Recent Docket Entry
Greiner v. Spacelabs Healthcare, LLC: First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
A woman alleges her employer and its parent company terminated her at age 59 because of her sex and age, and in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination. The parent company has moved to dismiss the complaint.
Court: M.D. Fla.Case: 5:26-cv-00611
Documents
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
OSI Systems, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss Complaint
First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
Element Map and Affirmative-Defense Negation Map
28 pp.
View PDFFIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff Colleen Greiner ("Plaintiff") sues Spacelabs Healthcare, LLC ("Spacelabs") and OSI Systems, Inc. ("OSI") and alleges:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. On July 1, 2025, Adam Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment at Spacelabs. Plaintiff was 59 years old. In a work history of more than 40 years, no employer had questioned Plaintiff's performance until Martin became Plaintiff's manager.
2. Martin is a man. Martin is substantially younger than Plaintiff. Plaintiff was the oldest person on Martin's team. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin rolled his eyes. Martin sighed. Martin showed disinterest and irritation. Martin did not treat Plaintiff's male co-workers that way. Martin did not treat Plaintiff's younger co-workers that way.
3. Twice Plaintiff met with Martin about Martin's conduct toward her. Twice, within days, Martin answered with criticism of Plaintiff's performance. On April 4, 2025, Martin placed Plaintiff on a performance improvement plan. Plaintiff told Spacelabs' human resources manager that Martin treated her that way because she was the oldest person on the team and because she is a woman. Plaintiff asked for an investigation. The answer came the next day: the plan "will remain in effect."
4. Plaintiff then wrote to Martin's manager. Plaintiff wrote to Glenn Grindstaff, the chief human resource officer of OSI, Spacelabs' parent company, that she was "an almost 60 year old, mature female" whose manager "has displayed strong bias, discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions." Grindstaff replied, "I'll look into it." Plaintiff complained to Spacelabs' new president. About two weeks later, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment.
5. Plaintiff brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 for discrimination because of sex, discrimination because of age, and retaliation.
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
6. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4).
7. Counts IV, V, XI, and XII arise under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII").
8. Counts VI, VII, XIII, and XIV arise under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. ("the ADEA").
9. Counts I, II, III, VIII, IX, and X arise under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. § 760.01 et seq. ("the FCRA"). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over those counts under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The FCRA counts arise from the same employment, the same complaints, and the same termination as the Title VII and ADEA counts.
10. Venue is proper in this district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Plaintiff worked for Spacelabs in Lake County, Florida. A substantial part of the events alleged in this pleading occurred in this district.
11. Venue is also proper under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The unlawful employment practices alleged in Counts IV, V, XI, and XII were committed in this district.
II. PARTIES
12. Plaintiff is a natural person who resides in Sumter County, Florida.
13. Plaintiff is female.
14. Plaintiff was 59 years old on July 1, 2025.
15. Spacelabs is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Washington. Spacelabs' principal place of business is in the State of Washington.
16. Spacelabs is sued as Plaintiff's employer.
17. OSI is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware. OSI's principal place of business is in the State of California.
18. OSI is sued as Plaintiff's employer.
III. EMPLOYMENT AND COVERAGE
A. Spacelabs
19. Plaintiff joined Spacelabs as part of the PeraHealth/Rothman Index acquisition.
20. Plaintiff worked for Spacelabs from on or about February 1, 2023 until July 1, 2025.
21. Plaintiff worked in sales for Spacelabs' Rothman Index business.
22. Spacelabs issued Plaintiff an email address on the spacelabs.com domain.
23. More than one year before June 1, 2025, Adam Martin ("Martin") became Plaintiff's direct manager at Spacelabs. Martin remained Plaintiff's direct manager through July 1, 2025.
24. Scott Iserman ("Iserman") was Martin's manager and Spacelabs' Vice President of Sales.
25. Kerry Stevenson ("Stevenson") was a Senior Human Resources Manager for Spacelabs.
26. In June 2025, Wilson Constantine ("Constantine") was the new President of Spacelabs.
27. Spacelabs sells its products, including the Rothman Index, through a sales organization led by a Vice President of Sales. Spacelabs is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.
28. Spacelabs employs 20 or more employees. Spacelabs is an "employer" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), and Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7).
B. OSI
29. Spacelabs is a wholly owned subsidiary of OSI.
30. Glenn Grindstaff ("Grindstaff") was OSI's Chief Human Resource Officer in June 2025.
31. On June 1, 2025 and on or about June 7, 2025, Plaintiff, a Spacelabs employee, sent complaints about Martin and the PIP to Grindstaff at OSI. Grindstaff responded to each. Those complaints and responses are described in Section VII.C.
32. OSI employs 20 or more employees. OSI is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.
33. OSI is an "employer" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), and Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7).
34. With respect to Plaintiff's employment, Spacelabs and OSI operated as a single, integrated employer.
IV. PLAINTIFF'S WORK HISTORY
35. Plaintiff's work history before July 1, 2025 spanned more than 40 years.
36. Plaintiff is a veteran.
37. Before Spacelabs, Plaintiff worked for more than 18 years for a Fortune 15 company.
38. At that company, Plaintiff served as a Vice President of Sales. Plaintiff led a team of 250 sales representatives. Plaintiff was responsible for an annual budget of one billion dollars.
39. During the transition that followed the PeraHealth/Rothman Index acquisition, several PeraHealth employees left. Those departures shifted Plaintiff into filling the gap they left.
40. Before Martin became Plaintiff's manager, no employer had questioned Plaintiff's performance.
V. MARTIN'S CONDUCT TOWARD PLAINTIFF
A. Martin's treatment of Plaintiff
41. When Plaintiff gave information or input in meetings, Martin rolled his eyes.
42. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin sighed.
43. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin displayed disinterest and irritation.
44. Martin's treatment of Plaintiff included a lack of communication and a lack of support.
45. During the year before June 1, 2025, Plaintiff scheduled two formal meetings with Martin. In those meetings, Plaintiff reviewed Martin's conduct toward her, including the eye rolling, the sighing, and the lack of communication and support.
46. After each of those two meetings, within days, Martin cited performance issues to Plaintiff.
47. In or before June 2025, Martin stated that because he is a white male he could drive business, while it would be difficult for a black male to do so.
B. Sex
48. Martin is male.
49. Martin did not roll his eyes, sigh, or display disinterest or irritation when Plaintiff's male co-workers spoke in meetings.
C. Age
50. Martin is substantially younger than Plaintiff.
51. Plaintiff was the oldest person on Martin's team.
52. Martin did not roll his eyes, sigh, or display disinterest or irritation when Plaintiff's younger co-workers spoke in meetings.
53. Upon information and belief, Spacelabs filled Plaintiff's position with a substantially younger employee after July 1, 2025.
VI. THE PIP
54. On April 4, 2025, Martin presented Plaintiff with a performance improvement plan ("the PIP"). Stevenson attended and participated in the presentation.
55. The PIP's statements about Plaintiff's performance were not accurate.
56. The PIP listed, under "Actions Expected," an item to "engage in regular performance reviews."
57. Martin scheduled PIP action-plan meetings with Plaintiff. The meetings were weekly.
58. The PIP remained in effect from April 4, 2025 through July 1, 2025.
59. After April 15, 2025, Plaintiff attended the weekly PIP meetings.
VII. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINTS
A. Stevenson, April 2025
60. On Friday, April 11, 2025, Plaintiff spoke with Stevenson about the PIP.
61. In April 2025, Plaintiff told Stevenson that Martin had discriminated against her, harassed her, demeaned her, ignored her, and treated her with disdain. Plaintiff told Stevenson that Martin did so because Plaintiff was the oldest person on Martin's team and because she is a woman.
62. On Monday, April 14, 2025, Plaintiff sent Stevenson an email with Plaintiff's written response to the PIP attached.
63. In the April 14, 2025 email, Plaintiff wrote: "I request the Performance Improvement Plan be suspended immediately pending review of my response, along with investigation into the erroneous information provided."
64. In the April 14, 2025 email, Plaintiff asked that the investigation include interviews with the Spacelabs team members she worked with. Plaintiff asked that Martin receive disciplinary action.
65. On April 15, 2025, Stevenson replied by email. Stevenson wrote: "the Performance Improvement Plan will remain in effect." Stevenson wrote: "Managers are responsible to provide their team members with feedback and performance coaching up to and including PIPs." Stevenson wrote: "Both Adam and I are here to provide support for you while you work through the PIP."
66. Stevenson's April 15, 2025 email did not state that Spacelabs would investigate Plaintiff's complaint.
67. Spacelabs did not investigate Plaintiff's April 2025 complaint. Spacelabs took no corrective action.
B. Iserman, May 16, 2025
68. On Friday, May 16, 2025, Plaintiff sent Iserman an email requesting a meeting about the PIP and Martin's conduct. Plaintiff attached her written response to the PIP.
69. In the May 16, 2025 email, Plaintiff described Martin "rolling his eyes when I speak, deep sighing, lack of communication/support etc." Plaintiff wrote that she had "never, ever had my performance called into question throughout my entire career, until Adam."
70. Iserman did not respond to the May 16, 2025 email.
C. Grindstaff, June 2025
71. On Sunday, June 1, 2025, Plaintiff sent Grindstaff an email with the subject line "Employee Meeting Request." Plaintiff marked the email high importance. Plaintiff attached her written response to the PIP.
72. The June 1, 2025 email included, below Plaintiff's message, Plaintiff's April 14, 2025 email to Stevenson, Stevenson's April 15, 2025 reply, and Plaintiff's May 16, 2025 email to Iserman.
73. In the June 1, 2025 email, Plaintiff wrote: "I am an almost 60 year old, mature female, a veteran with a successful 40+ year work history, who for the first time, is having my performance questioned, inappropriately, in an attempt to remove me from the organization, by a Manager who has displayed strong bias, discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions (as witnessed by others) towards me, which is extremely concerning."
74. In the June 1, 2025 email, Plaintiff wrote that Martin's conduct included "inappropriate, disrespectful, discriminating, and hostile behavior."
75. In the June 1, 2025 email, Plaintiff wrote that Stevenson had responded "indicating that the PIP would remain, thus refusing to investigate my concerns," and that Plaintiff was left "without appropriate HR representation/advocacy."
76. In the June 1, 2025 email, Plaintiff identified her age and her sex. Plaintiff described Martin's treatment of her as discriminatory and hostile. Plaintiff asked Grindstaff for a meeting and for review.
77. Grindstaff responded to the June 1, 2025 email. Grindstaff wrote, "I'll look into it."
78. On or about June 7, 2025, Plaintiff contacted Grindstaff again. Plaintiff relayed Martin's statement that because he is a white male he could drive business, while it would be difficult for a black male to do so.
79. Grindstaff responded by email, "I will be in touch with you shortly."
80. Neither Spacelabs nor OSI investigated Plaintiff's June 2025 complaints. Neither Spacelabs nor OSI took corrective action.
D. Constantine, June 2025
81. On or about June 17, 2025, Plaintiff and many other Spacelabs employees met with Constantine.
82. At that meeting, Plaintiff complained to Constantine about Martin's continued discrimination against her and harassment of her.
83. After that meeting, Plaintiff requested follow-up meetings with Constantine. Constantine put off those requests. No follow-up meeting took place before July 1, 2025.
VIII. KNOWLEDGE AND TIMING
84. Before July 1, 2025, Spacelabs knew of Plaintiff's complaints through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine.
85. Before July 1, 2025, OSI knew of Plaintiff's complaints through Grindstaff.
86. Stevenson received Plaintiff's April 14, 2025 request that the PIP be suspended and investigated and that Martin be disciplined. Stevenson attended the PIP presentation with Martin. Stevenson wrote that she and Martin were "here to provide support for you while you work through the PIP." Iserman, Martin's direct manager, received Plaintiff's May 16, 2025 email and the attached PIP response. Grindstaff undertook to look into Plaintiff's June 1, 2025 complaint. Constantine, Spacelabs' President, received Plaintiff's complaint on or about June 17, 2025.
87. On information and belief, Martin knew of Plaintiff's complaints of discrimination before July 1, 2025.
88. July 1, 2025 was 30 days after Plaintiff's June 1, 2025 email to Grindstaff. July 1, 2025 was about two weeks after Plaintiff's complaint to Constantine.
IX. TERMINATION
89. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment.
90. Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment as Plaintiff's manager at Spacelabs.
X. HARM
91. The termination ended the compensation and employment benefits Plaintiff received from Spacelabs.
92. Plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result of Martin's treatment of her and the termination.
XI. ADMINISTRATIVE PREREQUISITES
93. Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against Spacelabs and OSI with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The charge was dual-filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR").
94. On July 27, 2026, the EEOC issued a Determination and Notice of Rights as to Spacelabs.
95. On July 27, 2026, the EEOC issued a Determination and Notice of Rights as to OSI.
96. Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action on August 27, 2026, within 90 days after receiving the notices.
97. All conditions precedent to this action have occurred, have been performed, or have been waived.
XII. SCOPE
98. The termination is the employment action challenged in every count. The PIP, Martin's conduct, and the handling of Plaintiff's complaints are pleaded as the sequence that preceded the termination and as facts bearing on motive, notice, and knowledge.
99. This pleading asserts no separate hostile-work-environment count.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT I Discrimination Because of Sex, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a), Against Spacelabs
100. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III.A, IV, V.A, V.B, VI, IX, X, XI, and XII.
101. Spacelabs employed Plaintiff. Spacelabs is an "employer" under Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7).
102. Plaintiff is female. Martin is male.
103. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin rolled his eyes, sighed, and displayed disinterest and irritation. Martin did not do so when Plaintiff's male co-workers spoke.
104. On April 4, 2025, Martin placed Plaintiff on the PIP. The PIP's statements about Plaintiff's performance were not accurate. No employer had questioned Plaintiff's performance before Martin became her manager.
105. On July 1, 2025, Martin, acting as Plaintiff's manager at Spacelabs, terminated Plaintiff's employment.
106. Spacelabs terminated Plaintiff's employment because of her sex. Plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the termination.
107. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits and suffered emotional distress as a result.
COUNT II Discrimination Because of Age, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a), Against Spacelabs
108. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III.A, IV, V.A, V.C, VI, IX, X, XI, and XII.
109. Spacelabs employed Plaintiff. Spacelabs is an "employer" under Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7).
110. Plaintiff was 59 years old on July 1, 2025. Plaintiff was the oldest person on Martin's team. Martin is substantially younger than Plaintiff.
111. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin rolled his eyes, sighed, and displayed disinterest and irritation. Martin did not do so when Plaintiff's younger co-workers spoke.
112. On April 4, 2025, Martin placed Plaintiff on the PIP. The PIP's statements about Plaintiff's performance were not accurate. No employer had questioned Plaintiff's performance before Martin became her manager.
113. On July 1, 2025, Martin, acting as Plaintiff's manager at Spacelabs, terminated Plaintiff's employment.
114. Upon information and belief, Spacelabs filled Plaintiff's position with a substantially younger employee.
115. Spacelabs terminated Plaintiff's employment because of her age.
116. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits and suffered emotional distress as a result.
COUNT III Retaliation, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7), Against Spacelabs
117. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III.A, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII.
118. Spacelabs employed Plaintiff. Spacelabs is an "employer" under Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7).
119. In April 2025, Plaintiff told Stevenson that Martin had discriminated against her because Plaintiff was the oldest person on Martin's team and because she is a woman. On June 1, 2025, Plaintiff told Grindstaff in writing that she was "an almost 60 year old, mature female" whose manager "has displayed strong bias, discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions" toward her. On or about June 17, 2025, Plaintiff complained to Constantine about Martin's continued discrimination against her.
120. Each of those complaints opposed a practice Plaintiff believed to be discrimination because of sex or because of age.
121. Before July 1, 2025, Spacelabs knew of those complaints through Stevenson and Constantine. On information and belief, Martin knew of those complaints before July 1, 2025, as alleged in Section VIII.
122. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment. The termination came 30 days after the June 1, 2025 complaint to Grindstaff and about two weeks after the complaint to Constantine.
123. Spacelabs terminated Plaintiff's employment because Plaintiff complained of discrimination.
124. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits and suffered emotional distress as a result.
COUNT IV Discrimination Because of Sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), Against Spacelabs
125. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III.A, IV, V.A, V.B, VI, VII.A, IX, X, XI, and XII.
126. Spacelabs employed Plaintiff. Spacelabs is an "employer" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
127. Plaintiff is female. Martin is male.
128. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin rolled his eyes, sighed, and displayed disinterest and irritation. Martin did not do so when Plaintiff's male co-workers spoke.
129. On April 4, 2025, Martin placed Plaintiff on the PIP. The PIP's statements about Plaintiff's performance were not accurate. No employer had questioned Plaintiff's performance before Martin became her manager.
130. On July 1, 2025, Martin, acting as Plaintiff's manager at Spacelabs, terminated Plaintiff's employment.
131. Spacelabs terminated Plaintiff's employment because of her sex. Plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the termination.
132. In April 2025, Plaintiff told Stevenson, Spacelabs' human resources manager, that Martin had discriminated against her because she is a woman. Spacelabs did not investigate. Spacelabs kept the PIP in effect. Martin then terminated Plaintiff's employment. Spacelabs acted with malice or with reckless indifference to Plaintiff's federally protected right to be free from discrimination because of sex.
133. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits and suffered emotional distress as a result.
COUNT V Retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), Against Spacelabs
134. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III.A, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII.
135. Spacelabs employed Plaintiff. Spacelabs is an "employer" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
136. In April 2025, Plaintiff told Stevenson that Martin had discriminated against her because she is a woman. On June 1, 2025, Plaintiff told Grindstaff in writing that she was a "mature female" whose manager "has displayed strong bias, discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions" toward her. On or about June 17, 2025, Plaintiff complained to Constantine about Martin's continued discrimination against her.
137. Each of those complaints opposed a practice Plaintiff believed to be unlawful under Title VII.
138. Before July 1, 2025, Spacelabs knew of those complaints through Stevenson and Constantine. On information and belief, Martin knew of those complaints before July 1, 2025, as alleged in Section VIII.
139. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment. The termination came 30 days after the June 1, 2025 complaint to Grindstaff and about two weeks after the complaint to Constantine.
140. Spacelabs would not have terminated Plaintiff's employment on July 1, 2025 had Plaintiff not complained of discrimination.
141. Spacelabs received Plaintiff's complaints through its human resources manager and its President, did not investigate them, and then terminated Plaintiff's employment. Spacelabs acted with malice or with reckless indifference to Plaintiff's federally protected right to oppose discrimination.
142. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits and suffered emotional distress as a result.
COUNT VI Discrimination Because of Age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), Against Spacelabs
143. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III.A, IV, V.A, V.C, VI, VII.A, VII.C, IX, X, XI, and XII.
144. Spacelabs employed Plaintiff. Spacelabs is an "employer" under 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
145. Plaintiff was 59 years old on July 1, 2025. Plaintiff was within the class protected by 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). Plaintiff was the oldest person on Martin's team. Martin is substantially younger than Plaintiff.
146. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin rolled his eyes, sighed, and displayed disinterest and irritation. Martin did not do so when Plaintiff's younger co-workers spoke.
147. On April 4, 2025, Martin placed Plaintiff on the PIP. The PIP's statements about Plaintiff's performance were not accurate. No employer had questioned Plaintiff's performance before Martin became her manager.
148. On July 1, 2025, Martin, acting as Plaintiff's manager at Spacelabs, terminated Plaintiff's employment.
149. Upon information and belief, Spacelabs filled Plaintiff's position with a substantially younger employee.
150. Spacelabs would not have terminated Plaintiff's employment but for her age.
151. Before July 1, 2025, Plaintiff had told Stevenson that Martin discriminated against her because she was the oldest person on Martin's team. Plaintiff had told Grindstaff in writing that she was "an almost 60 year old, mature female" subjected to "discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions." Spacelabs did not investigate. Spacelabs knew that the ADEA prohibited terminating Plaintiff because of her age, or showed reckless disregard for whether the termination violated the ADEA.
152. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits as a result.
COUNT VII Retaliation, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), Against Spacelabs
153. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III.A, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII.
154. Spacelabs employed Plaintiff. Spacelabs is an "employer" under 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
155. In April 2025, Plaintiff told Stevenson that Martin had discriminated against her because she was the oldest person on Martin's team. On June 1, 2025, Plaintiff told Grindstaff in writing that she was "an almost 60 year old, mature female" whose manager "has displayed strong bias, discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions" toward her. On or about June 17, 2025, Plaintiff complained to Constantine about Martin's continued discrimination against her.
156. Each of those complaints opposed a practice Plaintiff believed to be unlawful under the ADEA.
157. Before July 1, 2025, Spacelabs knew of those complaints through Stevenson and Constantine. On information and belief, Martin knew of those complaints before July 1, 2025, as alleged in Section VIII.
158. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment. The termination came 30 days after the June 1, 2025 complaint to Grindstaff and about two weeks after the complaint to Constantine.
159. Spacelabs would not have terminated Plaintiff's employment on July 1, 2025 had Plaintiff not complained of age discrimination.
160. Spacelabs received Plaintiff's complaints of age discrimination through its human resources manager, did not investigate them, and then terminated Plaintiff's employment. Spacelabs knew that the ADEA prohibited terminating Plaintiff because she complained of age discrimination, or showed reckless disregard for whether the termination violated the ADEA.
161. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits as a result.
COUNT VIII Discrimination Because of Sex, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a), Against OSI
162. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III, IV, V.A, V.B, VI, IX, X, XI, and XII.
163. OSI is an "employer" under Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). With respect to Plaintiff's employment, Spacelabs and OSI operated as a single, integrated employer, as alleged in Section III.B. On that basis, Martin's termination of Plaintiff's employment was an act of OSI.
164. Plaintiff is female. Martin is male.
165. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin rolled his eyes, sighed, and displayed disinterest and irritation. Martin did not do so when Plaintiff's male co-workers spoke.
166. On April 4, 2025, Martin placed Plaintiff on the PIP. The PIP's statements about Plaintiff's performance were not accurate. No employer had questioned Plaintiff's performance before Martin became her manager.
167. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment.
168. Plaintiff's employment was terminated because of her sex. Plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the termination.
169. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits and suffered emotional distress as a result.
COUNT IX Discrimination Because of Age, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a), Against OSI
170. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III, IV, V.A, V.C, VI, IX, X, XI, and XII.
171. OSI is an "employer" under Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). With respect to Plaintiff's employment, Spacelabs and OSI operated as a single, integrated employer, as alleged in Section III.B. On that basis, Martin's termination of Plaintiff's employment was an act of OSI.
172. Plaintiff was 59 years old on July 1, 2025. Plaintiff was the oldest person on Martin's team. Martin is substantially younger than Plaintiff.
173. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin rolled his eyes, sighed, and displayed disinterest and irritation. Martin did not do so when Plaintiff's younger co-workers spoke.
174. On April 4, 2025, Martin placed Plaintiff on the PIP. The PIP's statements about Plaintiff's performance were not accurate. No employer had questioned Plaintiff's performance before Martin became her manager.
175. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment.
176. Upon information and belief, Spacelabs filled Plaintiff's position with a substantially younger employee.
177. Plaintiff's employment was terminated because of her age.
178. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits and suffered emotional distress as a result.
COUNT X Retaliation, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7), Against OSI
179. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII.
180. OSI is an "employer" under Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). With respect to Plaintiff's employment, Spacelabs and OSI operated as a single, integrated employer, as alleged in Section III.B. On that basis, Martin's termination of Plaintiff's employment was an act of OSI.
181. On June 1, 2025, Plaintiff told Grindstaff, OSI's Chief Human Resource Officer, in writing that she was "an almost 60 year old, mature female" whose manager "has displayed strong bias, discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions" toward her. In April 2025, Plaintiff told Stevenson that Martin had discriminated against her because Plaintiff was the oldest person on Martin's team and because she is a woman. On or about June 17, 2025, Plaintiff complained to Constantine about Martin's continued discrimination against her.
182. Each of those complaints opposed a practice Plaintiff believed to be discrimination because of sex or because of age.
183. Before July 1, 2025, OSI knew of the June 1, 2025 complaint through Grindstaff. Before July 1, 2025, Spacelabs knew of the April and June 17, 2025 complaints through Stevenson and Constantine. On information and belief, Martin knew of those complaints before July 1, 2025, as alleged in Section VIII.
184. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment. The termination came 30 days after the June 1, 2025 complaint to Grindstaff and about two weeks after the complaint to Constantine.
185. Plaintiff's employment was terminated because Plaintiff complained of discrimination.
186. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits and suffered emotional distress as a result.
COUNT XI Discrimination Because of Sex, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), Against OSI
187. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III, IV, V.A, V.B, VI, VII.A, VII.C, IX, X, XI, and XII.
188. OSI is an "employer" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). With respect to Plaintiff's employment, Spacelabs and OSI operated as a single, integrated employer, as alleged in Section III.B. On that basis, Martin's termination of Plaintiff's employment was an act of OSI.
189. Plaintiff is female. Martin is male.
190. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin rolled his eyes, sighed, and displayed disinterest and irritation. Martin did not do so when Plaintiff's male co-workers spoke.
191. On April 4, 2025, Martin placed Plaintiff on the PIP. The PIP's statements about Plaintiff's performance were not accurate. No employer had questioned Plaintiff's performance before Martin became her manager.
192. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment.
193. Plaintiff's employment was terminated because of her sex. Plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the termination.
194. On June 1, 2025, Grindstaff, OSI's Chief Human Resource Officer, received Plaintiff's written complaint that she was a "mature female" whose manager "has displayed strong bias, discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions" toward her. Grindstaff undertook to look into it. Neither OSI nor Spacelabs investigated. The PIP remained in effect. Martin then terminated Plaintiff's employment. OSI acted with malice or with reckless indifference to Plaintiff's federally protected right to be free from discrimination because of sex.
195. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits and suffered emotional distress as a result.
COUNT XII Retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), Against OSI
196. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII.
197. OSI is an "employer" under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). With respect to Plaintiff's employment, Spacelabs and OSI operated as a single, integrated employer, as alleged in Section III.B. On that basis, Martin's termination of Plaintiff's employment was an act of OSI.
198. On June 1, 2025, Plaintiff told Grindstaff, OSI's Chief Human Resource Officer, in writing that she was a "mature female" whose manager "has displayed strong bias, discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions" toward her. In April 2025, Plaintiff told Stevenson that Martin had discriminated against her because she is a woman. On or about June 17, 2025, Plaintiff complained to Constantine about Martin's continued discrimination against her.
199. Each of those complaints opposed a practice Plaintiff believed to be unlawful under Title VII.
200. Before July 1, 2025, OSI knew of the June 1, 2025 complaint through Grindstaff. Before July 1, 2025, Spacelabs knew of the April and June 17, 2025 complaints through Stevenson and Constantine. On information and belief, Martin knew of those complaints before July 1, 2025, as alleged in Section VIII.
201. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment. The termination came 30 days after the June 1, 2025 complaint to Grindstaff and about two weeks after the complaint to Constantine.
202. Plaintiff's employment would not have been terminated on July 1, 2025 had Plaintiff not complained of discrimination.
203. Grindstaff received Plaintiff's June 1, 2025 complaint and undertook to look into it. Neither OSI nor Spacelabs investigated. Martin then terminated Plaintiff's employment. OSI acted with malice or with reckless indifference to Plaintiff's federally protected right to oppose discrimination.
204. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits and suffered emotional distress as a result.
COUNT XIII Discrimination Because of Age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), Against OSI
205. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III, IV, V.A, V.C, VI, VII.A, VII.C, IX, X, XI, and XII.
206. OSI is an "employer" under 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). With respect to Plaintiff's employment, Spacelabs and OSI operated as a single, integrated employer, as alleged in Section III.B. On that basis, Martin's termination of Plaintiff's employment was an act of OSI.
207. Plaintiff was 59 years old on July 1, 2025. Plaintiff was within the class protected by 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). Plaintiff was the oldest person on Martin's team. Martin is substantially younger than Plaintiff.
208. When Plaintiff spoke in meetings, Martin rolled his eyes, sighed, and displayed disinterest and irritation. Martin did not do so when Plaintiff's younger co-workers spoke.
209. On April 4, 2025, Martin placed Plaintiff on the PIP. The PIP's statements about Plaintiff's performance were not accurate. No employer had questioned Plaintiff's performance before Martin became her manager.
210. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment.
211. Upon information and belief, Spacelabs filled Plaintiff's position with a substantially younger employee.
212. Plaintiff's employment would not have been terminated but for her age.
213. On June 1, 2025, Grindstaff, OSI's Chief Human Resource Officer, received Plaintiff's written complaint that she was "an almost 60 year old, mature female" subjected to "discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions." Grindstaff undertook to look into it. Neither OSI nor Spacelabs investigated. OSI knew that the ADEA prohibited terminating Plaintiff because of her age, or showed reckless disregard for whether the termination violated the ADEA.
214. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits as a result.
COUNT XIV Retaliation, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), Against OSI
215. Plaintiff incorporates Sections I, II, III, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII.
216. OSI is an "employer" under 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). With respect to Plaintiff's employment, Spacelabs and OSI operated as a single, integrated employer, as alleged in Section III.B. On that basis, Martin's termination of Plaintiff's employment was an act of OSI.
217. On June 1, 2025, Plaintiff told Grindstaff, OSI's Chief Human Resource Officer, in writing that she was "an almost 60 year old, mature female" whose manager "has displayed strong bias, discriminatory and hostile behavior/actions" toward her. In April 2025, Plaintiff told Stevenson that Martin had discriminated against her because she was the oldest person on Martin's team. On or about June 17, 2025, Plaintiff complained to Constantine about Martin's continued discrimination against her.
218. Each of those complaints opposed a practice Plaintiff believed to be unlawful under the ADEA.
219. Before July 1, 2025, OSI knew of the June 1, 2025 complaint through Grindstaff. Before July 1, 2025, Spacelabs knew of the April and June 17, 2025 complaints through Stevenson and Constantine. On information and belief, Martin knew of those complaints before July 1, 2025, as alleged in Section VIII.
220. On July 1, 2025, Martin terminated Plaintiff's employment. The termination came 30 days after the June 1, 2025 complaint to Grindstaff and about two weeks after the complaint to Constantine.
221. Plaintiff's employment would not have been terminated on July 1, 2025 had Plaintiff not complained of age discrimination.
222. Grindstaff received Plaintiff's June 1, 2025 complaint of age discrimination and undertook to look into it. Neither OSI nor Spacelabs investigated. Martin then terminated Plaintiff's employment. OSI knew that the ADEA prohibited terminating Plaintiff because she complained of age discrimination, or showed reckless disregard for whether the termination violated the ADEA.
223. Plaintiff lost compensation and employment benefits as a result.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in her favor and against Spacelabs and OSI, and award:
(a) On Counts I through XIV, back pay, including lost wages, commissions, bonuses, and the value of lost employment benefits, with prejudgment interest where authorized;
(b) On Counts I through XIV, reinstatement, or front pay and front benefits in lieu of reinstatement;
(c) On Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VIII, IX, X, XI, and XII, compensatory damages, including damages for emotional distress, as permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a and Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5);
(d) On Counts IV, V, XI, and XII, punitive damages as permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1);
(e) On Counts I, II, III, VIII, IX, and X, punitive damages as permitted by Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5);
(f) On Counts VI, VII, XIII, and XIV, for willful violations, liquidated damages in an additional amount equal to the back pay and lost benefits awarded, as permitted by 29 U.S.C. § 626(b);
(g) Reasonable attorney's fees and costs as permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (including expert fees), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), and Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5);
(h) Post-judgment interest as provided by law; and
(i) Such other relief as the Court finds just.
Plaintiff does not seek a double recovery for the same loss under more than one statute.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues so triable.
Dated: October ___, 2026.
Signature block omitted.
93 rows
Element Map and Affirmative-Defense Negation Map
ELEMENT MAP
Count I (Spacelabs) — Sex discrimination, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff | Spacelabs: ¶¶ 19–28, 101, 126. | 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1998) (post-trial; control over the adverse decision); McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment; four factors); Peppers v. Cobb County, 835 F.3d 1289, 1297–1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment; governmental entities; its governmental presumption does not govern private companies). | |
| Protected trait (sex) | ¶¶ 13, 102, 127, 164, 189. | Statutory text. | None. |
| Adverse action (termination) | ¶¶ 89–90, 105, 130, 167, 192. The PIP is pleaded as sequence and motive, not as a separately challenged action (¶ 98). | Statutory text ("to discharge"). Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) is not relied on because the PIP is not separately challenged. | |
| Facts making sex causation plausible | Facts: ¶¶ 40–43, 45–46, 48–49, 55. In count: ¶¶ 103–104, 106; 128–129, 131; 165–166, 168; 190–191, 193. Pleaded as "because of" and as a motivating factor (¶¶ 106, 131, 168, 193). | Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–14; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (motivating factor). | |
| Harm | ¶¶ 91–92, 107, 133, 169, 195. | 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). |
Count II (Spacelabs) — Age discrimination, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff; 20-employee threshold | Spacelabs: ¶¶ 19–28, 109, 144. Threshold: ¶¶ 28, 32–33. | 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: as in the sex-discrimination map. | |
| Age 40 or over | ¶¶ 14, 110, 145, 172, 207. | 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). | None. |
| Adverse action (termination) | ¶¶ 89–90, 113, 148, 175, 210. | Statutory text ("to discharge"). | |
| Facts making age the but-for cause plausible | Facts: ¶¶ 40, 50–53, 55. In count: ¶¶ 110–112, 114–115; 145–147, 149–150; 172–174, 176–177; 207–209, 211–212. But-for causation in plain words in the ADEA counts (¶¶ 150, 212). | Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (jury instruction; ADEA requires but-for causation). | |
| Harm | ¶ 91. ADEA counts: economic loss only (¶¶ 152, 214). FCRA counts: economic loss and emotional distress (¶¶ 116, 178). | 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). |
Count III (Spacelabs) — Retaliation, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff | Spacelabs: ¶¶ 118, 135, 154. | As in the discrimination maps. | |
| Protected activity (opposition) | April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46). | Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint. | |
| Materially adverse action | ¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220. | Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard. | None. |
| Employer and decisionmaker knowledge | Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86. | Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated. | |
| Causal connection | ¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221). | Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient). | None. |
| Harm | ¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only). | As in the discrimination maps. |
Count IV (Spacelabs) — Sex discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff | Spacelabs: ¶¶ 19–28, 101, 126. | 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1998) (post-trial; control over the adverse decision); McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment; four factors); Peppers v. Cobb County, 835 F.3d 1289, 1297–1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment; governmental entities; its governmental presumption does not govern private companies). | |
| Protected trait (sex) | ¶¶ 13, 102, 127, 164, 189. | Statutory text. | None. |
| Adverse action (termination) | ¶¶ 89–90, 105, 130, 167, 192. The PIP is pleaded as sequence and motive, not as a separately challenged action (¶ 98). | Statutory text ("to discharge"). Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) is not relied on because the PIP is not separately challenged. | |
| Facts making sex causation plausible | Facts: ¶¶ 40–43, 45–46, 48–49, 55. In count: ¶¶ 103–104, 106; 128–129, 131; 165–166, 168; 190–191, 193. Pleaded as "because of" and as a motivating factor (¶¶ 106, 131, 168, 193). | Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–14; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (motivating factor). | |
| Harm | ¶¶ 91–92, 107, 133, 169, 195. | 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). | |
| Malice or reckless indifference (Title VII punitive damages; Counts IV, XI) | ¶¶ 132, 194, pleaded with the basis facts: complaint to human resources, no investigation, PIP kept in effect, termination. | 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). |
Count V (Spacelabs) — Retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff | Spacelabs: ¶¶ 118, 135, 154. | As in the discrimination maps. | |
| Protected activity (opposition) | April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46). | Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint. | |
| Materially adverse action | ¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220. | Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard. | None. |
| Employer and decisionmaker knowledge | Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86. | Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated. | |
| Causal connection | ¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221). | Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient). | None. |
| Enhanced damages | Title VII malice or reckless indifference (Counts V, XII): ¶¶ 141, 203. ADEA willfulness (Counts VII, XIV): ¶¶ 160, 222. | 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). | |
| Harm | ¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only). | As in the discrimination maps. |
Count VI (Spacelabs) — Age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (ADEA)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff; 20-employee threshold | Spacelabs: ¶¶ 19–28, 109, 144. Threshold: ¶¶ 28, 32–33. | 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: as in the sex-discrimination map. | |
| Age 40 or over | ¶¶ 14, 110, 145, 172, 207. | 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). | None. |
| Adverse action (termination) | ¶¶ 89–90, 113, 148, 175, 210. | Statutory text ("to discharge"). | |
| Facts making age the but-for cause plausible | Facts: ¶¶ 40, 50–53, 55. In count: ¶¶ 110–112, 114–115; 145–147, 149–150; 172–174, 176–177; 207–209, 211–212. But-for causation in plain words in the ADEA counts (¶¶ 150, 212). | Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (jury instruction; ADEA requires but-for causation). | |
| Willfulness (ADEA liquidated damages; Counts VI, XIII) | ¶¶ 151, 213, pleaded with the basis facts. | 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) ("liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations"). | |
| Harm | ¶ 91. ADEA counts: economic loss only (¶¶ 152, 214). FCRA counts: economic loss and emotional distress (¶¶ 116, 178). | 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). |
Count VII (Spacelabs) — Retaliation, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff | Spacelabs: ¶¶ 118, 135, 154. | As in the discrimination maps. | |
| Protected activity (opposition) | April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46). | Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint. | |
| Materially adverse action | ¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220. | Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard. | None. |
| Employer and decisionmaker knowledge | Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86. | Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated. | |
| Causal connection | ¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221). | Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient). | None. |
| Enhanced damages | Title VII malice or reckless indifference (Counts V, XII): ¶¶ 141, 203. ADEA willfulness (Counts VII, XIV): ¶¶ 160, 222. | 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). | |
| Harm | ¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only). | As in the discrimination maps. |
Count VIII (OSI) — Sex discrimination, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff | OSI: ¶¶ 29–34, 163, 188. | 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1998) (post-trial; control over the adverse decision); McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment; four factors); Peppers v. Cobb County, 835 F.3d 1289, 1297–1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment; governmental entities; its governmental presumption does not govern private companies). | |
| Protected trait (sex) | ¶¶ 13, 102, 127, 164, 189. | Statutory text. | None. |
| Adverse action (termination) | ¶¶ 89–90, 105, 130, 167, 192. The PIP is pleaded as sequence and motive, not as a separately challenged action (¶ 98). | Statutory text ("to discharge"). Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) is not relied on because the PIP is not separately challenged. | |
| Facts making sex causation plausible | Facts: ¶¶ 40–43, 45–46, 48–49, 55. In count: ¶¶ 103–104, 106; 128–129, 131; 165–166, 168; 190–191, 193. Pleaded as "because of" and as a motivating factor (¶¶ 106, 131, 168, 193). | Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–14; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (motivating factor). | |
| Harm | ¶¶ 91–92, 107, 133, 169, 195. | 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). |
Count IX (OSI) — Age discrimination, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff; 20-employee threshold | OSI: ¶¶ 29–34, 171, 206. Threshold: ¶¶ 28, 32–33. | 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: as in the sex-discrimination map. | |
| Age 40 or over | ¶¶ 14, 110, 145, 172, 207. | 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). | None. |
| Adverse action (termination) | ¶¶ 89–90, 113, 148, 175, 210. | Statutory text ("to discharge"). | |
| Facts making age the but-for cause plausible | Facts: ¶¶ 40, 50–53, 55. In count: ¶¶ 110–112, 114–115; 145–147, 149–150; 172–174, 176–177; 207–209, 211–212. But-for causation in plain words in the ADEA counts (¶¶ 150, 212). | Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (jury instruction; ADEA requires but-for causation). | |
| Harm | ¶ 91. ADEA counts: economic loss only (¶¶ 152, 214). FCRA counts: economic loss and emotional distress (¶¶ 116, 178). | 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). |
Count X (OSI) — Retaliation, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff | OSI: ¶¶ 180, 197, 216. | As in the discrimination maps. | |
| Protected activity (opposition) | April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46). | Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint. | |
| Materially adverse action | ¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220. | Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard. | None. |
| Employer and decisionmaker knowledge | Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86. | Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated. | |
| Causal connection | ¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221). | Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient). | None. |
| Harm | ¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only). | As in the discrimination maps. |
Count XI (OSI) — Sex discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff | OSI: ¶¶ 29–34, 163, 188. | 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1244–45 (11th Cir. 1998) (post-trial; control over the adverse decision); McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 834 F.2d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment; four factors); Peppers v. Cobb County, 835 F.3d 1289, 1297–1301 (11th Cir. 2016) (summary judgment; governmental entities; its governmental presumption does not govern private companies). | |
| Protected trait (sex) | ¶¶ 13, 102, 127, 164, 189. | Statutory text. | None. |
| Adverse action (termination) | ¶¶ 89–90, 105, 130, 167, 192. The PIP is pleaded as sequence and motive, not as a separately challenged action (¶ 98). | Statutory text ("to discharge"). Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) is not relied on because the PIP is not separately challenged. | |
| Facts making sex causation plausible | Facts: ¶¶ 40–43, 45–46, 48–49, 55. In count: ¶¶ 103–104, 106; 128–129, 131; 165–166, 168; 190–191, 193. Pleaded as "because of" and as a motivating factor (¶¶ 106, 131, 168, 193). | Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1246; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–14; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (motivating factor). | |
| Harm | ¶¶ 91–92, 107, 133, 169, 195. | 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). | |
| Malice or reckless indifference (Title VII punitive damages; Counts IV, XI) | ¶¶ 132, 194, pleaded with the basis facts: complaint to human resources, no investigation, PIP kept in effect, termination. | 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). |
Count XII (OSI) — Retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff | OSI: ¶¶ 180, 197, 216. | As in the discrimination maps. | |
| Protected activity (opposition) | April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46). | Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint. | |
| Materially adverse action | ¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220. | Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard. | None. |
| Employer and decisionmaker knowledge | Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86. | Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated. | |
| Causal connection | ¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221). | Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient). | None. |
| Enhanced damages | Title VII malice or reckless indifference (Counts V, XII): ¶¶ 141, 203. ADEA willfulness (Counts VII, XIV): ¶¶ 160, 222. | 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). | |
| Harm | ¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only). | As in the discrimination maps. |
Count XIII (OSI) — Age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (ADEA)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff; 20-employee threshold | OSI: ¶¶ 29–34, 171, 206. Threshold: ¶¶ 28, 32–33. | 29 U.S.C. § 630(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7). OSI, single employer: as in the sex-discrimination map. | |
| Age 40 or over | ¶¶ 14, 110, 145, 172, 207. | 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). | None. |
| Adverse action (termination) | ¶¶ 89–90, 113, 148, 175, 210. | Statutory text ("to discharge"). | |
| Facts making age the but-for cause plausible | Facts: ¶¶ 40, 50–53, 55. In count: ¶¶ 110–112, 114–115; 145–147, 149–150; 172–174, 176–177; 207–209, 211–212. But-for causation in plain words in the ADEA counts (¶¶ 150, 212). | Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (jury instruction; ADEA requires but-for causation). | |
| Willfulness (ADEA liquidated damages; Counts VI, XIII) | ¶¶ 151, 213, pleaded with the basis facts. | 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) ("liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations"). | |
| Harm | ¶ 91. ADEA counts: economic loss only (¶¶ 152, 214). FCRA counts: economic loss and emotional distress (¶¶ 116, 178). | 29 U.S.C. § 626(b); Fla. Stat. § 760.11(5). |
Count XIV (OSI) — Retaliation, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (ADEA)
| Element | Paragraphs | Authority | Gap or note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employer; employed Plaintiff | OSI: ¶¶ 180, 197, 216. | As in the discrimination maps. | |
| Protected activity (opposition) | April 2025, to Stevenson: ¶ 61. June 1, 2025, to Grindstaff: ¶¶ 71–76. June 17, 2025, to Constantine: ¶¶ 81–82. In count: ¶¶ 119–120, 136–137, 155–156, 181–182, 198–199, 217–218. Pleaded as facts, not as opposition: the May 16, 2025 email (¶¶ 68–70), the June 7, 2025 report (¶¶ 78–79), and the two meetings with Martin (¶¶ 45–46). | Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7) ("opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (summary judgment; opposition requires more than a label). The pleading states the content of each complaint. | |
| Materially adverse action | ¶¶ 89–90, 122, 139, 158, 184, 201, 220. | Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (post-verdict). Termination meets any standard. | None. |
| Employer and decisionmaker knowledge | Companies: ¶¶ 84–86 (Spacelabs through Stevenson, Iserman, and Constantine; OSI through Grindstaff). In count: ¶¶ 121, 138, 157, 183, 200, 219. Martin: ¶ 87, on information and belief, with its basis at ¶ 86. | Company knowledge is pleaded as fact. Martin's knowledge is pleaded on information and belief with the basis stated. | |
| Causal connection | ¶ 88 (30 days after the Grindstaff complaint; about two weeks after the Constantine complaint); ¶¶ 45–46. In count: ¶¶ 122–123, 139–140, 158–159, 184–185, 201–202, 220–221. But-for causation in plain words in the Title VII and ADEA counts (¶¶ 140, 159, 202, 221). | Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation); Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1364 (summary judgment; temporal proximity alone must be very close; three to four months insufficient). | None. |
| Enhanced damages | Title VII malice or reckless indifference (Counts V, XII): ¶¶ 141, 203. ADEA willfulness (Counts VII, XIV): ¶¶ 160, 222. | 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). | |
| Harm | ¶¶ 91–92. In count: ¶¶ 124, 142, 186, 204 (economic loss and emotional distress); ¶¶ 161, 223 (ADEA counts, economic loss only). | As in the discrimination maps. |
AFFIRMATIVE-DEFENSE NEGATION MAP
| Anticipated defense | Counts | Facts pleaded against it | Paragraphs | Strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to exhaust: charge did not name OSI, or did not cover age or retaliation | States that the charge named Spacelabs and OSI (¶ 93), the two notices of July 27, 2026 (¶¶ 94–95), the filing of the original complaint on August 27, 2026 within 90 days (¶ 96), and conditions precedent (¶ 97). States no charge date or charge contents, because the charge was not supplied. | ¶¶ 93–97. | ||
| Untimeliness: 300-day charge period; 90-day suit period; 60-day ADEA waiting period | Pleads only the dates the record supplies. The 90-day allegation is from the original complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). | ¶¶ 94–97. | ||
| FCRA: no route to a civil action under Fla. Stat. § 760.11 | The route is not pleaded because the Florida Commission on Human Relations record was not supplied. | ¶ 97 (general). | ||
| OSI was not Plaintiff's employer | Pleads 100 percent ownership and the Grindstaff events, and states the single-employer theory once with those facts (¶ 34). Those facts do not by themselves answer the control argument in Doc. 12. | ¶¶ 29–34; 163, 171, 180, 188, 197, 206, 216. | ||
| Numerosity (15 or 20 employees) | Pleaded at the ADEA threshold, without calendar-year detail. Fla. Stat. § 760.02(7); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). | ¶¶ 27–28, 32–33. | ||
| Legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (performance) | Pleads that no employer questioned Plaintiff's performance before Martin; that Martin's criticism followed Plaintiff's objections each time; that the PIP's statements were not accurate; that Plaintiff asked for an investigation of the "erroneous information"; and that Spacelabs did not investigate. | ¶¶ 40, 45–46, 55, 63–67, 69. | ||
| Same-actor inference | Not pleaded. No source identifies who hired Plaintiff. | None. | ||
| Arbitration | Nothing pleaded concedes an agreement. | None. | ||
| Statute of limitations, beyond exhaustion | No limitations facts are pleaded, by design. | None. |