis alleged in paragraph 35, Michaels assumed the obligations under the Operating Agreement, the Ground Lease, and the property management agreements.

183. Each of those contracts was entered into to further the goal of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative to improve housing for service members. The contracting parties intended to benefit the service members living at MacDill and their families. David Phillip is a service member living at MacDill with his family. The maintenance obligations were included in those contracts to ensure that service members, including Plaintiffs, would be provided safe and habitable housing.

184. Defendants breached those contracts by failing to provide suitable management, maintenance, operation, and repair of the Residence in the respects alleged in paragraphs 69 through 115.

185. Defendants also breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in those contracts.

186. The breaches caused the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 124 and the losses alleged in paragraphs 127 through 129. Plaintiffs were damaged.

COUNT VI — Negligence Per Se (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

187. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 6 through 53 and 69 through 131.

188. On information and belief, the Residence lies within the present corporate limits of the City of Tampa.

189. Section 19-231 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Tampa provides: "No person shall occupy or let to another for occupancy or offer to let to another for occupancy any dwelling or dwelling unit which does not comply with the following standard."

190. Section 19-231(17) provides: "General condition of rental unit. Each dwelling unit let or offered to let shall be clean, sanitary, fit for human habitation and in a good state of repair."

191. Section 19-231(10) provides: "Every floor, wall and ceiling shall be capable of affording privacy and shall be maintained in a good state of repair."

192. Section 19-231(13) provides: "Plumbing fixtures and pipes. Every plumbing fixture and water and waste pipe shall be maintained in good working condition, free from defects, leaks and obstructions."

193. Section 19-232(7) provides: "The owner shall be responsible for the repair and replacement of all plumbing facilities and equipment."

194. Those provisions protect occupants of let dwelling units from injury caused by unsanitary, unrepaired, and leaking dwellings. Plaintiffs occupied a let dwelling unit.

195. AMC let the Residence to David Phillip. MMS offered the Residence to let and maintained it on AMC's behalf. Michaels, on the bases alleged in paragraphs 35 and 44, assumed the contractor's obligations for the Residence or employed the personnel who maintained it.

196. The Residence was let and maintained with mold around the kitchen vents and attic access panel, with water intrusion, and with saturated walls and ceilings. In that condition the Residence was not clean, sanitary, fit for human habitation, or in a good state of repair.

197. The ceilings and walls of the Residence were not maintained in a good state of repair after the December 2022 leak or after Hurricane Milton.

198. The plumbing that leaked from the upstairs bathroom through the kitchen ceiling in December 2022 was not maintained free from leaks. AMC, as owner, did not repair it.

199. Those violations caused the moisture and mold conditions that caused the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 124.

200. Plaintiffs were damaged.

COUNT VII — Unjust Enrichment, Pleaded in the Alternative (David Phillip against AMC)

201. David Phillip incorporates paragraphs 6 through 53, 69 through 115, and 127 through 131.

202. This Count is pleaded in the alternative to Count I under Rule 8(d)(2). It applies if the Court determines that no enforceable contract between David Phillip and AMC governs the rent paid for the Residence or AMC's obligation to provide and maintain habitable housing.

203. David Phillip conferred a benefit on AMC. His BAH was transferred to AMC monthly as rent for the Residence.

204. AMC knew of and accepted the BAH payments.

205. AMC accepted the BAH payments as rent for safe and habitable housing. For the months described in paragraph 130, the Residence had mold around the kitchen vents and attic access panel, water intrusion, or saturated walls and ceilings. AMC did not fully compensate the family for the displacement after Hurricane Milton.

206. AMC's retention of the full BAH payments, without providing housing of the value for which they were paid, is inequitable.

207. David Phillip is entitled to restitution of the portion of the BAH payments that exceeded the value of the housing AMC provided.

COUNT VIII — Negligent Misrepresentation Before Occupancy (David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

208. David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. incorporate paragraphs 6 through 131.

209. Before the Phillip family moved into the Residence, Leto represented to the Phillip family that the Residence had been "newly renovated" following a previous hurricane. Leto made the representation as Harbor Bay's Assistant Community Director, on behalf of the property manager, in leasing the Residence for AMC.

210. In context, the representation conveyed that the renovation had addressed the condition of the Residence and that the Residence was fit for the family to occupy.

211. The representation was materially incomplete. Earlier occupants had reported mold contamination and neurological symptoms in the Residence. The Residence had a history of repeated mold complaints. Leto did not disclose those facts.

212. On information and belief, the Lease, which AMC prepared and presented to David Phillip for signature, represented that the Residence was in safe, clean, and habitable condition and free of mold, mildew, and signs of water intrusion.

213. Within approximately one year after the family moved in, mold was visible around the kitchen vents and attic access panel, and water intrusion followed. The family encountered many of the same conditions the earlier occupants had reported.

214. Defendants made those representations without exercising reasonable care to learn whether they were true. Defendants kept the maintenance history of the Residence, which recorded the earlier occupants' complaints.

215. Defendants made the representations to induce David Phillip to sign the Lease and the Phillip family to accept and move into the Residence.

216. David Phillip and Carly Phillip justifiably relied on the representations. They accepted the Residence. David Phillip signed the Lease. They moved the family into the Residence. They relied on their own behalf and on behalf of C.P., P.P., and S.P., for whom they selected the Residence. They would not have moved the family into the Residence had the history been disclosed.

217. That reliance caused the family to occupy the Residence and to be exposed to the conditions alleged in Section IV. That exposure caused the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 122 and 124 and the losses alleged in paragraphs 127 through 129.

218. David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. were damaged.

COUNT IX — Negligent Misrepresentation Concerning Repairs (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

219. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 6 through 53 and 69 through 131.

220. After Carly Phillip's report on or about September 10, 2022, a Harbor Bay technician told Carly Phillip at the Residence that the growth around the kitchen vents and attic access panel was "dust" and that the attic area had already been addressed. The growth was mold. Nothing around the attic access panel had changed.

221. On or about December 10, 2022, a Harbor Bay technician told Carly Phillip at the Residence that the water coming through the kitchen ceiling was from "too much water in the tub upstairs." The upstairs bathroom had no wet conditions. The technician had not meaningfully investigated the source.

222. On at least four occasions during 2023, Harbor Bay maintenance personnel told Carly Phillip at the Residence that the growth around the kitchen vents and attic access panel was "dust." The growth was mold.

223. During Carly Phillip's cancer treatment, Harbor Bay personnel again told her that the growth was "dust." The growth was mold.

224. Approximately six weeks after relocating the family, Harbor Bay represented to the family that all repairs to the Residence had been completed. Water stains remained on the ceilings. Mold remained around the attic access panel. The work performed consisted largely of painting over the damage.

225. Each statement was made by Harbor Bay personnel of the property manager, in the course of responding to maintenance requests for the Residence, and on behalf of AMC, whose repair obligations the property manager performed.

226. Each statement concerned the existing condition of the Residence or the work that had been performed on it.

227. Each speaker made the statement without exercising reasonable care to learn whether it was true. No speaker tested the growth before calling it dust. The December 2022 technician did not meaningfully investigate the source before attributing the leak to the tub. The post-Milton statement was made when the work performed consisted largely of painting over damage that Defendants' own contractor had documented as saturation.

228. Defendants made the statements to cause the family to remain in the Residence and to accept the work performed as sufficient.

229. David Phillip and Carly Phillip justifiably relied on the statements. The family remained in the Residence after each statement. The family returned to the Residence after Harbor Bay represented that all repairs had been completed. David Phillip and Carly Phillip relied on their own behalf and on behalf of C.P., P.P., S.P., and, after R.P.'s birth, R.P.

230. That reliance prolonged the family's exposure to mold and moisture-damaged conditions. The prolonged exposure caused or worsened the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 124 and the losses alleged in paragraphs 127 through 129.

231. Plaintiffs were damaged.

COUNT X — Fraudulent Inducement (David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

232. David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. incorporate paragraphs 6 through 131.

233. Leto's representation, before the family moved in, that the Residence had been "newly renovated" following a previous hurricane, made without disclosure of the earlier occupants' reports, was a statement of material fact about the condition and history of the Residence.

234. On information and belief, the Lease's representation that the Residence was in safe, clean, and habitable condition and free of mold, mildew, and signs of water intrusion was a statement of material fact.

235. When those statements were made, Defendants knew that earlier occupants had reported mold contamination and neurological symptoms in the Residence and that the Residence had a history of repeated mold complaints. Defendants kept the maintenance history of the Residence.

236. Defendants knew that the statements, made without disclosure of that history, were false or misleading.

237. Defendants made the statements intending that David Phillip would sign the Lease and that the family would accept and move into the Residence, causing David Phillip's BAH to be paid to AMC.

238. David Phillip and Carly Phillip relied on the statements. David Phillip signed the Lease. They moved the family into the Residence. They relied on their own behalf and on behalf of C.P., P.P., and S.P. They would not have signed the Lease or moved the family into the Residence had the history been disclosed.

239. That reliance caused the family to occupy the Residence and to be exposed to the conditions alleged in Section IV. That exposure caused the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 122 and 124 and the losses alleged in paragraphs 127 through 129.

240. David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. were damaged.

COUNT XI — Fraudulent Misrepresentation Concerning Repairs (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

241. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 6 through 53 and 69 through 131.

242. The statements alleged in paragraphs 71, 73, 81, 86, 99, and 111 were statements of material fact about the condition of the Residence or the work performed on it.

243. Defendants knew the true condition of the Residence. Defendants' own personnel inspected the Residence and performed the repair work at the Residence.

244. When the September 2022 technician represented that the attic area had already been addressed, Defendants knew, from their own personnel's visits to the Residence, that the attic area had not been addressed. Nothing around the attic access panel had changed.

245. Each time Harbor Bay personnel characterized the growth as "dust," Defendants knew, from the repeated reports and from their own personnel's visits, that the growth was mold recurring in the same locations and that Defendants had not remediated it.

246. When Harbor Bay represented that all repairs had been completed, Defendants knew the scope of the work performed. Defendants knew that their contractor had documented saturation within the walls and ceilings. Defendants knew that the work performed consisted largely of painting over the damage and that mold remained around the attic access panel.

247. Defendants made the statements intending that the family would remain in the Residence, would accept the work performed as sufficient, and would return to the Residence.

248. David Phillip and Carly Phillip relied on the statements. The family remained in the Residence. The family returned to the Residence. David Phillip and Carly Phillip relied on their own behalf and on behalf of C.P., P.P., S.P., and, after R.P.'s birth, R.P. They would not have remained in or returned to the Residence had they known the statements were false.

249. That reliance prolonged the family's exposure. The prolonged exposure caused or worsened the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 124 and the losses alleged in paragraphs 127 through 129.

250. Plaintiffs were damaged.

COUNT XII — Fraudulent Concealment Before Occupancy (David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

251. David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. incorporate paragraphs 6 through 131.

252. Before the family accepted the Residence, Defendants knew that earlier occupants had reported mold contamination and neurological symptoms in the Residence and that the Residence had a history of repeated mold complaints.

253. David Phillip and Carly Phillip did not know those facts. The facts were not observable on inspection of a Residence described as newly renovated.

254. Having described the Residence as "newly renovated," and having represented in the Lease, on information and belief, that the Residence was free of mold and signs of water intrusion, Defendants were obligated to disclose the history those statements omitted.

255. In the alternative, Defendants, as lessor and property manager with possession of the maintenance history, knew of facts materially affecting the habitability of the Residence that were not readily observable and were not known to the family, and were obligated to disclose them.

256. Defendants did not disclose those facts.

257. Defendants concealed those facts intending that David Phillip would sign the Lease and that the family would move into the Residence.

258. David Phillip and Carly Phillip relied on the absence of any disclosed mold history. They accepted the Residence and moved the family into it. They relied on their own behalf and on behalf of C.P., P.P., and S.P. They would not have done so had the history been disclosed.

259. That reliance caused the family to occupy the Residence and to be exposed to the conditions alleged in Section IV. That exposure caused the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 122 and 124 and the losses alleged in paragraphs 127 through 129.

260. David Phillip, Carly Phillip, C.P., P.P., and S.P. were damaged.

COUNT XIII — Fraudulent Concealment Concerning Repairs (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

261. Plaintiffs incorporate paragraphs 6 through 53 and 69 through 131.

262. After the September 2022 duct cleaning, Defendants knew that the attic area had not been addressed and that the mold remained.

263. After December 2022, Defendants knew that the source of the kitchen-ceiling leak had not been identified or corrected.

264. After Hurricane Milton, Defendants knew from their contractor that the walls and ceilings of the Residence were saturated. Defendants knew that the work performed before the family's return consisted largely of painting over the damage. Defendants knew that mold remained around the attic access panel.

265. When Harbor Bay directed the family to return, the family did not know that the saturated structure had been painted rather than repaired. The painted surfaces concealed the condition beneath them.

266. Having represented that the attic area had been addressed and that all repairs had been completed, Defendants were obligated to disclose that those conditions remained. In the alternative, as lessor and property manager with knowledge of the contractor's findings and the scope of the work performed, Defendants were obligated to disclose those facts.

267. Defendants did not disclose those facts. Defendants concealed them by painting over the damage and by representing that repairs had been completed.

268. Defendants concealed those facts intending that the family would remain in and return to the Residence.

269. David Phillip and Carly Phillip relied on the absence of any disclosure. The family remained in the Residence. The family returned to the Residence. David Phillip and Carly Phillip relied on their own behalf and on behalf of C.P., P.P., S.P., and R.P.

270. That reliance prolonged the family's exposure. The prolonged exposure caused or worsened the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 124 and the losses alleged in paragraphs 127 through 129.

271. Plaintiffs were damaged.

COUNT XIV — Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act: Deceptive Acts (David Phillip against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

272. David Phillip incorporates paragraphs 6 through 53, 61 through 68, 69 through 115, and 130 through 131.

273. AMC leased the Residence to David Phillip in exchange for his BAH. MMS provided property management services for the Residence. On information and belief, Michaels held itself out as the provider of housing at MacDill and, through its employees, participated in leasing and maintenance communications for the Residence. In doing so, each Defendant engaged in trade or commerce within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.204.

274. David Phillip was a consumer. He leased the Residence for his family's use.

275. Defendants engaged in deceptive acts in that trade or commerce. Leto represented that the Residence had been "newly renovated" without disclosing its history of mold reports. On information and belief, the Lease represented that the Residence was free of mold and signs of water intrusion. Harbor Bay personnel characterized visible mold as "dust" in September 2022, on at least four occasions in 2023, and during Carly Phillip's treatment. A technician attributed the December 2022 leak to "too much water in the tub upstairs." Harbor Bay represented that all post-Milton repairs had been completed when the work consisted largely of painting. Each statement was likely to mislead a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances.

276. Those acts caused David Phillip to accept the Residence, to remain in it, and to return to it, and caused his BAH to be paid to AMC at the rate for habitable housing.

277. In its condition, the Residence was worth a fraction of the rent paid for it. David Phillip's actual damages are the difference between the value of the housing as represented and the value of the housing received.

278. On this Count, David Phillip seeks those actual damages under Fla. Stat. § 501.211, together with attorney's fees and court costs as the FDUTPA provides. On this Count, David Phillip does not seek damages for personal injury, emotional distress, or damage to property other than his leasehold interest in the Residence.

COUNT XV — Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act: Unfair Acts (David Phillip against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

279. David Phillip incorporates paragraphs 6 through 53, 61 through 68, 69 through 115, and 130 through 131.

280. AMC leased the Residence to David Phillip in exchange for his BAH. MMS provided property management services for the Residence. On information and belief, Michaels held itself out as the provider of housing at MacDill and participated through its employees in leasing and maintenance communications for the Residence. Each Defendant engaged in trade or commerce within the meaning of Fla. Stat. § 501.204.

281. David Phillip was a consumer. He leased the Residence for his family's use.

282. Defendants engaged in unfair and unconscionable acts in that trade or commerce. Defendants let the Residence for the full BAH knowing its history of mold reports. Defendants closed mold work orders without testing or remediation. Defendants left the family in a Residence with saturated walls and ceilings for approximately two weeks while telling the family the Residence was "not a priority." Defendants returned the family to the Residence after painting over the damage. On information and belief, Defendants did not follow their own mold policies and procedures.

283. Those acts offended established public policy and were substantially injurious to consumers.

284. In its condition, the Residence was worth a fraction of the rent paid for it. David Phillip seeks the difference between the value of the housing as represented and the value of the housing received as actual damages under Fla. Stat. § 501.211, together with attorney's fees and court costs as the FDUTPA provides. On this Count, David Phillip does not seek damages for personal injury, emotional distress, or damage to property other than his leasehold interest in the Residence.

VI. DAMAGES

285. Each Plaintiff seeks damages for the physical injuries alleged in paragraphs 116 through 124, including past and future pain and suffering, physical impairment, loss of enjoyment of life, and the emotional distress that accompanied those injuries.

286. David Phillip and Carly Phillip seek the past and future medical, diagnostic, and care expenses incurred for themselves and for C.P., P.P., S.P., and R.P. during the children's minority. Each child seeks the medical expenses the child will incur after reaching majority.

287. David Phillip and Carly Phillip each seek lost income and lost earning capacity to the extent each sustained them.

288. David Phillip and Carly Phillip seek the displacement costs, out-of-pocket expenses, and personal-property losses the family incurred.

289. Plaintiffs seek future diagnostic and treatment expenses reasonably necessary because of the injuries caused or aggravated by Defendants' conduct.

290. Plaintiffs seek punitive damages on Counts III, X, XI, XII, and XIII against each Defendant whose conduct is alleged in those Counts.

291. No Plaintiff seeks to recover more than once for the same loss.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs request that the Court enter judgment:

A. Awarding each Plaintiff compensatory damages on the Counts on which that Plaintiff sues, in an amount to be determined at trial, without duplicate recovery for any single loss;

B. Awarding David Phillip restitution on Count VII, in the alternative to Count I;

C. Awarding punitive damages on Counts III, X, XI, XII, and XIII, in an amount to be determined at trial;

D. Awarding David Phillip attorney's fees and costs on Count I to the extent the Lease provides, and on Counts XIV and XV as the FDUTPA provides;

E. Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as permitted by law; and

F. Granting such other relief as the Court finds just.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on all issues so triable.

Signature block omitted.

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Element Map and Affirmative-Defense Negation Map

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Phillip v. The Michaels Organization, LLC, No. 8:26-cv-02634 (M.D. Fla.)

ELEMENT MAP

Count I — Breach of the Lease (David Phillip v. AMC)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Valid contract48, 133Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 28 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1824, 47 Communications Reg. (P&F) 767, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 7682, 2009 WL 910411 (11th Cir. 2009) (Florida elements)Lease not attached; obligations pleaded by substance (Doc. 1 ¶ 41), not text. Attach when available.
Material breach51, 134, 136–137VegaBreach events dated; agency performance pleaded at 45, 137.
Damages127–128, 130, 138VegaScope confined to economic loss by choice, not legal compulsion; Mann v. Pierce, 803 F.2d 1552, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 33558 (11th Cir. 1986) allowed contractual housing claims to proceed with consequential personal-injury allegations.
Fees139—§ 83.48 removed per Fla. Stat. § 83.48 (fees barred "in a claim for personal injury damages based on a breach of duty under s. 83.51"). Lease fee clause unconfirmed.

Count II — Negligence (All Plaintiffs v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Duty — AMC141–142Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 2003 WL 22966277 (Fla. 2003) (elements); Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1981) (inspect-before-possession and repair-on-notice duties; 1981, reached through § 5001(b)); pre-cession root: Butler v. Maney, 146 Fla. 33, 200 So. 226, 1941 Fla. LEXIS 1071 (Fla. 1941) (lessor's known undisclosed latent dangers)141 pleads the pre-1950 latent-danger theory as facts so the count does not depend on post-cession duty law.
Duty — MMS (undertaking)38–43, 143Kimmons v. Crawford, 92 Fla. 652, 109 So. 585 (Fla. 1926) (landlord who undertakes repairs and performs them negligently; child plaintiff; pleading stage)Pre-cession authority. Successor liability basis at 41.
Duty — Michaels34–37, 44, 144Clay ElectricWeakest attribution; alternative pleading rests on Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6, 19. The "common or trade name" statement (¶ 44) was not located on the Mullins docket; identify the filing or narrow ¶ 44 before filing.
Breach145–148Mansur; KimmonsEach breach tied to a dated event.
Agency (AMC for property manager)45, 137, 150Goldschmidt v. Holman, 571 So. 2d 422, 1990 WL 191710 (Fla. 1990) (acknowledgment, acceptance, control)Control pleaded on information and belief at 45; property management agreement not in record.
Causation151–152Clay ElectricTumor causation not pleaded (record supplies no case-specific basis; Doc. 1 ¶ 33 offers only a general association). Carly Phillip's injuries limited to 118–119. R.P.'s injury pleaded as exposure requiring evaluation (123); thinnest injury allegation in the count.
Damages incl. emotional distress125, 129, 153Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, LLC, 967 So. 2d 846, 2007 WL 3024039 (Fla. 2007) (impact rule; distress recoverable with physical impact)Physical contact with mold pleaded at 116.

Count III — Gross Negligence (All Plaintiffs v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Duty155–156Clay Electric; Mansur; KimmonsRestated inside the count; no incorporation of Count II.
Knowledge of danger157–161Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959) (course of conduct a reasonable person would know would probably result in injury)Knowledge of Carly Phillip's diagnosis at the time of the "not a priority" statement is not pleaded; record does not identify who knew.
Conduct showing conscious disregard162–164CarrawayManagerial participation pleaded at 164 only as to relocation/return decisions and Leto's title; Fla. Stat. § 768.72 entity standards will require more at the proof stage.
Causation and damages165–166Clay ElectricSame injury gaps as Count II.
Punitive pleading in federal court290Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 1069, 46 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 73, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2789, 2000 WL 217490 (11th Cir. 2000) (operative opinion after partial vacatur; § 768.72 proffer procedure not applied in federal court)Carraway distinguishes gross negligence from the showing for punitive damages.

Count IV — § 83.51 Statutory Obligation (All Plaintiffs v. AMC)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Landlord / tenant status168–169Fla. Stat. § 83.43(17) ("Tenant" means any person "entitled to occupy" a dwelling unit under a rental agreement)Children's and spouse's entitlement pleaded as occupancy under the Lease (49, 169); Lease occupant list unconfirmed.
Statutory obligation170Fla. Stat. § 83.51(1) (quoted verbatim; verified)§ 83.51(1) obligations "may be altered or modified in writing with respect to a single-family home or duplex" — a defense; not pleaded.
Noncompliance after notice171–174§ 83.51(1)(a), (b)Both branches pleaded; roof failure pleaded as unrepaired damage, not as failure to resist normal forces.
Right of action / damages175–177Fla. Stat. § 83.55; Paterson v. Deeb, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 1417, 472 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (personal-injury damages recoverable under § 83.55)Not negligence per se: Mann v. Pierce. Post-1973 statute; survives in the enclave only as a claim brought on account of physical injury (Mullins Doc. 68 treats it as conditionally barred). Physical injury pleaded at 176.

Count V — Third-Party Beneficiary (All Plaintiffs v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Contract29–31, 179–181Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Center, LLC, 41 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 394, 203 So. 3d 146, 2016 Fla. LEXIS 2074 (Fla. 2016) (four elements)AMC East, LLC versus AMC distinguished; AMC's lessee interest on information and belief (31, 180). PMA parties unidentified.
Intent to benefit primarily and directly179–183MendezNo provision quoted; Mullins Doc. 68 accepted an equivalent pleading, but a quoted clause closes the surface.
Breach184–185MendezMichaels bound only through ¶ 35 assumption allegation.
Damages186Mendez—

Count VI — Negligence Per Se (All Plaintiffs v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Enactment protecting a class from a particular injury189–194deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973) (class-protective enactment versus evidence of negligence)Predicate unverified. Ordinance text carried from Doc. 1. Confirm section numbers, text, and version in force. Flooring provisions and § 19-47 dropped (no supporting facts; § 19-47 protects adjacent owners). Chapter 386 not pleaded: a sanitary-nuisance prohibition protecting the public generally supplies evidence of negligence at most under deJesus.
Applicability to the Residence188—Municipal coverage pleaded on information and belief; Mullins Doc. 68 found the land outside Tampa in 1950 and annexed in 1953. Whether a post-cession municipal ordinance is "the law of the State" under § 5001(b) is open.
Violation by each actor195–198deJesusOwner-specific § 19-232(7) attributed to AMC only.
Injury of the protected type, caused by violation199–200deJesusMost exposed count; retained because the conditional route in Mullins Doc. 68 is open and the facts are already pleaded.

Count VII — Unjust Enrichment, Alternative (David Phillip v. AMC)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Benefit conferred50, 203Kopel v. Kopel, 229 So. 3d 812 (Fla. 2017) (elements)—
Knowledge and acceptance204Kopel—
Inequitable retention205–207KopelRestitution net of value received (207).
Alternative pleading202Real Estate Value Co. v. Carnival Corp., 92 So. 3d 255, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 9849, 2012 WL 2327767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (alternative pleading permitted; claim fails once express contract on same subject is established); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)Condition tied to the Court's determination, not AMC's denial.

Count VIII — Negligent Misrepresentation Before Occupancy (David, Carly, C.P., P.P., S.P. v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Misrepresentation of material fact62–65, 209–213Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 365, 696 So. 2d 334, 1997 Fla. LEXIS 944, 1997 WL 348100 (Fla. 1997) (§ 552 elements); pre-cession root: Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696 (Fla. 1894) (deceit by statement the speaker ought to have known false)Date, place, and method of Leto's statement not in record; recipient pleaded as "the Phillip family" per Doc. 1 ¶ 27. Rule 9(b) exposure on time/place: Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 25435, 2006 WL 2883238 (11th Cir. 2006); Ziemba v. Cascade International, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 50 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 335, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15529, 2001 WL 776765 (11th Cir. 2001). Mullins Doc. 68 held the claim not enclave-barred.
Speaker should have known falsity67, 214Gilchrist—
Intent to induce215Gilchrist—
Justifiable reliance causing injury68, 216–218Butler v. Yusem, 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 493, 44 So. 3d 102, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 1508, 2010 WL 3488979 (Fla. 2010) (justifiable reliance required for negligent misrepresentation); children through parental reliance: Albertson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 441 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (different context; defeats a categorical rule); bodily-injury remedy on safety representation: Godelia v. Doe 1, 881 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2018) (medical-device context)Whether Leto's statement preceded Lease execution is unknown; reliance pleaded as acceptance and move-in, not signature.

Count IX — Negligent Misrepresentation Concerning Repairs (All Plaintiffs v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Misrepresentation of material fact71, 73, 81, 86, 99, 111, 220–226Gilchrist; Wheeler2023 statements lack dates/work-order numbers; the record supplies none.
Should have known falsity227GilchristLimited to what the record supports (no testing; no meaningful investigation; contractor's documented saturation).
Intent to induce228Gilchrist—
Justifiable reliance causing injury229–231Butler v. Yusem; AlbertsonCarly Phillip observed mold and called it mold; reliance is pleaded as remaining/returning on the assurances that the condition was benign or addressed. Defense will argue she disbelieved the statements.

Count X — Fraudulent Inducement (David, Carly, C.P., P.P., S.P. v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
False statement of material fact233–234Butler v. Yusem (elements); HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 447, 685 So. 2d 1238, 1996 Fla. LEXIS 1796, 1996 WL 600501 (Fla. 1996) (fraud in the inducement is an independent tort)Mullins Doc. 68 held fraud claims not enclave-barred and particularity sufficient on an equivalent pleading.
Knowledge of falsity235–236Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (knowledge may be alleged generally); Otto Candies, LLC v. Citigroup Inc., 137 F.4th 1158 (11th Cir. 2025) (ordinary fraud not subject to securities scienter standard)Knowledge pleaded generally with the circumstance (maintenance history kept by Defendants).
Intent to induce237Butler v. YusemWhat Defendants obtained: BAH payments (237).
Reliance causing injury238–240Butler v. Yusem (no due-diligence requirement for fraud); Albertson—

Count XI — Fraudulent Misrepresentation Concerning Repairs (All Plaintiffs v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
False statement of material fact242Butler v. YusemStatements identified by paragraph; no incorporation of Count IX.
Knowledge of falsity243–246Rule 9(b); Otto CandiesKnowledge grounded in Defendants' own inspections, repeated reports, and contractor findings (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 168–169).
Intent to induce247Butler v. Yusem—
Reliance causing injury248–250Butler v. Yusem; AlbertsonSame reliance exposure as Count IX.

Count XII — Fraudulent Concealment Before Occupancy (David, Carly, C.P., P.P., S.P. v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Material fact concealed; knowledge252Friedman v. American Guardian Warranty Services, Inc., 837 So. 2d 1165, 2003 WL 470217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (elements)—
Duty to disclose254–255Gutter v. Wunker, 631 So. 2d 1117, 1994 WL 6719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (partial disclosure creates duty); alternative: Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 54 U.S.L.W. 2303 (Fla. 1985) (seller; extension to lessors unsettled); Butler v. Maney (lessor's known latent danger)Half-truth theory is primary and rests on pre-1950 fraud law.
Intent to induce257Friedman—
Reliance causing injury258–260Friedman; Albertson—

Count XIII — Fraudulent Concealment Concerning Repairs (All Plaintiffs v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Material fact concealed; knowledge262–264FriedmanPre-Milton concealment events preserved (262–263).
Duty to disclose266Gutter; Johnson v. Davis (alternative)—
Concealment and intent265, 267–268Friedman265 limited to the painted-over structure; visible mold after return is pleaded as observed (112), not unknown.
Reliance causing injury269–271Friedman; Albertson—

Count XIV — FDUTPA, Deceptive Acts (David Phillip v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Trade or commerce; consumer273–274Fla. Stat. § 501.204—
Deceptive act275§ 501.204—
Causation276Fla. Stat. § 501.211—
Actual damages within statutory scope277–278Fla. Stat. § 501.212(3) (excludes "[a] claim for personal injury or death or a claim for damage to property other than the property that is the subject of the consumer transaction")Enclave exposure. Mullins Doc. 68 held FDUTPA "barred unconditionally" because it cannot be brought on account of physical injury. Retained as an economic-loss claim; the § 5001(b) "injury" interpretation is preserved for briefing, where Doc. 68 n.20 records the court's own stated doubt about the physical-injury limitation. Fee statute not cited by section; confirm before filing.

Count XV — FDUTPA, Unfair Acts (David Phillip v. AMC, MMS, Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Trade or commerce; consumer280–281§ 501.204Restated; no incorporation of Count XIV.
Unfair or unconscionable act282–283§ 501.204—
Causation and actual damages within scope284§ 501.211; § 501.212(3)Same enclave exposure as Count XIV.

Cross-cutting

ItemParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Personal jurisdiction, each Defendant26–28, 36–37, 41–44Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)1., 2. (verified text); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 108 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1956, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 23932, 2013 WL 6224027 (11th Cir. 2013) (long-arm plus due process)Michaels rests on registration, holding-out, acquisition, and information-and-belief employee contacts.
Subject-matter jurisdiction17–2328 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 5001(b) (quoted verbatim; verified)§ 5001(b) pleaded at the action level, not count by count. Residence-to-parcel survey not performed.
Venue2528 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)—
Shotgun auditevery countWeiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 92 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 378, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11750, 2015 WL 4098270 (11th Cir. 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b)No count incorporates a prior count; each names its Plaintiffs and Defendants; Michaels alternatives are stated with their basis.
Minors; next friends; birth datecaption, 9–12Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2; Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)Birth year only (12); delivery date retained as medical chronology (90–92).
Formattitle; wholeM.D. Fla. L.R. 1.08; M.D. Fla. L.R. 1.09Apply typeface and spacing at assembly.
Amendment as of right; relation back—Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B), (c)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6Due October 29, 2026 (Doc. 17 served electronically October 8; day 21). Every count arises from conduct set out in Doc. 1; no new party.

COUNTS NOT PLEADED

CountElement that fails on this record
Negligent infliction of emotional distressNo element independent of Count II. Distress accompanying physical impact is pleaded and recoverable there under Willis; a stand-alone NIED count would seek distress damages only and Mullins Doc. 68 held that form "barred unconditionally" under Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
Intentional infliction of emotional distressDefendant's knowledge of Carly Phillip's treatment at the time of the "not a priority" statement, and severe distress separate from physical injury for each claimant, are not established in the supplied record. Elements per Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. McCarson, 10 Fla. L. Weekly 154, 467 So. 2d 277, 1985 Fla. LEXIS 3223 (Fla. 1985). Facts preserved at 102–103 for any later amendment.
Medical monitoringOf the seven elements in Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 1999 WL 1221653 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), the record does not supply a proven hazardous substance at greater-than-background levels, an available detection procedure, or a monitoring regime different from ordinary care. Future diagnostic expenses for actionable injury are sought at 284.
Carly Phillip's astrocytoma as a Defendant-caused injuryCase-specific causation. Doc. 1 ¶ 33 alleges only a general association with environmental exposures. If counsel has a basis, add a direct causation allegation (Rule 11(b)(3) designation available) and restore tumor-related damages; the chronology (89–98) is already pleaded.
NuisanceNot pleaded in Doc. 1; Mullins Doc. 68 held failure to maintain is not a "use of property."
Omission consequenceAn amendment supersedes Doc. 1; restoring an omitted claim later requires an available Rule 15 vehicle. Lalitha E. Jacob, MD v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, 40 F.4th 1329 (11th Cir. 2022) addresses claims already dismissed; no Phillip claim has been dismissed.

AFFIRMATIVE-DEFENSE NEGATION MAP

Anticipated defenseCountsFacts pleaded against itParagraphsStrength
Federal enclave doctrine (post-1950 law inapplicable)IV, VI, VIII–IX (duty formulations), XIV–XVCession facts; action brought on account of injuries sustained at the Residence; physical injury by Plaintiff; pre-1950 duty facts (latent danger; negligent repair undertaking)19–23, 116–124, 141, 143, 176, 199Strong for I–III, V, VII–XIII (Mullins Doc. 68 held them not barred); moderate for IV, VI (conditional); weak for XIV–XV under the current ruling.
Express contract bars unjust enrichmentVIIPleaded in the alternative, conditioned on the Court's determination; restitution net of value received202, 207Strong as alternative pleading.
Rule 9(b) particularityVIII–XIIISpeaker role, recipient, place (the Residence), dated events, content, falsity, knowledge basis, what was obtained62–67, 71–73, 81, 86, 99, 111, 209–214, 220–227, 233–237, 242–247, 252–257, 262–268Moderate; Leto's date/method and 2023 dates are missing from the record.
No personal jurisdiction over Michaelsall against MichaelsFlorida registration; holding out MacDill housing; 2021 acquisition; employee contacts; trade-name representation28, 34–37, 44Moderate; weakest Defendant.
Harbor Bay conduct not attributable to a named DefendantII–III, V–VI, VIII–XVMMS as property manager; successor to Michaels Management Services, Inc. (Mullins Doc. 22); Lease designation; alternative Michaels attribution with basis; AMC agency38–46Strong as to MMS; moderate as to AMC (agency on information and belief); weak-to-moderate as to Michaels.
Tenant-caused condition (§ 83.51(4))IVUpstairs bathroom dry; no evidence for tub explanation; reporting as instructed53, 70, 80, 82, 85Strong.
Hurricane as superseding causeII–IV, VIDefendants' own pre-return inspection and contractor's saturation findings; two-week delay; painting over; direction to return101–113Strong; storm damage separated from the response to it.
No reliance (family saw the mold and stayed)VIII–XIIIReliance tied to specific assurances (attic addressed; repairs complete); return after "all repairs completed"73–74, 111–113, 216, 229, 238, 248, 258, 269Moderate; the "dust" statements are the exposed point.
Statute of limitationsII–III, VI, VIII–XIIINot pleaded by design; dates appear only as chronology. Accrual, minority, and David Phillip's service period under 50 U.S.C. § 3936 are analyzed outside the pleading. First observation September 10, 2022; filing September 9, 2026.69, 79, 85, 99–115Not negated on the face; the 2023 "dust" events are the exposure if treated as discrete accruals under a two-year period.
FDUTPA personal-injury exclusion (§ 501.212(3))XIV–XVDamages expressly limited to leasehold value difference277–278, 284Strong as to scope; does not cure the enclave ruling.
Shotgun pleadingallTargeted incorporation; Plaintiff- and Defendant-specific counts; no count incorporates a count132, 140, 154, 167, 178, 187, 201, 208, 219, 232, 241, 251, 261, 272, 279Strong.
Economic-loss / independent-tort ruleX–XIIIFraud in the inducement and concealment pleaded as torts independent of Lease performance; bodily injury pleaded233–239, 252–259Strong under HTP.

AUTHORITIES RELIED ON

AuthorityProposition usedPosture
Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (11th Cir. 2009)Florida breach-of-contract elementsAppeal from class certification/judgment; elements stated generally
Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson (Fla. 2003)Negligence elements; undertaker's dutySummary-judgment review
Mansur v. Eubanks (Fla. 1981)Landlord duty to inspect before possession and repair on noticeCertified question; post-cession authority reached through § 5001(b)
Kimmons v. Crawford (Fla. 1926)Landlord who undertakes repairs and performs them negligently is liable; child plaintiffReversal of demurrer-stage judgment; pre-cession
Butler v. Maney (Fla. 1941)Lessor's responsibility for known undisclosed latent dangersPre-cession; discussion of lessor liability
Goldschmidt v. Holman (Fla. 1990)Actual agency elementsCertified question
Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, LLC (Fla. 2007)Impact rule; distress recoverable with physical impactCertified question
Carraway v. Revell (Fla. 1959)Gross negligence standard; distinct from punitive showingCertiorari; guest-statute context
Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc. (11th Cir. 2000)§ 768.72 proffer procedure does not govern federal pleadingOpinion on rehearing; pleading holding intact
Mann v. Pierce (11th Cir. 1986)§ 83.51 breach is contractual, not negligence per se; housing claims proceed with consequential allegationsAppeal in HUD-housing action
Paterson v. Deeb (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)Personal-injury damages recoverable under § 83.55Reversal of dismissal
Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Center, LLC (Fla. 2016)Third-party-beneficiary elementsCertified conflict; arbitration context
deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad (Fla. 1973)Negligence per se versus evidence of negligenceCertified question
Kopel v. Kopel (Fla. 2017)Unjust-enrichment elementsCertified conflict
Real Estate Value Co. v. Carnival Corp. (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)Alternative pleading permitted; express contract defeats quasi-contract once establishedAppeal from dismissal
Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc. (Fla. 1997)Negligent-misrepresentation elements (§ 552)Certified question
Wheeler v. Baars (Fla. 1894)Deceit by statement the speaker ought to have known falsePre-cession appeal
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp. (11th Cir. 2006); Ziemba v. Cascade International, Inc. (11th Cir. 2001)Rule 9(b) "who, what, when, where, how" applies to claims sounding in fraudAppeals from dismissal
Butler v. Yusem (Fla. 2010)Fraud elements; justifiable reliance required for negligent misrepresentation but not for fraudReview of district court decision
HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A. (Fla. 1996)Fraudulent inducement is an independent tortCertified question
Otto Candies, LLC v. Citigroup Inc. (11th Cir. 2025)Rule 9(b) permits general allegation of knowledge; securities scienter standard not importedAppeal after trial/judgment in Florida fraud action
Albertson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)Reliance through an intermediary/parent supports a dependent's claimReversal of dismissal; pharmaceutical context
Godelia v. Doe 1 (11th Cir. 2018)Florida fraud and negligent misrepresentation on safety representations causing bodily injury survive at pleading stageAppeal from dismissal; medical-device/preemption context
Friedman v. American Guardian Warranty Services, Inc. (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)Fraudulent-concealment elementsAppeal from dismissal
Gutter v. Wunker (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)Partial disclosure creates duty to disclose the wholeAppeal from dismissal
Johnson v. Davis (Fla. 1985)Seller's duty to disclose known, non-observable material defectsCertified conflict; residential sale
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri (11th Cir. 2013)Long-arm and due-process analysisAppeal from denial of motion to dismiss
Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office (11th Cir. 2015)Shotgun categories; incorporation of facts versus countsAppeal from dismissal
Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc. (Fla. 1958); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. McCarson (Fla. 1985); Petito v. A.H. Robins Co. (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Lalitha E. Jacob, MD v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC (11th Cir. 2022)Omitted-claims analysis onlyVarious; not relied on for any pleaded count
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1391, 5001; Fla. Stat. §§ 48.193, 83.43, 83.48, 83.51, 83.55, 501.204, 501.211, 501.212, 768.72; 50 U.S.C. § 3936; Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 15, 17; M.D. Fla. L.R. 1.08, 1.09Jurisdiction, venue, statutory counts, fee exclusion, FDUTPA scope, punitive standards, SCRA tolling, pleading formStatutory and rule text; § 5001(b), § 83.51(1), § 83.48, § 83.43(17), § 501.212(3), and § 48.193(1)(a) verified verbatim