Docket Entry

Recent Docket Entry

Scire v. The Michaels Organization, LLC: Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

Air Force Major Robert Scire, his wife, and minor son allege privatized MacDill housing exposed them to sewage, water intrusion, and HVAC mold, causing sepsis, mastoiditis, and respiratory injuries; Harbor Bay closed work orders, skipped mold testing, and concealed a prior mold complaint. Defendants move to dismiss.

Court: M.D. Fla.Case: 8:26-cv-02696

Documents

1Court record

Complaint

ECF No. 1 · 09/15/2026 · 50 pp.

2Court record

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint or in the Alternative Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

ECF No. 20 · 10/08/2026 · 19 pp.

3Prepared by Docket Entry

Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial

Not filed in the case · 44 pp.

4Prepared by Docket Entry

Element Map and Affirmative-Defense Negation Map

Not filed in the case · 168 rows

44 pp.

View PDF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

1. Robert Scire spent six days in a hospital in August 2025 with sepsis and mastoiditis. His wife, Shelley Scire, has memory impairment, chronic sinus congestion, and headaches. Their son, R.S., has been referred for surgery on his tonsils and adenoids. They got sick in a home that Harbor Bay at MacDill leased to them, maintained for them, and told them was fine.

2. Before the Scires moved in, a prior occupant of 8538 Tampa Point Boulevard had complained to Harbor Bay about mold in that home. No one told the Scires. They learned it from a neighbor a year later.

3. The Air Force moved Major Scire to MacDill in September 2024 on a humanitarian reassignment because members of his family were ill. Within one month, rain came through the ceilings. Within three months, sewage came up through the drains. The technician could not fix the drains. Harbor Bay marked the work order "completed." In January 2025, the family reported visible mold. Harbor Bay fixed the leak that day. Harbor Bay left the mold and the water-damaged drywall in place and marked that work order complete too.

4. In January 2025, episodes of numbness in Major Scire's arms and legs became more frequent and more severe. By July he had a perforated eardrum. In August he was hospitalized. An infectious-disease physician told the family to have the home evaluated for mold. The environmental assessor that Harbor Bay retained found suspected mold growth inside the air handler. The family was displaced on September 15, 2025. Harbor Bay's post-remediation process ordinarily includes mold testing. Harbor Bay did not do that testing. Harbor Bay recorded the home as passing and told the family it had passed. The family returned. Three weeks later, independent sampling of the HVAC supply plenum measured about 910,000 and 750,000 Penicillium/Aspergillus-type spores per cubic meter. Harbor Bay's response was a visual inspection and the words "no moisture was found."

5. The roof leaked into the master-bathroom ceiling in December 2025. Harbor Bay said it would paint over the ceiling. The roof leaked again in July 2026. Harbor Bay put plastic over the wet ceiling. Growth appeared under the plastic. Harbor Bay reported the repair complete by about August 19, 2026. On August 23, 2026, rain came through the bathroom exhaust fan.

6. Major Scire has been referred to a Medical Evaluation Board. This action seeks recovery for the physical injuries the Scire family sustained in that home and for the losses that followed.

A. PARTIES

7. Robert Scire is a Major in the United States Air Force. From on or about September 16, 2024 through the filing of the original Complaint, Robert Scire resided at 8538 Tampa Point Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida (the "residence"), except for one overnight displacement in December 2024, a displacement from September 15, 2025 through October 15, 2025, and periods of travel.

8. Shelley Scire is the spouse of Robert Scire. She resided at the residence during the same period.

9. R.S. is the minor son of Robert Scire and Shelley Scire. He resided at the residence during the same period. R.S. sues through his parents as next friends and is identified by initials under Rule 5.2(a)(3).

10. Defendant The Michaels Organization, LLC ("Michaels") is a New Jersey limited liability company with its principal place of business at 2 Cooper Street, Camden, New Jersey 08102. Michaels is registered to do business in Florida.

11. Defendant AMC East Communities, LLC ("AMC") is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business at 2 Cooper Street, Camden, New Jersey 08102.

12. Defendant MMS Air Force, LLC ("MMS") is a New Jersey limited liability company with its principal place of business at 2 Cooper Street, Camden, New Jersey 08102. MMS is registered to do business in Florida.

13. "Harbor Bay at MacDill" ("Harbor Bay") is the name under which leasing, management, maintenance, and remediation of military housing at MacDill, including the residence, were conducted during Plaintiffs' tenancy. Harbor Bay is not registered as an entity with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations. The legal identity of Harbor Bay is alleged in Section D.

B. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND GOVERNING LAW

14. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The residence is located on MacDill Air Force Base. By Deed of Cession dated March 29, 1950, the State of Florida ceded to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over described lands in Hillsborough County held by the United States for military purposes. The residence is located on land within MacDill over which the United States holds exclusive jurisdiction. The exposures and physical injuries alleged in this Amended Complaint occurred at the residence. The maintenance, inspection, repair, and remediation of the residence alleged in this Amended Complaint occurred at the residence. Plaintiffs' claims therefore arise under federal law.

15. In the alternative, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over any claim determined not to arise under federal law. Each such claim forms part of the same case or controversy as the claims that do.

16. This civil action is brought to recover on account of physical injuries sustained by Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. at the residence. Under 28 U.S.C. § 5001(b), the rights of the parties in this action are governed by the law of the State of Florida.

17. Plaintiffs also seek recovery of the contract, property, and financial losses alleged in Section P.

18. On information and belief, the lease for the residence provides that Florida law applies.

19. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). The residence is located in this District. The exposures, injuries, maintenance, repairs, inspections, and remediation alleged in this Amended Complaint occurred at the residence.

20. This Court has personal jurisdiction over AMC under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)1., 2., and 7. AMC is identified as Owner on the lease for the residence. AMC received Robert Scire's rent. AMC's maintenance and repair obligations under the lease were to be performed at the residence in Florida. The acts and omissions alleged in Sections G through M occurred at the residence in Florida.

21. This Court has personal jurisdiction over MMS under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)1. and 2. MMS acted as property manager for MacDill housing, including the residence. MMS conducted that management in Florida. The acts and omissions of MMS personnel alleged in Sections G through M occurred at the residence in Florida.

22. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Michaels under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)1. and 2. Michaels is registered to do business in Florida. Michaels identifies MacDill publicly as one of its military housing locations. Employees whose email addresses and signature blocks identify Michaels as their employer communicate with residents at MacDill about leasing and maintenance. On information and belief, Michaels conducts leasing, management, and maintenance of MacDill housing under the Harbor Bay name, as alleged in Section D. The acts and omissions attributed to Michaels in Sections G through N occurred at the residence in Florida.

23. The claims in this action arise from the Florida contacts of each Defendant alleged in paragraphs 20 through 22.

C. THE PRIVATIZED HOUSING PROGRAM AT MACDILL

24. In November 2007, AMC East, LLC and the United States Air Force entered into a 50-year lease to privatize military housing at MacDill (the "Ground Lease").

25. In 2021, Michaels acquired the assets of AMC East, LLC and of AMC.

26. Service members who rent housing at MacDill pay rent through their Basic Allowance for Housing ("BAH"). Robert Scire's BAH was paid to AMC each month of the tenancy.

27. The Air Force also pays the privatized-housing contractor at MacDill for management and maintenance of the housing. Those payments consist of a monthly base fee and an incentive fee payable upon achieving performance criteria. To obtain the incentive fee, the contractor submits documentation and a statement that the performance criteria were satisfied. The criteria include objectives related to maintenance work orders and customer satisfaction.

28. The Operating Agreement originally entered into by AMC East, LLC and the Air Force (the "Operating Agreement") states that the Agreement is intended to further the goal of the Military Housing Privatization Initiative to benefit residents of MacDill military housing.

D. EACH DEFENDANT'S ROLE IN THE RESIDENCE

29. On information and belief, AMC is identified as the "Owner" on the lease for the residence. On information and belief, AMC holds the lessee's interest under the Ground Lease with respect to the residence.

30. Robert Scire signed the lease as tenant. On information and belief, the lease identifies Shelley Scire and R.S. as occupants of the residence.

31. On information and belief, the lease identifies the property manager as Michaels Management Services, Inc., or its successor. The relationship between Michaels Management Services, Inc. and MMS is known to Defendants.

32. MMS acted as property manager for MacDill housing, including the residence, at all times relevant to this Amended Complaint.

33. The lease obligates AMC to maintain the residence and to repair leaks, moisture, mold, and other conditions during the tenancy. The lease contains warnings about moisture and mold. On information and belief, the lease incorporates a Mold Addendum.

34. Harbor Bay appears as Landlord or Lessor on the Mold Addendum. On information and belief, Harbor Bay appears as Community Manager on the lease and the lease addenda.

35. On information and belief, in Mullins v. The Michaels Organization, LLC, No. 8:25-cv-02637 (M.D. Fla.), AMC stated in a filing that Harbor Bay is a "common or trade name" of Michaels and not a distinct legal entity.

36. Michaels's website identifies MacDill as one location of its military housing. Employees whose email addresses and signature blocks identify Michaels as their employer communicate with residents at MacDill about leasing and maintenance.

37. The Harbor Bay personnel who performed the leasing, maintenance, inspection, and remediation activities alleged in Sections F through N acted under the Harbor Bay name. This allegation does not include InDepth Environmental, Inc. or the third-party contractors identified in Section J. On information and belief, each Harbor Bay employee identified in Sections F through N was employed by MMS, by Michaels, or by both. The identity of the employer of each such person is known to Defendants. Under Rule 8(d)(2), Plaintiffs allege in the alternative that each such person acted as an employee or agent of MMS, of Michaels, or of both, within the scope of that employment or agency.

38. Harbor Bay personnel performed the maintenance, inspection, and remediation of the residence in performance of AMC's obligations as Owner under the lease. On information and belief, AMC engaged the property manager to perform those obligations on AMC's behalf.

39. Robert Scire submitted maintenance requests through a work-order system operated by Harbor Bay. Harbor Bay personnel recorded the status of each work order in that system. Robert Scire could view the recorded status of his work orders in that system.

E. WHAT HARBOR BAY KNEW ABOUT MOISTURE AND MOLD AT MACDILL

40. For years, military families at MacDill have submitted complaints to Harbor Bay about mold and about health problems from exposure to mold.

41. The standard lease used at MacDill contains warnings about moisture and mold.

42. The Resident Guidelines and Community Handbook issued to MacDill residents instruct residents to report signs of leaks, moisture, or mold immediately.

43. On information and belief, Harbor Bay personnel knew that numerous homes at MacDill lacked vapor barriers between the first floor and the outdoors, or had defective vapor barriers, and that moisture entered those homes as a result. On information and belief, Harbor Bay personnel knew that air-conditioning units in numerous homes at MacDill lacked secondary drain lines and that water leaked into those homes as a result.

44. Harbor Bay maintains written policies and procedures for the treatment and remediation of mold.

45. Before the Scire family moved in, a prior occupant of the residence complained to Harbor Bay about mold or suspected mold within the residence. Robert Scire learned of that complaint from a neighbor in September 2025, as alleged in paragraph 85.

F. THE FAMILY ACCEPTED THE RESIDENCE

46. The Air Force assigned Robert Scire to MacDill through an approved humanitarian reassignment, processed through the Air Force Surgeon General, related to illnesses affecting members of his immediate family.

47. Before moving in, Robert Scire signed the lease. Shelley Scire did not sign the lease. Shelley Scire accepted the residence as the family's home and moved into it with R.S.

48. On information and belief, the lease states that, before move-in, the residence was in safe, clean, and habitable condition and was free of mold, mildew, and signs of water intrusion. On information and belief, that statement was made by AMC as Owner and was delivered to Robert Scire by Harbor Bay leasing personnel before he signed. The names of the Harbor Bay leasing personnel who handled the lease are known to Defendants.

49. Before the lease was signed and before move-in, no Harbor Bay personnel disclosed to Robert Scire or Shelley Scire that a prior occupant had complained of mold or suspected mold in the residence.

50. Harbor Bay personnel had access to prior-occupant complaints concerning the residence. Robert Scire and Shelley Scire did not.

51. Had Robert Scire known of the prior occupant's complaint, he would not have signed the lease. Had Shelley Scire known of it, she would not have moved into the residence with R.S.

52. Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. moved into the residence on or about September 16, 2024.

G. RAIN CAME THROUGH THE CEILINGS

53. Hurricane Milton struck the Tampa area in October 2024, less than one month after the family moved in. The family evacuated.

54. The family returned on October 12, 2024. That day, the family reported to Harbor Bay damage to the roof, damage to the screened porch, and rainwater leaking through the ceilings, including water intrusion into the upstairs hallway ceiling.

55. On October 15, 2024, Harbor Bay placed a temporary cloth-like covering over the damaged roof.

56. Harbor Bay did not fully re-shingle the roof until January 22, 2025, more than three months after the family first reported the damage.

H. SEWAGE CAME UP THROUGH THE DRAINS

57. In December 2024, every shower and bathtub in the residence stopped draining properly. The toilet would not flush.

58. Sewage came up into the residence through the drains.

59. On December 4, 2024, a Harbor Bay technician attempted to correct the plumbing problems. The technician was unable to correct them.

60. Harbor Bay marked the December 4, 2024 work order "completed." A work order marked "completed" in the Harbor Bay system records that the reported condition has been resolved. The plumbing had not been resolved. The identity of the Harbor Bay employee who marked the work order completed is known to Defendants.

61. Robert Scire asked Harbor Bay to move the family out of the residence during plumbing repairs. Harbor Bay at first declined. Robert Scire told Harbor Bay that none of the drains worked and that sewage was entering the home. Harbor Bay then moved the family out of the residence overnight while it conducted further repairs.

I. LEAKS, VISIBLE MOLD, AND CLOSED WORK ORDERS, JANUARY THROUGH APRIL 2025

62. On January 26, 2025, the family reported to Harbor Bay an active water leak and visible mold in a storage room of the residence.

63. Harbor Bay repaired the active leak that day. Harbor Bay did not address the mold. Harbor Bay did not address the water-damaged drywall.

64. Harbor Bay marked the January 26, 2025 work order complete while the mold and the water-damaged drywall remained in place.

65. On February 19, 2025, the family reported to Harbor Bay another active leak, in the master bathroom, accompanied by a mold-like odor. Harbor Bay repaired that leak on February 24, 2025.

66. On March 17, 2025, the family submitted another service request to Harbor Bay seeking installation of drywall or a new access panel around the exposed water meter and piping damaged by the January 26, 2025 leak.

67. On or about April 4, 2025, Harbor Bay applied Kilz and replaced part of the drywall in the storage room. That work did not fully remediate the conditions caused by the leak.

68. The water-damaged area reported on January 26, 2025 remained in place for more than two months before that work was done.

J. CONTRACTORS WORKED INSIDE THE HOME WHILE THE FAMILY STAYED

69. Beginning on or about April 7, 2025, third-party contractors retained by Harbor Bay began work on areas of the residence damaged by water intrusion from Hurricane Milton.

70. The work affected R.S.'s bedroom, the downstairs hallway, the living room, and a bathroom.

71. Harbor Bay did not relocate the family during this work. The family remained inside the residence for about seven days while the work proceeded.

72. The contractors cordoned off the work areas with loose plastic sheeting. Robert Scire and Shelley Scire observed that the sheeting was loose and did not seal the work areas from the occupied areas of the residence.

K. ASSESSMENT, DISPLACEMENT, VERIFICATION, AND RETURN

73. In August 2025, after the hospitalization alleged in paragraph 138, an infectious-disease physician encouraged the family to have the residence evaluated for mold.

74. On August 28, 2025, Harbor Bay retained InDepth Environmental, Inc. ("IDE"), an environmental assessor, to conduct a moisture assessment of the residence.

75. IDE performed a visual inspection, moisture and relative-humidity measurements, temperature measurements, infrared imaging, and moisture-meter readings.

76. IDE documented suspected mold growth on the mechanical-room ceiling near the HVAC supply plenum, suspected growth within the air handler and supply plenum, and elevated temperatures in Bedroom #3.

77. IDE did not identify the species of mold through laboratory sampling.

78. On September 15, 2025, the family was displaced from the residence for remediation.

79. On September 30, 2025, a post-remediation verification of the residence was performed under Harbor Bay's post-remediation process. The identity of the person who performed the verification is known to Defendants.

80. At the time of that verification, the HVAC system of the residence had reportedly been inoperable for more than a week. Interior temperatures had risen to about 96 degrees.

81. A post-remediation verification under Harbor Bay's process ordinarily includes mold testing. Harbor Bay did not conduct that mold testing on September 30, 2025.

82. Harbor Bay recorded the residence as passing its post-remediation process.

83. Between September 30, 2025 and October 15, 2025, a Harbor Bay representative communicated to Robert Scire that the residence had passed Harbor Bay's post-remediation process. The identity of that representative is known to Defendants.

84. The family returned to the residence on October 15, 2025.

85. About five days after the September 15, 2025 displacement, a neighbor told Robert Scire that a prior occupant of the residence had complained to Harbor Bay about mold or suspected mold within the residence.

L. INDEPENDENT TESTING AND HARBOR BAY'S RESPONSE

86. On November 6, 2025, independent mold sampling was performed at the residence.

87. Samples from the HVAC supply plenum measured about 910,000 and 750,000 Penicillium/Aspergillus-type spores per cubic meter.

88. The sampling identified Chaetomium and Penicillium/Aspergillus-type fungal contamination on subflooring surfaces.

89. On information and belief, the contamination documented on November 6, 2025 was present in the HVAC system on October 15, 2025, when the family returned.

90. The family submitted a work order to Harbor Bay concerning the November 6, 2025 results. Robert Scire and Shelley Scire were concerned that Harbor Bay would retaliate against them if they pressed further.

91. On December 8, 2025, the roof leaked into the master-bathroom ceiling. Robert Scire submitted a service request that day.

92. On January 29, 2026, a Harbor Bay representative informed Robert Scire that the affected ceiling would be painted over. The identity of that representative is known to Defendants.

93. On February 2, 2026, Robert Scire submitted a service request seeking a post-remediation inspection based on the November 6, 2025 findings.

94. Harbor Bay maintenance employees identified as Ivan and Julio performed limited visual inspections of the residence. They did not conduct invasive inspection of the ductwork, the HVAC intake areas, or the other concealed locations identified by the November 6, 2025 sampling. The full names of Ivan and Julio are known to Defendants.

95. On February 23, 2026, a Harbor Bay representative advised Robert Scire that "no moisture was found" and that everything was clean. The identity of that representative is known to Defendants.

96. The family remained in the residence after February 23, 2026.

M. WATER INTRUSION CONTINUED THROUGH AUGUST 2026

97. In late July 2026, another active leak developed in the same area of the master-bathroom ceiling.

98. Harbor Bay maintenance personnel placed clear plastic directly over the wet ceiling drywall. The roof or vent leak above the ceiling remained unrepaired.

99. The plastic trapped moisture against the ceiling. By early August 2026, Robert Scire observed dark, circular, scattered growth beneath or around the affected area.

100. Harbor Bay's work-order system showed the associated work order "on hold pending remediation."

101. On August 7, 2026, Harbor Bay technician Luis Figueroa arrived at the residence. Mr. Figueroa told Robert Scire that he had been told remediation was not necessary and that a contractor would instead perform the repair.

102. Mr. Figueroa took a moisture reading. The reading confirmed excessive moisture. Mr. Figueroa entered the attic and confirmed a visible leak associated with the bathroom exhaust vent extending through the roof.

103. On August 10, 2026, Harbor Bay acknowledged in writing that there had been miscommunication regarding the work orders. Harbor Bay advised that a remediation supervisor would conduct a more thorough inspection while separate vendors addressed the leak and the affected materials.

104. Harbor Bay remediation supervisor Daniel then inspected the residence. He acknowledged that the visible or suspected growth required remediation. He confirmed moisture and growth within the taped-off area. He advised that the roof or vent source had to be repaired before the ceiling could be addressed. Daniel's full name is known to Defendants.

105. By about August 19, 2026, Harbor Bay reported the master-bathroom ceiling work and the roof or vent work complete.

106. On August 23, 2026, the family returned from a weekend trip and found water on the master-bathroom toilet and floor. Rainwater was dripping through the bathroom ceiling exhaust fan. The dripping stopped when the rain outside subsided. Robert Scire reported the condition that day and submitted another work order.

107. The August 23, 2026 leak was at least the third reported episode of water intrusion in the same master-bathroom ceiling area.

108. On August 24, 2026, Harbor Bay technician David inspected the master-bathroom ceiling with a moisture meter. The meter detected moisture within the ceiling drywall near the exhaust fan. David's full name is known to Defendants.

109. Robert Scire separately notified Harbor Bay's remediation manager of the August 23, 2026 leak and requested that containment be arranged.

N. THE THREE COMMUNICATIONS ON WHICH THE FAMILY RELIED

110. Each communication alleged in this Section was made in the course of performing AMC's obligations under the lease and in the course of the property management of the residence alleged in Section D.

Episode 1: The lease and the undisclosed prior complaint

111. On information and belief, before September 16, 2024, AMC, through the lease delivered by Harbor Bay leasing personnel, stated that the residence was in safe, clean, and habitable condition and free of mold, mildew, and signs of water intrusion (paragraph 48).

112. When that statement was made, Harbor Bay had received a prior occupant's complaint of mold or suspected mold within the residence (paragraph 45). Neither the lease nor any Harbor Bay personnel disclosed that complaint to Robert Scire or Shelley Scire (paragraph 49).

113. On information and belief, the statement was false when made. A prior occupant had complained of mold or suspected mold in the residence, and visible mold and a mold-like odor appeared in two locations in the residence within five months of move-in (paragraphs 62 and 65).

114. Harbor Bay personnel knew of the prior occupant's complaint when the lease was delivered, because the complaint had been made to Harbor Bay.

115. Robert Scire read the lease as a statement by the Owner about the condition of the home. He signed the lease on that understanding. Shelley Scire moved into the residence with R.S. on the understanding that the home had no history of mold. Through the lease, AMC obtained Robert Scire's BAH.

Episode 2: "Passed"

116. Between September 30, 2025 and October 15, 2025, a Harbor Bay representative communicated to Robert Scire that the residence had passed Harbor Bay's post-remediation process (paragraph 83).

117. The family had been displaced on September 15, 2025 for remediation after IDE documented suspected growth within the air handler and supply plenum. In that context, the communication that the residence had passed conveyed that the remediation had been completed and verified and that the residence was safe for the family to reoccupy.

118. The communication did not state that mold testing had not been performed during the verification. The communication did not state that the HVAC system had reportedly been inoperable during the verification.

119. Harbor Bay personnel knew that no mold testing had been performed, because Harbor Bay conducted the verification under its own process (paragraphs 79 through 82).

120. On information and belief, the HVAC system remained contaminated when the communication was made (paragraph 89).

121. Robert Scire understood the communication to mean that the residence had been remediated, tested, and found safe. The family returned to the residence on October 15, 2025 on that understanding. Through the family's return, AMC obtained continued occupancy and continued payment of BAH.

Episode 3: "No moisture was found" and "everything was clean"

122. On February 23, 2026, a Harbor Bay representative advised Robert Scire that "no moisture was found" and that everything was clean (paragraph 95).

123. Harbor Bay made those statements in response to Robert Scire's February 2, 2026 request for a post-remediation inspection based on the November 6, 2025 sampling (paragraph 93). Harbor Bay personnel therefore knew of the November 6, 2025 results when the statements were made.

124. The statement that "no moisture was found" concerned moisture. The statement that everything was clean concerned contamination. In response to a request for inspection based on laboratory findings of fungal contamination in the HVAC supply plenum and on subflooring, the statement that everything was clean conveyed that those locations had been inspected and were free of contamination.

125. The inspections that preceded the statements were visual only and did not reach the ductwork, the HVAC intake areas, or the other concealed locations identified by the November 6, 2025 sampling (paragraph 94). The communication did not state that the inspection had not reached those locations.

126. Harbor Bay personnel knew that the inspections by Ivan and Julio were visual only and had not reached those locations, because Harbor Bay assigned and performed the inspections.

127. Harbor Bay, not the family, had the authority and the responsibility to remediate the HVAC system and the concealed areas of the residence. Robert Scire understood the February 23, 2026 statements to mean that the party responsible for remediation had inspected the contaminated locations and determined that no remediation was needed. The family remained in the residence after February 23, 2026 on that understanding. Through the family's continued occupancy, AMC obtained continued payment of BAH.

O. HARBOR BAY MANAGEMENT DECISIONS

128. The following decisions concerning the residence were made under the Harbor Bay name: the decision not to relocate the family during the April 2025 work (paragraph 71); the decision to record the residence as passing without mold testing (paragraphs 81 and 82); the January 29, 2026 proposal to paint over a leaking ceiling (paragraph 92); the decision to respond to the November 6, 2025 laboratory findings with visual inspection only (paragraph 94); and the instruction, reported by Mr. Figueroa, that remediation of the master-bathroom ceiling was not necessary (paragraph 101).

129. On information and belief, each decision identified in paragraph 128 was made or approved by Harbor Bay management personnel with authority over maintenance and remediation at MacDill, including the remediation manager and the remediation supervisor identified in paragraphs 104 and 109.

130. On information and belief, those management personnel were employed by MMS, by Michaels, or by both, and acted as managing agents of each Defendant on whose behalf they performed those functions.

P. EXPOSURE, PHYSICAL INJURIES, AND LOSSES

131. The HVAC supply plenum of the residence distributes air to the occupied rooms of the residence.

132. During the tenancy, Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. each inhaled, ingested, and came into physical contact with mold and mold spores within the residence, and each lived in elevated interior moisture and water intrusion.

Robert Scire

133. Before January 2025, Robert Scire experienced occasional episodes of bilateral numbness and tingling in his extremities. Beginning in about January 2025, those episodes increased in frequency, severity, and persistence without explanation.

134. In the same period, Robert Scire experienced fatigue, anxiety, irritability, headaches, vertigo, and other neurological complaints.

135. Robert Scire sought neurological evaluation on January 31, 2025. He underwent cardiovascular evaluation for diminished pulses on February 21, 2025. He returned for neurological evaluation in March 2025. He underwent an echocardiogram in April 2025.

136. By May 20, 2025, Robert Scire's physicians documented persistent fatigue, loud snoring, witnessed apneic episodes, and breathing concerns, and referred him for pulmonary evaluation. A pulmonologist evaluated him in July 2025.

137. On July 23, 2025, Robert Scire sought urgent treatment for severe ear pain and a perforated eardrum. On July 24, 2025, worsening facial and ear pain and fever required emergency-room treatment. He was diagnosed with a middle-ear infection associated with fluid buildup from his sinuses. He was then diagnosed with an outer-ear infection that persisted despite treatment.

138. On August 21, 2025, Robert Scire was hospitalized with a fever of about 103 degrees, sepsis, and shortness of breath. He remained hospitalized for about six days. At discharge on August 26, 2025, he had been diagnosed with mastoiditis and autoimmune-related concerns, among other conditions.

139. CT imaging on October 21, 2025 revealed a right maxillary sinus retention cyst measuring about 2.2 centimeters.

140. After the family's return on October 15, 2025, Robert Scire continued to experience respiratory problems requiring an inhaler. In April 2026, the family traveled to Orlando for several days. During the trip, despite substantial physical activity, Robert Scire used his inhaler about once per day. At the residence, he used it about two to three times per day. Within about twenty-four hours of returning to the residence, his inhaler use returned to about two to three times per day.

141. Robert Scire's conditions have required evaluation by neurology, cardiology, pulmonology, infectious disease, and other specialties. His conditions have caused his referral into the Air Force Medical Evaluation Board process.

142. The Medical Evaluation Board referral has altered Robert Scire's career timeline and accelerated his retirement trajectory. Robert Scire has lost, and will continue to lose, active-duty earnings. His military pension will be reduced as a result. His future earning capacity is reduced.

Shelley Scire

143. During the tenancy, Shelley Scire experienced memory impairment, chronic sinus congestion, headaches, respiratory irritation, and fatigue. Those conditions continued after the family's return on October 15, 2025.

R.S.

144. During the tenancy, R.S. developed rashes and respiratory and airway problems. He was evaluated for breathing concerns in February 2025.

145. On April 3, 2025, R.S. received a medical referral for hypertrophy of the tonsils and adenoids and allergic rhinitis. He underwent a sleep study on April 27, 2025. He was evaluated by an ear, nose, and throat physician in May 2025 and was referred for an adenoidectomy.

146. R.S. experienced sleep-disordered breathing during the tenancy. Those conditions continued after the family's return on October 15, 2025.

Causation

147. Each Plaintiff's physical injuries alleged in this Section arose or worsened after the family moved into the residence and during the family's exposure to the conditions alleged in Sections G through M.

148. Robert Scire's respiratory symptoms decreased when he was away from the residence and returned within a day of his return (paragraph 140).

149. The physical injuries alleged in this Section were caused by each Plaintiff's inhalation, ingestion, and contact with mold, mold spores, and moisture conditions within the residence.

150. The physical injuries that each Plaintiff experienced after October 15, 2025, and after February 23, 2026, continued and worsened because the family returned to and remained in the residence during those periods.

151. Each Plaintiff requires continuing medical evaluation and treatment for the physical injuries alleged in this Section.

Losses

152. Robert Scire incurred and will incur medical expenses for his own treatment. Shelley Scire incurred and will incur medical expenses for her own treatment. Robert Scire and Shelley Scire incurred and will incur medical expenses for the treatment of R.S.

153. Robert Scire lost and will lose earnings and earning capacity as alleged in paragraph 142.

154. Each Plaintiff suffered pain, physical impairment, loss of enjoyment of life, and emotional distress accompanying the physical injuries alleged in this Section.

155. Robert Scire paid full rent through BAH for months in which the residence was not habitable, including the displacement from September 15, 2025 through October 15, 2025, and the periods alleged in Sections G, H, I, L, and M.

156. The family lost the use of the residence during the displacement from September 15, 2025 through October 15, 2025, during the overnight displacement in December 2024, and during the April 2025 work.

157. Plaintiffs sustained damage to personal property within the residence.

158. Had Robert Scire and Shelley Scire known the prior occupant's mold complaint, the omission of mold testing from the verification, and the limits of the February 2026 inspection, they would not have moved into, returned to, or remained in the residence with R.S.

COUNT I — BREACH OF THE LEASE (Robert Scire against AMC; Shelley Scire and R.S. as intended beneficiaries)

159. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, and P.

160. Robert Scire and AMC are parties to the lease for the residence. Robert Scire performed his obligations under the lease, including payment of rent through BAH.

161. The lease obligates AMC to maintain the residence and to repair leaks, moisture, mold, and other conditions during the tenancy (paragraph 33).

162. On information and belief, the lease identifies Shelley Scire and R.S. as occupants of the residence, and AMC undertook its maintenance and repair obligations for the direct benefit of the tenant and the identified occupants.

163. AMC breached the lease. AMC left the roof under a temporary covering from October 15, 2024 to January 22, 2025 (Section G). AMC closed the December 4, 2024 plumbing work order without correcting the plumbing (Section H). AMC left visible mold and water-damaged drywall in place from January 26, 2025 to about April 4, 2025 (Section I). AMC did not remediate the HVAC contamination documented on November 6, 2025 (Section L). AMC did not repair the master-bathroom roof or vent leak reported on December 8, 2025, in July 2026, and on August 23, 2026 (Sections L and M).

164. Each breach was material. Each breach left the residence unfit for habitation while the family lived in it.

165. As a direct and foreseeable result of those breaches, Robert Scire paid rent for a residence that was not habitable, the family lost the use of the residence during displacement and repairs, and Plaintiffs sustained damage to personal property (paragraphs 155 through 157).

166. As a further direct and foreseeable result of those breaches, Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. inhaled, ingested, and came into contact with mold and moisture within the residence and sustained the physical injuries alleged in Section P.

COUNT II — NEGLIGENCE (All Plaintiffs against AMC)

167. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, and P.

168. AMC leases the residence as a residential dwelling. AMC owed Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. a duty to inspect the residence before the family took possession, to make the repairs necessary to deliver a reasonably safe dwelling, and, after notice of a dangerous condition, to exercise reasonable care to repair it.

169. AMC performed its maintenance and repair obligations through Harbor Bay personnel (paragraph 38). AMC is responsible for the acts and omissions of those personnel within the scope of that engagement.

170. AMC received notice of each dangerous condition at the residence through the family's reports alleged in Sections G, H, I, L, and M, through IDE's August 28, 2025 findings (Section K), and through the family's work order concerning the November 6, 2025 sampling (paragraph 90).

171. AMC breached its duty. AMC delivered the residence without disclosing the prior occupant's mold complaint or inspecting for the condition it described (Sections E and F). AMC left the roof under a temporary covering for more than three months (Section G). AMC closed the December 4, 2024 work order while sewage remained in the residence and the drains did not function (Section H). AMC closed the January 26, 2025 work order while mold and water-damaged drywall remained (Section I). AMC left the family inside the residence for about seven days while contractors worked behind unsealed plastic (Section J). AMC recorded the residence as passing post-remediation verification without mold testing and while the HVAC system was reportedly inoperable (Section K). AMC responded to laboratory findings of fungal contamination in the HVAC system with visual inspection only and did not remediate the HVAC system (Section L). AMC placed plastic over wet drywall while the leak continued and reported the roof or vent repair complete while rainwater continued to enter (Section M).

172. Those breaches caused Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. to inhale, ingest, and come into contact with mold, mold spores, sewage, and moisture within the residence. That exposure caused the physical injuries alleged in Section P.

173. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157.

COUNT III — NEGLIGENCE (All Plaintiffs against MMS)

174. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, E, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, and P.

175. MMS acted as property manager for the residence (paragraph 32). By that undertaking, MMS owed Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. a duty to perform the management, maintenance, inspection, and remediation of the residence with reasonable care.

176. On information and belief, the Harbor Bay personnel identified in Sections G through M were employees or agents of MMS acting within the scope of their employment or agency (paragraph 37).

177. MMS, through those personnel, breached the duty of reasonable care. MMS left the roof under a temporary covering for more than three months (Section G). MMS closed the December 4, 2024 work order while the plumbing did not function (Section H). MMS closed the January 26, 2025 work order while mold and water-damaged drywall remained (Section I). MMS did not relocate the family during the April 2025 work and permitted the work to proceed behind unsealed plastic (Section J). MMS recorded the residence as passing without the mold testing its own process ordinarily includes (Section K). MMS assigned Ivan and Julio to perform a visual inspection in response to laboratory findings of HVAC contamination and did not remediate the HVAC system (Section L). MMS placed plastic over wet drywall while the leak continued and reported the roof or vent repair complete while rainwater continued to enter (Section M). MMS did not follow Harbor Bay's written mold policies and procedures at the residence (paragraph 44).

178. Those breaches caused Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. to inhale, ingest, and come into contact with mold, mold spores, sewage, and moisture within the residence. That exposure caused the physical injuries alleged in Section P.

179. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157.

COUNT IV — NEGLIGENCE (All Plaintiffs against Michaels)

180. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, E, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, and P.

181. On information and belief, Michaels conducts leasing, management, maintenance, and remediation of MacDill housing, including the residence, under the Harbor Bay name (paragraphs 35 and 36). By that undertaking, Michaels owed Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. a duty to perform the management, maintenance, inspection, and remediation of the residence with reasonable care.

182. On information and belief, and in the alternative to paragraph 176 under Rule 8(d)(2), the Harbor Bay personnel identified in Sections G through M were employees or agents of Michaels acting within the scope of their employment or agency (paragraph 37).

183. Michaels, through those personnel, breached the duty of reasonable care in each respect alleged in paragraph 177, which Plaintiffs restate as to Michaels: the three-month temporary roof covering (Section G); the closed December 4, 2024 and January 26, 2025 work orders (Sections H and I); the decision not to relocate the family during the April 2025 work (Section J); the verification recorded as passing without mold testing (Section K); the visual-only response to laboratory findings of HVAC contamination (Section L); the plastic over wet drywall and the completion report issued while rainwater continued to enter (Section M); and the failure to follow Harbor Bay's written mold policies (paragraph 44).

184. Those breaches caused Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. to inhale, ingest, and come into contact with mold, mold spores, sewage, and moisture within the residence. That exposure caused the physical injuries alleged in Section P.

185. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157.

COUNT V — GROSS NEGLIGENCE (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

186. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, E, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, O, and P.

187. AMC owed the duty alleged in paragraph 168. MMS owed the duty alleged in paragraph 175. On information and belief, Michaels owed the duty alleged in paragraph 181.

188. Harbor Bay personnel knew of circumstances at the residence that presented a danger to the health of its occupants beyond ordinary peril. Harbor Bay received the prior occupant's mold complaint (paragraph 45). Harbor Bay received the family's reports of sewage, visible mold, and a mold-like odor (Sections H and I). Harbor Bay retained IDE and received IDE's findings of suspected growth within the air handler and supply plenum (Section K). Harbor Bay received the family's work order concerning the November 6, 2025 spore counts (paragraph 90). Harbor Bay's own technicians confirmed moisture and growth in August 2026 (paragraphs 102 and 104).

189. With that knowledge, Harbor Bay personnel closed work orders while the reported conditions remained (paragraphs 60 and 64), recorded the residence as passing without mold testing (paragraphs 81 and 82), responded to laboratory findings of HVAC contamination with visual inspection only (paragraph 94), told Robert Scire that everything was clean (paragraph 95), proposed to paint over a leaking ceiling (paragraph 92), and placed plastic over wet drywall while the leak continued (paragraph 98).

190. That conduct is attributable to AMC because the personnel acted in performance of AMC's lease obligations (paragraph 38). That conduct is attributable to MMS as the employer or principal of those personnel (paragraph 176). On information and belief, that conduct is attributable to Michaels as the employer or principal of those personnel (paragraph 182).

191. That conduct showed a conscious disregard of, or indifference to, the health and safety of Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S.

192. On information and belief, the decisions identified in paragraph 128 were made or approved by Harbor Bay management personnel acting as managing agents of each Defendant on whose behalf they performed those functions (paragraphs 129 and 130).

193. That conduct caused the exposure and the physical injuries alleged in Section P.

194. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157 and punitive damages.

COUNT VI — VIOLATION OF FLA. STAT. § 83.51 (All Plaintiffs against AMC)

195. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, G, H, I, K, L, M, and P.

196. AMC is the landlord of the residence. Robert Scire is a tenant of the residence. Shelley Scire and R.S. are entitled to occupy the residence under the lease.

197. Fla. Stat. § 83.51(1)(a) requires a landlord, at all times during the tenancy, to comply with the requirements of applicable building, housing, and health codes. Fla. Stat. § 83.51(1)(b) requires a landlord, where there are no applicable building, housing, or health codes, to maintain the roofs, windows, doors, floors, steps, porches, exterior walls, foundations, and all other structural components in good repair and capable of resisting normal forces and loads, and the plumbing in reasonable working condition. Fla. Stat. § 83.54 makes those duties enforceable by civil action.

198. Plaintiffs allege in the alternative under Rule 8(d)(2) that the residence is subject to applicable building, housing, or health codes within the meaning of § 83.51(1)(a), or, if no such code applies, that AMC owed the duty stated in § 83.51(1)(b).

199. AMC did not maintain the roof in good repair. Rainwater entered through the roof and ceilings in October 2024, December 2025, July 2026, and August 2026 (Sections G, L, and M).

200. AMC did not maintain the plumbing in reasonable working condition. Every drain in the residence failed and sewage entered the residence in December 2024 (Section H).

201. AMC did not maintain the floors and other structural components in good repair. Water-damaged drywall remained in place from January 26, 2025 to about April 4, 2025 (Section I). Fungal contamination was present on subflooring surfaces on November 6, 2025 (Section L).

202. None of those conditions was created or caused by Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, R.S., or any person on the premises with their consent. Each condition arose from the roof, the plumbing, or the structure of the residence. The family reported each condition to Harbor Bay when it appeared.

203. AMC's failure to maintain the roof, the plumbing, and the structural components of the residence caused water intrusion, sewage intrusion, and moisture within the residence. Those conditions caused Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. to inhale, ingest, and come into contact with mold, mold spores, sewage, and moisture. That exposure caused the physical injuries alleged in Section P.

204. Plaintiffs seek damages for the physical injuries alleged in Section P and the losses alleged in paragraphs 151 through 154 that resulted from those injuries.

COUNT VII — BREACH OF CONTRACT, THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY (OPERATING AGREEMENT AND GROUND LEASE) (All Plaintiffs against AMC)

205. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, C, D, G, H, I, K, L, M, and P.

206. The Operating Agreement was entered into by AMC East, LLC and the Air Force. On information and belief, AMC is bound by the Operating Agreement, and the current version of the Operating Agreement under which AMC operates contains the language alleged in paragraphs 28 and 208.

207. The Ground Lease was entered into by AMC East, LLC and the Air Force in November 2007. On information and belief, AMC holds the lessee's interest under the Ground Lease and is bound by its obligations concerning the provision, management, and maintenance of housing at MacDill.

208. The Operating Agreement states that it is intended to further the goal of benefiting residents of MacDill military housing (paragraph 28). The Operating Agreement contains language establishing that residents of MacDill military housing are intended beneficiaries of the housing obligations in that agreement. On information and belief, the Ground Lease contains language stating that service members and their families residing at MacDill are intended beneficiaries of the housing obligations in that agreement. The text of each agreement is in Defendants' possession.

209. Robert Scire is a service member residing at MacDill. Shelley Scire and R.S. are members of his family residing with him. Each is a member of the class each agreement identifies as beneficiaries.

210. Each agreement obligates AMC to provide, manage, and maintain safe and habitable housing at MacDill.

211. AMC breached each agreement by failing to maintain the residence in the respects alleged in Sections G, H, I, K, L, and M.

212. Those breaches caused the losses alleged in paragraphs 155 through 157 and the exposure and physical injuries alleged in Section P.

213. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157.

COUNT VIII — BREACH OF CONTRACT, THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY (PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT) (All Plaintiffs against MMS)

214. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, C, D, G, H, I, K, L, M, and P.

215. On information and belief, MMS is a party to a property management agreement under which MMS undertook the management and maintenance of housing at MacDill, including the residence. The identity of the other party or parties to that agreement is known to Defendants.

216. On information and belief, the property management agreement contains provisions stating that residents of MacDill housing are intended beneficiaries of the management and maintenance obligations MMS undertook in that agreement.

217. Robert Scire, Shelley Scire, and R.S. are residents of MacDill housing and members of that beneficiary class.

218. MMS breached the property management agreement by failing to manage and maintain the residence in the respects alleged in Sections G, H, I, K, L, and M.

219. Those breaches caused the losses alleged in paragraphs 155 through 157 and the exposure and physical injuries alleged in Section P.

220. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157.

COUNT IX — UNJUST ENRICHMENT (IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO COUNT I) (Robert Scire against AMC)

221. Robert Scire incorporates Sections A, B, C, D, G, H, I, K, L, M, and P.

222. Robert Scire pleads this Count in the alternative to Count I under Rule 8(d)(2).

223. Robert Scire conferred a benefit on AMC. His BAH was paid to AMC each month of the tenancy in exchange for a habitable residence.

224. AMC knew of and accepted that benefit.

225. AMC retained the full BAH for months in which the residence was not habitable, including the displacement from September 15, 2025 through October 15, 2025, and the periods alleged in Sections G, H, I, L, and M, when sewage, mold, HVAC contamination, or active water intrusion was present. The value of the residence to Robert Scire during those periods was a fraction of the rent paid.

226. It would be inequitable for AMC to retain that benefit without paying its value.

227. Robert Scire seeks restitution of the difference between the BAH paid for the periods identified in paragraph 225 and the value of the residence during those periods, less any credit, abatement, or refund AMC provided.

COUNT X — NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (CONDITION OF THE RESIDENCE BEFORE OCCUPANCY) (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

228. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, E, F, N (Episode 1), and P.

229. On information and belief, AMC, through the lease, represented that the residence was in safe, clean, and habitable condition and free of mold, mildew, and signs of water intrusion (paragraphs 48 and 111). On information and belief, Harbor Bay leasing personnel employed by MMS or Michaels delivered that representation to Robert Scire.

230. That representation concerned a material existing fact about the condition of the residence.

231. On information and belief, the representation was false when made (paragraph 113).

232. Defendants made the representation without reasonable care to determine its truth. Harbor Bay had received a prior occupant's complaint of mold or suspected mold within the residence (paragraph 45). Harbor Bay personnel had access to that complaint (paragraph 50). A reasonable inquiry into the complaints concerning the residence would have disclosed it.

233. Defendants made the representation to induce Robert Scire to sign the lease and to induce the family to occupy the residence.

234. Robert Scire justifiably relied on the representation by signing the lease. Shelley Scire justifiably relied on the representation by moving into the residence with R.S. (paragraph 115). Neither would have done so had the prior complaint been disclosed (paragraph 51).

235. That reliance caused the exposure and the physical injuries alleged in Section P.

236. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157.

COUNT XI — NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION (REMEDIATION AND INSPECTION) (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

237. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, K, L, N (Episodes 2 and 3), and P.

238. Between September 30, 2025 and October 15, 2025, a Harbor Bay representative communicated to Robert Scire that the residence had passed post-remediation verification (paragraphs 116 and 117). On February 23, 2026, a Harbor Bay representative advised Robert Scire that everything was clean (paragraphs 122 and 124). Each representative acted in performance of AMC's lease obligations and, on information and belief, as an employee or agent of MMS or Michaels (paragraph 37).

239. Each statement concerned a material existing fact about the condition of the residence.

240. The statement that the residence had passed was false information in the context in which it was made. It conveyed that the remediation had been completed and verified. The verification omitted the mold testing that Harbor Bay's process ordinarily includes (paragraph 81). On information and belief, the HVAC system remained contaminated when the statement was made (paragraph 120).

241. The statement that everything was clean was false information in the context in which it was made. It conveyed that the locations identified by the November 6, 2025 sampling had been inspected and were free of contamination. Those locations had not been inspected (paragraph 125).

242. Harbor Bay personnel made each statement without reasonable care to determine its truth. Harbor Bay controlled the verification and the inspection. Harbor Bay made each statement without the testing or inspection that would have shown the condition of the residence.

243. Defendants made each statement to induce the family to return to the residence and to remain in it.

244. Robert Scire justifiably relied on each statement. The family returned on October 15, 2025 (paragraph 121). The family remained after February 23, 2026 (paragraph 127). Harbor Bay, not the family, had the authority and the responsibility to remediate the HVAC system and the concealed areas of the residence (paragraph 127).

245. That reliance prolonged the family's exposure after October 15, 2025 and after February 23, 2026, and caused the physical injuries alleged in Section P to continue and worsen during those periods (paragraphs 139, 140, 143, 146, and 150).

246. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157 for the period after October 15, 2025.

COUNT XII — FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

247. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, E, F, N (Episode 1), and P.

248. On information and belief, before September 16, 2024, AMC, through the lease delivered by Harbor Bay leasing personnel employed by MMS or Michaels, stated that the residence was safe, clean, habitable, and free of mold, mildew, and signs of water intrusion (paragraphs 48 and 111). The names of the Harbor Bay leasing personnel who handled the lease are known to Defendants.

249. That statement concerned a material fact. On information and belief, it was false (paragraph 113).

250. Harbor Bay personnel knew of the prior occupant's complaint of mold or suspected mold in the residence when the statement was made, because the complaint had been made to Harbor Bay (paragraph 114). On information and belief, the Harbor Bay leasing personnel who delivered the lease knew that the statement was false or made it with knowledge of the prior complaint and without regard to whether the statement was true.

251. Defendants made the statement intending that Robert Scire rely on it by signing the lease and that Shelley Scire rely on it by moving into the residence with R.S.

252. Robert Scire signed the lease in reliance on the statement. Shelley Scire moved into the residence with R.S. in reliance on the statement (paragraph 115). Through the lease, AMC obtained Robert Scire's BAH.

253. That reliance caused the exposure and the physical injuries alleged in Section P.

254. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157 and punitive damages.

COUNT XIII — FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION (REMEDIATION AND INSPECTION) (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

255. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, K, L, N (Episodes 2 and 3), O, and P.

256. Between September 30, 2025 and October 15, 2025, a Harbor Bay representative, whose identity is known to Defendants, communicated to Robert Scire that the residence had passed post-remediation verification (paragraph 116). In context, the statement conveyed that the remediation had been completed and verified and that the residence was safe to reoccupy (paragraph 117). The verification omitted mold testing and was performed while the HVAC system had reportedly been inoperable (paragraphs 80 and 81). Harbor Bay personnel knew those facts because Harbor Bay conducted the verification under its own process (paragraph 119).

257. On February 23, 2026, a Harbor Bay representative, whose identity is known to Defendants, told Robert Scire that everything was clean (paragraph 122). In context, the statement conveyed that the locations identified by the November 6, 2025 sampling had been inspected and were free of contamination (paragraph 124). Those locations had not been inspected (paragraph 125). Harbor Bay personnel knew that the inspections by Ivan and Julio were visual only and had not reached those locations, and knew of the November 6, 2025 results, because Robert Scire's February 2, 2026 request cited those results (paragraphs 123 and 126).

258. Each statement concerned a material fact about the condition of the residence.

259. Each representative acted in performance of AMC's lease obligations and, on information and belief, as an employee or agent of MMS or Michaels (paragraph 37).

260. Defendants made each statement intending that the family rely on it by returning to and remaining in the residence.

261. The family returned on October 15, 2025 in reliance on the first statement (paragraph 121). The family remained after February 23, 2026 in reliance on the second statement (paragraph 127). Through the family's continued occupancy, AMC obtained continued payment of BAH.

262. That reliance prolonged the family's exposure after October 15, 2025 and after February 23, 2026, and caused the physical injuries alleged in Section P to continue and worsen during those periods (paragraphs 139, 140, 143, 146, and 150).

263. On information and belief, the decisions to record the residence as passing without mold testing and to respond to the November 6, 2025 findings with visual inspection only were made or approved by Harbor Bay management personnel acting as managing agents of each Defendant (paragraphs 128 through 130).

264. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157 for the period after October 15, 2025, and punitive damages.

COUNT XIV — FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT (CONDITION OF THE RESIDENCE BEFORE OCCUPANCY) (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

265. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, E, F, N (Episode 1), and P.

266. Before September 16, 2024, Harbor Bay had received a prior occupant's complaint of mold or suspected mold within the residence (paragraph 45). That fact materially affected the safety and value of the residence. It was not observable to Robert Scire or Shelley Scire. It was not known to them (paragraph 49).

267. AMC, as lessor, and MMS and Michaels, as the operators of Harbor Bay through which the residence was leased, had a duty to disclose the prior complaint to the family before the lease was signed. The duty arose on two grounds. First, the fact was known to Harbor Bay and not accessible to the family (paragraph 50). Second, on information and belief, Defendants affirmatively stated through the lease that the residence was free of mold, mildew, and signs of water intrusion while withholding the complaint (paragraph 111). That statement was misleading without disclosure of the complaint.

268. Harbor Bay personnel knew of the prior complaint, because it had been made to Harbor Bay (paragraph 114).

269. Defendants did not disclose the prior complaint (paragraph 49). Defendants withheld it intending that Robert Scire sign the lease and that the family occupy the residence without knowledge of it.

270. Robert Scire relied on the absence of any disclosed mold history by signing the lease. Shelley Scire relied on it by moving into the residence with R.S. Neither would have done so had the complaint been disclosed (paragraph 51).

271. That reliance caused the exposure and the physical injuries alleged in Section P.

272. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157 and punitive damages.

COUNT XV — FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT (REMEDIATION AND INSPECTION) (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

273. Plaintiffs incorporate Sections A, B, D, K, L, N (Episodes 2 and 3), O, and P.

274. When a Harbor Bay representative communicated that the residence had passed post-remediation verification, Harbor Bay personnel knew, and the communication did not disclose, that mold testing had not been performed during the verification and that the HVAC system had reportedly been inoperable during the verification (paragraphs 118 and 119).

275. When a Harbor Bay representative told Robert Scire on February 23, 2026 that everything was clean, Harbor Bay personnel knew, and the communication did not disclose, that the inspection had not reached the ductwork, the HVAC intake areas, or the other concealed locations identified by the November 6, 2025 sampling (paragraphs 125 and 126).

276. Each omitted fact materially affected the safety of the residence. Each was within Harbor Bay's knowledge because Harbor Bay controlled the verification and the inspection. Each concerned concealed areas of the residence that Harbor Bay, not the family, had the authority and the responsibility to remediate (paragraph 127).

277. Defendants had a duty to disclose each omitted fact. The duty arose because Defendants made affirmative statements that the residence had passed and was clean (paragraphs 116 and 122), and those statements were misleading without the omitted facts.

278. Defendants withheld each fact intending that the family return to and remain in the residence.

279. Robert Scire understood each statement as made and without the omitted facts (paragraphs 121 and 127). The family returned on October 15, 2025 and remained after February 23, 2026 on that understanding. Had the omitted facts been disclosed, Robert Scire and Shelley Scire would not have returned to or remained in the residence with R.S. (paragraph 158).

280. That reliance prolonged the family's exposure after October 15, 2025 and after February 23, 2026, and caused the physical injuries alleged in Section P to continue and worsen during those periods (paragraphs 139, 140, 143, 146, and 150).

281. On information and belief, the decisions to record the residence as passing without mold testing and to respond to the November 6, 2025 findings with visual inspection only were made or approved by Harbor Bay management personnel acting as managing agents of each Defendant (paragraphs 128 through 130).

282. Plaintiffs seek the damages alleged in paragraphs 151 through 157 for the period after October 15, 2025, and punitive damages.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs request that the Court enter judgment in their favor and against Defendants as follows:

A. Compensatory damages for Robert Scire, for Shelley Scire, and for R.S., each in an amount to be determined at trial, on each Count on which that Plaintiff prevails, without duplication of recovery for the same loss under more than one Count;

B. On Count IX, in the alternative to Count I, restitution to Robert Scire as alleged in paragraph 227, without duplication of recovery;

C. Punitive damages on Counts V, XII, XIII, XIV, and XV, in an amount to be determined at trial;

D. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees to the extent authorized by the lease or by statute; and

E. Such other relief as the Court deems just.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiffs demand trial by jury on all issues so triable.

Signature block omitted.

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Element Map and Affirmative-Defense Negation Map

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ELEMENT MAP

Count I — Breach of the Lease (Robert Scire against AMC; Shelley Scire and R.S. as intended beneficiaries)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Valid contract between Robert Scire and AMC160, 30Beck v. Lazard Freres & Co., 175 F.3d 913, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 9039, 1999 WL 300894 (11th Cir. 1999)AMC as "Owner" on the lease is pleaded on information and belief (¶ 29). Confirm from the executed lease.
Plaintiff's performance160BeckRent paid through BAH (¶ 26).
Term breached: maintenance and repair covenant161, 33Beck¶¶ 33 and 161 rest on a lease. Confirm the covenant's wording and whether § 83.51 duties are modified in writing.
Breach163BeckFive dated breaches, each tied to a factual section.
Materiality164BeckPleaded as leaving the residence unfit while occupied.
Damages165–166, 152–157BeckPhysical-injury damages on a contract theory are contestable. ¶ 166 pleads them as foreseeable; ¶ 165 carries the contract losses independently so the count survives if ¶ 166 is struck.
Beneficiary standing of Shelley Scire and R.S.162, 30Thompson v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. of New York, 250 So. 2d 259, 1971 Fla. LEXIS 3506 (Fla. 1971)30 (occupants listed) is on information and belief. If occupants are not listed, strike Shelley and R.S. from the heading and ¶ 162.
Existence of the claim under 1950 law (enclave)—Eid, Doc. 55 at 6–7 (parallel count survived); Kirksey (damages for mental pain as of March 24, 1950)Contract claims existed in 1950; no enclave exposure. Kirksey supports only the ¶ 154 damages proposition, not the elements.

Count II — Negligence (All Plaintiffs against AMC)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Duty: inspect before possession; deliver a reasonably safe dwelling; repair dangerous conditions on notice168Mansur v. Eubanks, 401 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1981)Mansur states the duty "unless defects are waived by the tenant" and that it "may be modified by agreement of the parties." See negation-map row on waiver.
Vicarious responsibility for Harbor Bay personnel169, 38Mansur (duty runs to the landlord)38 (AMC engaged the property manager) is on information and belief.
Notice of each dangerous condition170Mansur ("upon notice of their existence by the tenant")Notice pleaded through reports, IDE findings, and the November 6, 2025 work order.
Breach171MansurEight dated breaches, each tied to a factual section.
Causation172, 147–150—Away-from-residence symptom change (¶¶ 140, 148) and per-period worsening (¶ 150).
Injury133–146—Per-plaintiff, dated, with treating specialties.
Damages173—Cross-reference to ¶¶ 151–157.
1950-law backstop (if enclave law governs)59–60, 63–64, 67, 98–105; 45, 49Felshin v. Sir, 149 Fla. 218, 5 So. 2d 600, 1942 Fla. LEXIS 755, 5 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1942); Kimmons v. Crawford, 92 Fla. 652, 109 So. 585 (Fla. 1926)Kimmons supplies liability for repairs negligently undertaken (distinguished from omission to perform a covenant to repair). Felshin supplies lessor liability for direct concealment of a known defect the lessee could not discover. Both sets of facts are pleaded.

Count III — Negligence (All Plaintiffs against MMS)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Undertaking and duty of reasonable care175, 32Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 2003 WL 22966277 (Fla. 2003)31 pleads that the lease names Michaels Management Services, Inc. as property manager and places its relationship to MMS in Defendants' knowledge. Eid n.3 records that the parties could not explain that relationship. If MMS was not the manager, the count fails as to MMS. Confirm from the executed lease.
MMS as employer or principal of Harbor Bay personnel176, 37Clay Electric (duty extends "to third parties")On information and belief; alternative under Rule 8(d)(2).
Breach177Clay ElectricEight breaches plus failure to follow written mold policies (¶ 44).
Causation178, 147–150—
Injury133–146—
Damages179—

Count IV — Negligence (All Plaintiffs against Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Undertaking under the Harbor Bay name181, 35–36Clay Electric35 (AMC's "common or trade name" statement in Mullins) is now on information and belief; Doc. 1 ¶ 6 pleaded it directly. Locate the Mullins docket entry and restore the direct allegation with a docket cite.
Michaels as alternative employer or principal182, 37Clay ElectricNo Michaels-domain employee is yet tied to this residence. One email from Robert Scire's records would supply ¶ 36.
Breach183Clay ElectricRestated rather than cross-referenced to Count III.
Causation184, 147–150—
Injury133–146—
Damages185—
Personal jurisdiction (threshold)22–23, 10, 36Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)1., 2.Doc. 20 asserts Rule 12(b)(2) as to Michaels in one sentence without argument. General jurisdiction under § 48.193(2) was deliberately dropped.

Count V — Gross Negligence (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Duty187Mansur (AMC); Clay Electric (MMS, Michaels)Cross-references ¶¶ 168, 175, 181.
Knowledge of circumstances presenting danger beyond ordinary peril188Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959)Five knowledge routes, each dated.
Conscious disregard or indifference189, 191CarrawaySix acts, each pin-cited.
Attribution to each Defendant190—AMC by lease performance (¶ 38); MMS and Michaels as employer or principal (¶¶ 176, 182).
Managing-agent conduct (punitive predicate)192, 128–130Fla. Stat. § 768.72(2)–(3)¶¶ 129–130 are on information and belief. Identity of the management personnel who made the ¶ 128 decisions comes from discovery.
Causation193—
Damages and punitive damages194Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 184 F.3d 1292, 44 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 757, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19581, 1999 WL 622013 (11th Cir. 1999)Florida treats gross negligence as a degree of negligence, not a freestanding tort. The count's function is the punitive predicate. Cohen was decided in diversity; no court has applied Cohen on an enclave claim. Posture note only.

Count VI — Violation of Fla. Stat. § 83.51 (All Plaintiffs against AMC)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Landlord and tenant196Fla. Stat. § 83.43§ 83.54 runs to a "tenant," which § 83.43 defines by entitlement to occupy. ¶ 196 pleads Shelley's and R.S.'s entitlement.
Duty under (1)(a) or (1)(b), pleaded in the alternative197–198Fla. Stat. § 83.51; Fla. Stat. § 83.54; Mullins Doc. 68 at 14, 20 n.21Doc. 68 held no Tampa code governed MacDill at cession; ¶ 198 pleads (1)(b) in the alternative. § 83.51(1) permits written modification for a single-family home; whether the lease modifies the duty is unknown.
Breach: roof199§ 83.51(1)(b)Four dated intrusions.
Breach: plumbing200§ 83.51(1)(b)December 2024.
Breach: floors and structural components201§ 83.51(1)(b)Water-damaged drywall; subflooring contamination.
Condition not caused by tenant or invitee202§ 83.51(4)
Causation203—
Damages, limited to physical injury and resulting losses204Doc. 68 at 20 n.21Doc. 68 dismissed the parallel Mullins count without prejudice and allowed re-assertion only "to the extent" brought to recover on account of physical injury. ¶¶ 203–204 so limit the count. Only post-1950 enactment in the pleading.

Count VII — Third-Party Beneficiary: Operating Agreement and Ground Lease (All Plaintiffs against AMC)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Existence of contracts; AMC bound206–207, 24, 28ThompsonAMC's succession to AMC East, LLC's obligations is on information and belief.
Intent to benefit, clearly expressed in the contract208Thompson; Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5614, 2005 WL 779314 (11th Cir. 2005)The Operating Agreement sentence (¶ 28) is pleaded directly; the Ground Lease language is on information and belief. Obtain the Operating Agreement (likely in the Mullins record) and quote the beneficiary clause before filing.
Membership in the beneficiary class209Thompson
Obligation to provide, manage, and maintain safe housing210—
Breach211—Cross-references Sections G, H, I, K, L, M.
Damages212–213—Doc. 68 at 18 held the parallel Mullins count stated a claim. Doc. 20 does not attack this count.

Count VIII — Third-Party Beneficiary: Property Management Agreement (All Plaintiffs against MMS)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Existence of contract; MMS as party215ThompsonOn information and belief. Counterparty unknown.
Intent to benefit residents, expressed in the contract216Thompson; BocheseOn information and belief.
Membership in the beneficiary class217—
Breach218—
Damages219–220—Lowest-confidence count. If the counterparty is Michaels Management Services, Inc. rather than MMS (¶ 31), the count fails as to MMS. Its function is to place the agreement within Rule 34.

Count IX — Unjust Enrichment, in the Alternative to Count I (Robert Scire against AMC)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Benefit conferred223Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012)BAH paid monthly.
Knowledge and acceptance224Resnick
Retention under inequitable circumstances225–226ResnickPeriods of non-habitability identified.
Alternative pleading222Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)
Measure of restitution227—Net of any credit, abatement, or refund.
Express-contract bar—Global Network Management, Ltd. v. CenturyLink Latin American Solutions, LLC, 67 F.4th 1312 (11th Cir. 2023) (Defendants' authority, Doc. 20 at 16)Doc. 20 states the lease's existence is "undisputed." Expect dismissal. Value: preserves restitution if the lease's maintenance covenant is held not to reach habitability. No enclave exposure.

Count X — Negligent Misrepresentation: Condition Before Occupancy (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Representation of material existing fact229–230, 48, 111Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 22 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 365, 696 So. 2d 334, 1997 Fla. LEXIS 944, 1997 WL 348100 (Fla. 1997) (Restatement § 552)Lease-dependent. If the "safe, clean, and habitable" language is a tenant move-in acknowledgment rather than an Owner statement, ¶¶ 229–231 fail. Strike Count X and rest the pre-occupancy theory on Count XIV.
Falsity231, 113GilchristOn information and belief; supported by the prior complaint and mold within five months.
Lack of reasonable care232, 45, 50Gilchrist
Intent to induce233Gilchrist
Justifiable reliance234, 115, 51GilchristShelley's reliance is on a statement delivered to Robert; ¶ 30 (occupants listed) supports her as within the group the statement was meant to reach.
Injury and damages235–236Gilchrist
Rule 9(b) particulars48, 111, 115Lamm ex rel. Ira v. State Street Bank & Trust, 749 F.3d 938, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6868, 2014 WL 1410172 (11th Cir. 2014) (Defendants' authority, Doc. 20 at 16)Leasing personnel unnamed; names placed in Defendants' knowledge.
Enclave—Doc. 68 at 17; Wheeler v. Baars, 33 Fla. 696 (Fla. 1894)Doc. 68 held misrepresentation claims not enclave-barred, citing Wheeler (15 So. 584).

Count XI — Negligent Misrepresentation: Remediation and Inspection (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Statements of material existing fact238–239, 116–117, 122–124GilchristChannel, date, and speaker of the October 2025 "passed" communication must come from Robert Scire's records. ¶ 95 quotes "no moisture was found" and paraphrases "everything was clean"; confirm whether "clean" was the speaker's word.
Falsity in context240–241Gilchrist"Passed" is literally true; falsity rests on the meaning conveyed (¶ 117).
Lack of reasonable care242Gilchrist
Intent to induce243Gilchrist
Justifiable reliance244, 121, 127GilchristReliance after the family's own November 6, 2025 results is the defense target. ¶ 127 answers it; comparative negligence under Gilchrist is a jury question.
Causation245, 150—Per-period worsening.
Damages (post-October 15, 2025)246—
Rule 9(b) particulars83, 95, 116, 122LammSpeaker identities placed in Defendants' knowledge.

Count XII — Fraudulent Inducement (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
False statement of material fact248–249Butler v. Yusem, 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 493, 44 So. 3d 102, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 1508, 2010 WL 3488979 (Fla. 2010)Lease-dependent as Count X.
Knowledge of falsity250, 114ButlerCorporate knowledge rests on Harbor Bay's receipt of the complaint (¶ 114). Scienter of the individual who delivered the lease is on information and belief.
Intent to induce251Butler
Reliance and action252Butler ("Justifiable reliance is not a necessary element")
Consequent injury253Butler
Damages and punitive damages254Butler; § 768.72
Rule 9(b) particulars48, 111, 115United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 52 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 793, 15 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 560, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 8899 (11th Cir. 2002)"Who" is the open particular.
Enclave—Doc. 68 at 18Fraud counts held not enclave-barred.

Count XIII — Fraudulent Misrepresentation: Remediation and Inspection (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
False statements and knowledge256–257, 119, 126Butler"Passed" is literally true: Harbor Bay recorded a pass. The count rests on the meaning conveyed (¶ 117). Count XV carries the same facts as an omission without that exposure.
Materiality258Butler
Attribution259—On information and belief as to MMS and Michaels.
Intent to induce260Butler
Reliance and action261Butler
Consequent injury262Butler
Managing-agent conduct (punitive predicate)263, 128–130§ 768.72(3)On information and belief.
Damages and punitive damages264—
Rule 9(b) particulars83, 95, 116, 122ClausenSame speaker gap as Count XI.

Count XIV — Fraudulent Concealment: Condition Before Occupancy (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Concealed fact materially affecting safety and value; not observable; not known266Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 54 U.S.L.W. 2303 (Fla. 1985)Johnson is a seller case; extension to a residential lessor is not settled by the Florida Supreme Court.
Duty to disclose, two grounds267Johnson (ground one); Felshin (1950 concealment rule); half-truth (ground two)Ground two (affirmative statement misleading without the omitted fact) does not depend on Johnson. Both grounds pleaded. Strongest pre-occupancy count.
Knowledge268Butler
Intent269Butler
Reliance270Butler
Injury271—
Damages and punitive damages272§ 768.72

Count XV — Fraudulent Concealment: Remediation and Inspection (All Plaintiffs against AMC, MMS, and Michaels)

ElementParagraphsAuthorityGap or note
Omitted facts274–275JohnsonThe omission (no mold testing, ¶ 81) is a pleaded fact rather than a contested meaning. Stronger than Count XIII on the same episode.
Materiality and knowledge276Johnson
Duty to disclose (half-truth)277Johnson; Butler
Intent278Butler
Reliance279, 158Butler
Injury280—
Managing-agent conduct (punitive predicate)281, 128–130§ 768.72(3)
Damages and punitive damages282—Same channel and speaker gap as Count XI.

COUNTS NOT PLEADED

CountElement that fails on this record
Negligent infliction of emotional distressNone fails on the record. Consequence: the § 5001(b) "injury" question that Doc. 68 n.20 flagged as the textually weaker reading is not carried by this pleading and cannot be preserved from it.
Intentional infliction of emotional distressOutrageousness. The facts pleaded are management and maintenance failures, not conduct beyond all bounds of decency. Doc. 68 at 13 also bars the claim unconditionally.
Medical monitoringAbsence of present physical injury. The claim exists for exposure without present injury; this pleading alleges present physical injury in ¶¶ 133–146. Doc. 68 at 16 holds the claim inapplicable where physical injury is alleged.
FDUTPAActual damages. [Fla. Stat. § 501.212(3)] excludes personal-injury claims, and the pleading's losses are personal-injury losses. Exclusion operates independently of the enclave.
NuisanceUse of Defendants' property interfering with Plaintiffs' use. No fact pleads a condition on separate property of Defendants.
Negligence per seStatute enacted to protect a particular class. Chapter 386 protects the public generally under deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, 281 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973). The facts are carried by Counts II–IV.
10 U.S.C. § 2891a(d)(2)Withholding of a test result beyond the statutory period. No fact pleads that any test result was withheld beyond three days.

AFFIRMATIVE-DEFENSE NEGATION MAP

The pleading names none of these defenses and argues none of them. Strength is measured at Rule 12 against a court looking for a reason to dismiss.

Anticipated defenseCountsFacts pleaded against itParagraphsStrength
Federal-enclave limitation (post-1950 claims)All; VI principally (only post-1950 enactment)The action is brought to recover on account of physical injury; each plaintiff's injuries are pleaded with dates, diagnoses, and treating specialties; causation is tied to exposure in the residence; emotional distress is pleaded only as accompanying physical injury; each count's injury paragraph ties the count to Section P14, 16, 133–146, 147–150, 154; 166, 172, 178, 184, 193, 203–204, 212, 219, 235, 245, 253, 262, 271, 280Strong. Doc. 68 at 12 n.15 and 20 n.21 state the "brought to recover on account of" condition; ¶ 16 meets it at the action level and each count ties to Section P. Doc. 68 holds Counts X–XV not barred.
Lack of personal jurisdiction over Michaels (Doc. 20, Rule 12(b)(2))IV, V, X–XVFlorida registration; MacDill on Michaels's website; Michaels-domain employees communicating with MacDill residents; AMC's own "trade name" statement; acts at the residence10, 22–23, 35–36, 181Moderate. § 48.193(1)(a)1. and 2. facts pleaded; ¶ 35 is on information and belief. One Michaels-domain email about this residence would close the gap.
Shotgun pleading (Doc. 20 § IV.c)AllTargeted incorporation by section in every count; negligence split into single-defendant counts; alternative employer pleaded under Rule 8(d)(2) with identity placed in Defendants' knowledge; per-plaintiff injuries and losses159, 167, 174, 180, 186, 195, 205, 214, 221, 228, 237, 247, 255, 265, 273; 37; 133–146; 152–153Strong. Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 92 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 378, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 11750, 2015 WL 4098270 (11th Cir. 2015) categories one and four are the ones Doc. 20 invokes; neither survives the final structure.
Rule 9(b) particularityX–XVWho: named technicians and representatives whose identity is placed in Defendants' possession. What and when: quoted or dated statements. How misled: the meaning conveyed in context. What obtained: BAH; continued occupancy48, 60, 79, 83, 92, 94–95, 101, 104, 108; 111, 116, 122; 115, 117, 121, 124, 127Moderate. Clausen particulars are met except the October 2025 speaker and channel. Lamm applies 9(b) to negligent misrepresentation; Defendants cited it.
Tenant-caused condition (§ 83.51(4))VIEach condition originated in the roof, plumbing, HVAC, or structure; the family reported each on discovery202; 54, 57–58, 62, 65, 76, 87–88, 91, 102, 106; 54, 62, 65–66, 90–91, 93, 106, 109Strong.
Waiver or modification of the landlord's duty (Mansur; § 83.51(1))I, II, VIThe lease obligates AMC to repair; the lease and handbook direct reporting, which the family did; § 83.51(1)(a) and (1)(b) pleaded in the alternative33, 41–42, 198; reporting paragraphs aboveGap. Mansur's duty exists "unless defects are waived by the tenant" and "may be modified by agreement of the parties." The Mold Addendum (¶ 34) is the likeliest vehicle for a shifted duty. If the addendum assigns reporting or ventilation duties to the tenant, add the facts of compliance to Section D.
Act of God (Hurricane Milton)I–VIIIThe claims rest on the response, not the storm: temporary covering for more than three months; family kept inside during repairs; later leaks unconnected to the storm55–56, 69–72, 91, 97, 106–108Strong.
Independent contractor (IDE; April 2025 contractors)II–VIDE and the contractors are expressly excluded from the employee allegation; Harbor Bay retained them, made the relocation decision, and ran the verification under its own process37, 69, 71, 74, 79, 81–82, 128Strong.
Comparative fault; assumption of risk (remained after knowledge)II–V, X, XI; damages on all countsHumanitarian-assignment context; relocation requested; retaliation concern; containment requested; Harbor Bay's authority and responsibility over concealed areas; what the family would have done if told46, 61, 90, 109, 117, 121, 127, 158Not a Rule 12 ground. Fla. Stat. § 768.81; Gilchrist applies comparative negligence to negligent misrepresentation. Jury question.
Express contract bars restitutionIXPleaded in the alternative; benefit tied to identified periods of non-habitability; measure stated222, 225, 227Weak. Global Network is Defendants' authority and the lease is "undisputed." Expect dismissal; the count's value is preservation.
Economic-loss rule; independent-tort doctrineX–XVInducement statements pre-date the contract; every tort count seeks physical-injury damages111–115, 149–154Strong. Tiara Condominium Ass'n v. Marsh & McLennan Companies, 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 151, 110 So. 3d 399, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 343, 2013 WL 828003 (Fla. 2013) confines the rule to products liability; HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 21 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 447, 685 So. 2d 1238, 1996 Fla. LEXIS 1796, 1996 WL 600501 (Fla. 1996) treats fraud in the inducement as an independent tort.
Punitive-damages pleading bar (§ 768.72(1))V, XII–XVCorporate-conduct facts for § 768.72(3) pleaded by information and belief128–130, 192, 263, 281Moderate. Cohen holds the leave requirement inapplicable in federal court (diversity posture). The substantive § 768.72(2)–(3) standard is pleaded, not argued. Identity of the managing agents is a discovery item.
No duty to disclose (arm's-length transaction)XIV, XVFact known to Harbor Bay and inaccessible to the family; affirmative statements misleading without the omitted fact50, 111–112, 267, 277Strong on the half-truth ground; moderate on the Johnson ground (seller case; lessor extension unsettled). Both pleaded.
Non-signatory standing (Shelley; R.S.)I, VI, VII, VIIIOccupants listed on the lease; entitlement to occupy; beneficiary class membership30, 47, 162, 196, 209, 217Lease-dependent. § 83.43 definition of "tenant" supports Count VI; Count I depends on the occupant listing (¶ 30, on information and belief).
Statute of limitations (§ 95.11)AllNot pleaded, deliberately. Chronology: move-in September 16, 2024; first injury onset January 2025; original complaint September 15, 2026—Strong by chronology. Every injury date falls within two years of filing under Fla. Stat. § 95.11. Eid n.5 noted Defendants' unexplained reliance on a 2023 statute under a 1950-law theory. Do not plead accrual or tolling.
Preexisting condition; alternative causation (plausibility attack)II–VI, XI, XIII, XVPreexisting episodes pleaded and their worsening dated; symptom change away from the residence; per-period worsening133, 140, 147–148, 150Strong at Rule 12. Pleading the preexisting episodes forecloses the argument that they were concealed.
Judicial notice of enclave status (Doc. 20 § III)All (jurisdictional)Not contested; the cession is pleaded as the basis of federal-question jurisdiction14Not contested. Doc. 20's request to notice the Mullins and Eid rulings is a request to notice legal conclusions; it does not bear on the pleading.

AUTHORITIES RELIED ON (MAP ONLY; NONE APPEARS IN THE PLEADING)

AuthorityProposition usedPosture
Beck v. Lazard Freres & Co. (11th Cir. 1999)Elements of breach of contract under Florida law (Count I).Appeal from Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on limitations grounds (§ 95.11(2)(b)); affirmed. Elements stated as background.
Mansur v. Eubanks (Fla. 1981)Landlord's duty to inspect before possession, deliver a reasonably safe dwelling, and repair dangerous conditions on notice; duty subject to tenant waiver and modification by agreement (Count II; waiver row).Conflict review; DCA affirmance of summary judgment for the landlord quashed; remanded. Favorable posture: the duty was recognized to reverse a judgment for the landlord.
Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Johnson (Fla. 2003)Undertaker's doctrine: one who undertakes a service "assumes a duty to act carefully"; duty extends "to third parties" (Counts III–V).Conflict review; summary judgment for the maintenance contractor reversed; duty held to exist.
Carraway v. Revell (Fla. 1959)Gross negligence as a degree of negligence between simple negligence and willful and wanton conduct; in doubtful cases a jury question (Count V). Not quoted.Certiorari on conflict and certified question of great public interest; after non-jury trial and judgment for defendant; quashed and remanded. Guest-statute context.
Thompson v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. of New York (Fla. 1971)Third-party beneficiary: intent to benefit must be clear and expressed in the contract (Counts I, VII, VIII).Certiorari on conflict; review of DCA affirmance of dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. Pleading-stage posture.
Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet (11th Cir. 2005)Third-party beneficiary standing requires intended, not incidental, beneficiary status (Counts VII, VIII).Appeal from summary judgment; vacated for lack of Article III standing. Summary-judgment posture; the beneficiary rule is applied to a jurisdictional question, not to pleading sufficiency.
Resnick v. AvMed, Inc. (11th Cir. 2012)Elements of unjust enrichment under Florida law; sufficiency at the pleading stage (Count IX).Appeal from Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; reversed in part; the unjust-enrichment claim held sufficiently pleaded. Rule 12 posture.
Global Network Management, Ltd. v. CenturyLink Latin American Solutions, LLC (11th Cir. 2023)An express contract on the same subject bars a claim for contract implied in law (Count IX; Defendants' authority, Doc. 20 at 16).Appeal from Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal with prejudice; dismissal of the implied-in-law claim affirmed. Rule 12 posture, adverse.
Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc. (Fla. 1997)Negligent misrepresentation under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552; comparative negligence under § 768.81 applies (Counts X, XI; comparative-fault row).Certified question from the Eleventh Circuit after jury verdict for plaintiff and JNOV for defendant. Post-trial posture; the holding states the elements and the comparative-fault rule.
Butler v. Yusem (Fla. 2010)Elements of fraudulent misrepresentation; "Justifiable reliance is not a necessary element of fraudulent misrepresentation" (Counts XII–XV).Conflict review of a post-trial DCA decision (tipsy-coachman application); DCA quashed on the reliance question. Post-trial posture.
Johnson v. Davis (Fla. 1985)Duty to disclose "facts materially affecting the value of the property which are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer"; rule "equally applicable to all forms of real property" (Counts XIV, XV).Conflict review after bench trial and final judgment; DCA approved. Residential seller case; lessor extension not decided.
Wheeler v. Baars (Fla. 1894)Elements of deceit; scienter provable by three phases of proof; principal liable for agent's deceit in the course of employment (Count X enclave row; Doc. 68 relies on it as 15 So. 584).Appeal after jury verdict for plaintiff in an action for deceit; reversed for instruction error. Post-trial posture; the elements appear in the syllabus and opinion.
Felshin v. Sir (Fla. 1942)Lessor liability for fraud, misrepresentation, or direct concealment of a known fact the lessee had no reasonable opportunity to discover; otherwise no implied warranty of condition (Counts II, XIV, 1950-law backstop).Appeal after jury verdict for the landlord; affirmed. The concealment rule appears in a quotation from 32 Am. Jur. adopted by the court. Cite as the rule stated, not as a holding for the tenant.
Kimmons v. Crawford (Fla. 1926)Landlord liable for injury caused by repairs negligently undertaken; distinguished from omission to perform a covenant to repair (Count II, 1950-law backstop).Writ of error from judgment for the landlord on demurrer; reversed. Pleading-stage posture, favorable.
Kirksey v. Jernigan (Fla. 1950)Florida law as of March 24, 1950 on recoverability of compensatory damages for mental pain and punitive damages in a tort action (¶ 154; enclave timing). Not a contract-elements authority.Appeal from judgment on demurrer in a tort action. Decided five days before the March 29, 1950 cession. Confirm the intended proposition before citing.
deJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad (Fla. 1973)A statute protecting the public generally supports evidence of negligence, not negligence per se (Counts Not Pleaded).Certified question of great public interest and conflict review after jury trial; DCA reversed.
Tiara Condominium Ass'n v. Marsh & McLennan Companies (Fla. 2013)Economic loss rule limited to products liability cases (economic-loss row).Certified question from the Eleventh Circuit following summary judgment; answered in the negative.
HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A. (Fla. 1996)Fraudulent inducement is an independent tort not barred by the economic loss rule (economic-loss row).Review of DCA decision after jury finding of fraudulent inducement and judgment thereon; approved. Post-trial posture.
United States ex rel. Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of America, Inc. (11th Cir. 2002)Rule 9(b) particulars: who, what, when, where, how misled, what obtained (Counts XII–XV; 9(b) row).Appeal from two Rule 9(b) dismissals; affirmed. Rule 12 posture, adverse to the pleader.
Lamm ex rel. Ira v. State Street Bank & Trust (11th Cir. 2014)"Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard applies to negligent misrepresentation claims" (Counts X, XI; Defendants' authority, Doc. 20 at 16).Appeal from Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; affirmed. Rule 12 posture, adverse to the pleader.
Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office (11th Cir. 2015)Four categories of shotgun pleading (shotgun row).Appeal from Rule 8(a)(2)/10(b) dismissal with prejudice; reversed in part. Rule 12 posture, favorable.
Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc. (11th Cir. 1999)"[T]he pleading requirements of Florida Statutes § 768.72 are inapplicable in federal diversity cases" (Count V; punitive row).Appeal from order striking punitive-damages request and dismissing for lack of diversity jurisdiction; reversed. Diversity posture; no court has applied Cohen on an enclave claim.
Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Newton (U.S. 2019)Federal-enclave model: on transfer of jurisdiction, "only the [state] law in effect at the time of the transfer of jurisdiction continues in force" as surrogate federal law; later state law presumptively does not apply (¶ 14; enclave row).Certiorari to resolve a Fifth–Ninth Circuit split on OCSLA choice of law. The enclave rule is stated as background to OCSLA interpretation, not as a holding on an enclave claim.
Mullins v. The Michaels Organization, LLC, No. 8:25-cv-02637, Doc. 68 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2026)Post-cession statutory claims survive only "to the extent" brought to recover on account of physical injury; § 83.51 count dismissed without prejudice; misrepresentation and fraud counts not enclave-barred; third-party beneficiary count stated a claim; IIED and medical monitoring barred or inapplicable (Counts VI, VII, X–XV; enclave row; Counts Not Pleaded).District court order on a motion to dismiss in a parallel action. Not a reported case; persuasive only; same district.
Eid, Doc. 55 (M.D. Fla.)Parallel contract count survived dismissal (at 6–7); parties could not explain the Michaels Management Services, Inc./MMS relationship (n.3); Defendants' unexplained reliance on a 2023 statute (n.5) (Counts I, III; limitations row).District court order on a motion to dismiss in a parallel action. Not a reported case; persuasive only.
Doc. 20 (this case)Defendants' motion to dismiss: Rule 12(b)(2) as to Michaels; shotgun pleading; Rule 9(b) via Lamm; express-contract bar via Global Network; "undisputed" lease.Pending adverse filing. Response due October 22, 2026 under M.D. Fla. L.R. 3.01(d); amendment as of course due October 29, 2026.
Fla. Stat. § 83.51Landlord's maintenance duty under (1)(a) and (1)(b); written modification for single-family homes; tenant-caused exclusion under (4) (Count VI).Statutory text. Post-1950 enactment; enclave-limited per Doc. 68.
Fla. Stat. § 83.54Duties under § 83.51 enforceable by civil action (Count VI).Statutory text.
Fla. Stat. § 83.43"Tenant" defined by entitlement to occupy (Count VI; non-signatory row).Statutory text.
Fla. Stat. § 768.72Punitive damages: employer liability standard in (2)–(3); pleading-leave requirement in (1) (Counts V, XII–XV).Statutory text; (1) held procedural and inapplicable in federal court by Cohen.
Fla. Stat. § 768.81Comparative fault (comparative-fault row).Statutory text.
Fla. Stat. § 95.11Limitations periods (limitations row).Statutory text. Not pleaded.
Fla. Stat. § 48.193Long-arm jurisdiction, (1)(a)1., 2., 7. (¶¶ 20–23; Count IV).Statutory text. Cited in the pleading.
28 U.S.C. § 5001(b)Florida law governs the rights of the parties in an action for physical injury on a federal enclave (¶ 16).Statutory text. Cited in the pleading.
28 U.S.C. § 1331; 28 U.S.C. § 1367; 28 U.S.C. § 1391; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2; Fed. R. Civ. P. 10Jurisdiction, venue, amendment as of course, alternative pleading, minor's initials, form (¶¶ 9, 14–15, 19, 37, 198, 222; preamble).Statutory and rule text. Cited in the pleading; confirmed.